标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [打印本页] 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:37 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用
INFANTRY OPERATIONS AND WEAPONS USAGE IN KOREA
Winter of 1950-1951
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The Johns Hopkins University
Chevy Chase, Maryland
作者：S. L. A. Marshall准将
因译者水平有限，错误之处在所难免，将原文附于下方以供参照，请各位网友不吝赐教
进攻中的中共军队
当描述敌人在这个国家开展的军事行动时，人们滥用了“人海战术”一词。新闻报道曾给人一种印象：中国人以极度密集的大量兵力发动进攻。某些官方文件也曾过于随意地用过这个词，因此就加深了人们的这样一种误解，即在我军各种武器火力笼罩下的敌军目标，正如“人海战术”一词所形容的那样，是个密集而又宽大从而有利于我方火力大量杀伤敌军的那样一种目标。曾有过这种性质的目标。例如，二月初中共军队进攻第23步兵团在砥平里的阵地时，以密集队形向前推进，在狭小区域内被大批地扫倒。
但这样高的兵力密度是例外。二战中红军在乌克兰战役对付德国人时，连续使用过以人海吸收并最终中和敌军火力，中国人集中兵力时并不是这样。更确切的说，中国人在接敌的最后阶段从纵队展开后，往往以多层细散兵线接近我们的工事，彼此间有相当的间隔。接敌纵队可能为一列宽，甚至为以4列纵队接敌的团级兵力，这取决于形势和攻击部队的规模。
地面状况的复杂情况也增加了我军火力集中捕捉敌军目标的困难，因为在各种复杂的地面状况下，敌军的进攻队形被自然的分散了，这就加大了我军火力集中一处而大量杀伤敌军的难度。山岭从来不是平直的，经常有突出部、裸岩、洼地、细沟。结果，即使攻击队列行进速度一致，也没有哪种防御武器有杀伤任何大量敌人的清晰的射程。当敌人进入各种武器的反击火力射程之内，渐渐向阵地推近时，依然不会过分簇集。
在防御时，中共军队有效利用了地被植物，避免使用长的壕沟和密集队形，经常通过自身部署使我们的各种火力极少有大规模杀死他们的机会。主要战果是通过系统地使用合成火力取得的，没有哪一种或哪一类武器（迫击炮、火炮或轻武器）在实施决定性射击的过程中起主导作用。
CCF IN ATTACK
The word “mass” has been used quite loosely in descriptions of enemy operations circulated in this country. Press accounts have given the impression that the Chinese attack in great numbers closely concentrated. Some official documents have also used the term rather indiscriminately, thus furthering the belief that broad targets are frequently presented to all weapons. There have been some targets of this character. For example, in the assault against 23rd Infantry Regiment positions in Chipyong-ni in early February, CCF pressed forward in fairly solid ranks, and were cut down in large numbers within small areas.
But intense concentrations are the exception. The Chinese do not characteristically employ mass, for example, in the way that the Red Army used it against the Germans in operations in the Ukraine during World War II, coming on in such numbers that the human sea absorbed and ultimately smothered the fire volume. Rather, in the attack, CCF tend to move against our works in multiple, thin lines, well spaced each from the other, after having deployed out of column in the last phase of the approach.The approach column may be single file, or even a regiment moving four abreast, depending on the situation and the size of the attack force.
The nature of the ground also compounds the fire problem, since it induces greater dispersion. The ridges are not evenly bottomed or sided. There are frequent bulges, outcroppings, draws, and small ravines. In consequence, even when the attacking line advances quite uniformly, no defending weapon is likely to have a clear field of fire against any significant number of the enemy. When brought in check by the counterfire of various weapons, the enemy gradually presses forward against the position, but still does not tend to bunch excessively.
On defense, CCF make efficient employment of ground cover, eschew use of long intrenchments and tight formations, and in general so dispose themselves that our fires, in any type, rarely have a large killing opportunity. The chief effects are therefore achieved through the systematic employment of fires in combination, with no one weapon or group of weapons (such as mortars, artillery, or small arms) predominating in the delivery of decisive fire. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:38 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 机枪
用法
由于朝鲜特殊的地形，使得我们在那里操作机枪的方式与常规以及教科书的规定大相径庭。
在防御的时候，机枪通常并不从两翼组成交叉火力，而是常常置于敌军的直接正面，从而对敌军最有可能的突破口进行直接的火力封锁和压制。一般情况下，那些利用山脊的高低起伏而建起的山头阵地，并不完全依赖机枪的保护。尽管有利的地形使我们的机枪在阵地上的作用变小了，但是当需要阻断一个在相当狭窄的扇形区域的敌军进攻时，通常还是机枪的作用大。有时候，机枪设置在与防线成直角的山梁和褶皱处，以这种方式他们的火力可以投射到任何径直闯进阵地的人身上。他们更频繁地布置在能以火力覆盖有利于敌人攀登的褶皱和斜坡的地方。在朝鲜很少遇到良好的机枪射界。
地形限制使这种武器失去了正常的战术效能和压制能力，而且消耗比迫击炮、勃朗宁轻机枪和步枪更大的弹药量。即使所有机枪操作状态良好，但单凭机枪火力不足以粉碎敌人的进攻，保障阵地安全。
中共军队主要以机枪火力为基础发扬战斗力，他们采用以下两种方式：（1）在防御时，将机枪配置在坚强的防御工事后方的掩体内；(2)在进攻时将机枪前出到尽可能靠近前沿的地方，尽管不可避免地要付出暴露目标的代价。
我方很少以这种方式使用机枪。
MACHINE GUNS
THEIR USE
The pattern of machine-gun operation in Korea is highly unconventional and contrary to the book, but the ground permits of nothing else.
In defense, the gun is most frequently used to block the more likely avenues of approach; its fire is directed straight ahead instead of from flankward across the front.The average hilltop position, by reason of elevation and the unevenness of the ridge crust, does not lend itself to over-all protection by machine guns. They do their bit, but usually they are set to traverse over a relatively narrow sector of the perimeter.
Occasionally, as the ground and situation permit, the guns are set up on a nose or fold in the ridge running at right angles to the defending line, in such a way that their fire will take in flank any body moving directly into the position. More frequently they are disposed in such a way as to cover the main draws or the slope which looks most favorable to ascent by the enemy. Good fields of fire for the machine gun are rarely met with in Korea.
This limiting factor in the terrain deprives the weapon of its normal tactical power and persuasion, and throws an extra load of work on the mortars, the BARS, and the riflemen.Even though all guns remain in operation, machine-gun fire alone is never enough to break up enemy attack and give security to the position.
The CCF develop their fighting power largely around a base of machine-gun fire by (1) bunkering the guns behind heavily resistant works when on defense, and (2) advancing the guns well to the fore in the attack, despite the entailed exposure.
Our guns are seldom employed in this manner.
进攻中，我军士兵携带的机枪通常并不向前推进到前沿，而更经常地被布置在具有合理掩蔽条件的地点以提供半压制性的火力尽管如此，我军仍在敌军火力下损失了相当比率的机枪。在防御时，机枪经常在上方敞开的情况下作战，通常只有薄弱的防护，比如土堆或不牢固的岩石垒成的胸墙。我军要比中共军队进行更多的机动，阵地位置变换极为频繁。很少有时间为机枪提供保护措施。我军的攻势往往在黄昏时分趋弱，到天黑时机枪必须要准备好从新阵地上进行射击。
这些机枪操作方式上的一般差异，并不能确切反映出双方使用效率的高低，或是反映了在机枪技术发展方面的出现了某种空白。更准确的说，那些差异和技术空白直接源自交战双方所采用的战术手段的不同，而关键在于机枪只是整个火力体系中的一部分。
In the attack our man-handled machine guns are not ordinarily pressed far to the fore but are more likely to be used to provide a semi-covering fire from whatever ground will provide them reasonably good protection. Even so, we lose a high percentage of machine guns to enemy fire.
On defense, the gun is usually fought in the open and is seldom given better than superficial protection - such as an earth bank or a rude parapet of loose rock.We maneuver more than CCF; changes in position are most frequent. There is rarely time to provide the gun with a protected siting. Our own attack is likely to wear along until late afternoon; the guns must be ready to fire by dark from the new defensive position.
These general differences in operating method do not accurately reflect relative efficiency, or lack thereof, in the development of machine-gun technique. Rather, they arise from the fact that the two sides are employing two greatly differing tactical methods, in which emphasis on the machine gun is only part of the over-all fire equation.
中共军队的行动是以单一的火力手段为特色的，这种单一的火力手段完全以机枪为中心，围绕机枪的效用，将机枪的作用发挥到极至。而之所以可以这么做，其中一个重要因素是中共军队具有足可消耗的人力。中共军队中的重机枪组成员总是能够忠于职守，最后一个撤退，因此就使他的机枪发挥了更大的作用（当然，这种做法是要冒着被歼灭的风险的）。
而在我军的行动则发展出多元性的火力使用特点——比其他军队中发展出更多的特点。因为有多种可以选择的武器系统，机枪的使用并不十分重要。我们现在习惯认为机枪的使用就意味着广泛和良好的火力带。不过在朝鲜，这种情况比较少见。偶尔，时机合适，机枪也能够发挥在较大距离中充分发挥作用。不过，当战斗到关键时刻，这个优势距离会被前沿的缩短迅速打破。此时，步枪和勃朗宁轻机枪在300码以下的范围内就发挥了更大的杀伤效能。
中共军队使用机枪的有效距离是30到500码。进攻中，如果需要前沿火力压制，他们可以尽可能的使机枪伴随步枪和半自动步枪。并且在白天的就地防御中，如果他们能够得到较好掩护前沿，他们有时就会把机枪阵地设在步枪线前面。
他们的远距离射击缺乏准头，我们的重机枪则能很正常地射击，相比之下，他们在极短距离内对这种武器鲁莽而有效的使用则威胁较大。只有在极少数的情况下中共军队才会在500码的距离上使用机枪。当他们试图延长射程，也就是说加上200码，我们的部队就会毫不犹豫的开火，并且忽视他的存在。这通常是正确的，大群的步兵或者一个车队通常是一个相当合适的目标。根据教科书，重机枪在中等距离是相当精确的阻止武器。可根据我军在冬季战役中的经验，这并不是一个好方法。有大量战例记录显示，在几个小时的战斗中，2到3挺敌人机枪在600到700码距离上打击一个有限目标，取得的效果非常差。所有的参战条件都表明在火力范围超过500到650码这个范围，杀伤效率更多的依靠人眼所能看到的而不是机枪所能做到的。
CCF operations are characterized by simplicity of fire means, centering around maximum use of the machine gun. The expendability of this force’s human material is one of the enabling factors toward this end. When Chinese MG crews can be committed repeatedly to situations permitting no escape, the weapon ipso facto is given a chance to score heavily prior to liquidation.
Our operations develop around multiplicity of fire means - an evolution more marked in our Army than in any other. The effects of the gun are less decisive simply because of the existence of so many complementary weapons. We habitually think of machine-gun usage in connection with expansive and favorable fields of fire. In Korea these are generally lacking. There are some occasions when the gun is useful at the longer ranges for relatively brief periods. But in the crises of action, the preponderant portion of its fire almost invariably is directed against the immediate foreground. As with the rifle and the BAR, its killing effects for the most part are achieved at ranges under 300 yards.
The CCF employ the machine gun effectively at ranges running between 30 and 500 yards. In the attack, when there is suitable cover in the foreground, they will get in as close with their machine guns as with rifles and sub-machine guns, and in local counter-attacks during daylight, if they are advantaged by a thicket or brush-covered salient, they will sometimes run the machine gun out as a point beyond the rifle line.
Their reckless and effective use of the weapon at extreme short ranges, however, is less instructive than what their gunnery appears to lack over distances which we have always considered quite normal for the HMG. It is only in the exceptional tactical circumstance that CCF employ the machine gun successfully against our infantry at 500 yards range. When they attempt to engage with the gun at ranges longer than that, say adding another 200 yards to the distance, our troops are relatively unsusceptible to the fire and pay it little heed. That holds generally true even when the fire is delivered broadside against a body of infantry (or a column of vehicles) offering a fairly substantial target. According to the book, the HMG should be an accurate stopping weapon at these intermediate ranges. Insofar as the general experience of our own line during the winter campaign sheds light on this subject, it does not work out in practice. There are numerous examples in the record of engagements wherein two or three enemy guns, firing from 600-700 yards distance against one limited target area, failed to bear effectively during several hours of fighting. All of the attendant circumstances appeared to indicate that when fires are exchanged at ranges in excess of somewhere between 550 and 650 yards, the rate of effectiveness is less dependent on what the gun can do than on what the human eye can see.
他们对机枪的使用最为持久稳定。有保养机枪和在任何天气情况下操作的诀窍。他们的火力在较短距离内十分精确。最大限度的使用火力掩护部队插入而不是浪费大量子弹去扫射地面。通过这些很基本的技术，他们取得了巨大的战果。机枪作为他们的进攻的支点表现出色。
一般情况下，如果和我们携带的其他步兵武器，即7.62毫米通用口径武器族的使用效果相比，在朝鲜的战斗中，我们机枪火力所发挥的影响力似乎逊于以往的那支现代化美军中所使用的机枪火力。距离有限，使机枪不能发挥防御点和在交火中阻止敌人进攻的关键作用。怎么会这样？很难解释，因为步兵连队里的搬运工们过去从来也没有抱怨过轻机枪是个特别沉重累赘的东西。枪不是特别重，机枪手们不会掉队。曾经有过部队扛着机枪径直向敌人阵地冲锋的事例。但是一般情况下机枪却做不到根据战术形势变化而机动部署。这可能真的是出於我们多种武器系统里面天生的惰性吧：武器多了，其战术效果就是加进一种新的兵器，导致其他所有兵器的相对机动性就下降。
在朝鲜的机枪使用，特别是在我们的进攻中，上述这种情况似乎出现的相当普遍，尽管普通勃朗宁轻机枪手的灵活性和显著的积极性提供了反例。
Their use of machine guns is most persistent. They have the knack of keeping their guns fed and operating under any weather conditions. Their fire is accurate at the short distances. They make maximum use of grazing fire, with the object of keeping troops inert, rather than wasting an excess of bullets by shooting into the dirt embankments. Out of these rather elementary techniques, they achieve large effects. The gun is pretty much the pivot of their attack.
In general, the impact of our own machine-gun fire upon the local situation in the Korean fighting, when considered in relation to the effects of other weapons carried by the infantry (this refers to the .30 fire), would seem to be somewhat less than in past performances by modern American forces. The instances are few indeed in which the operation of the machine guns appears to be the decisive factor in retaining a position, or in depressing the counterfire which is deterring the attack. Why this is so becomes difficult to evaluate, since the LMG is almost never mentioned among the overburdening items in the company load by the load carriers. The weight of the gun is not prohibitive; the gunners do not straggle. There are instances in the record where it was carried by troops directly charging the enemy position. But the average employment of the gun is not mobile in respect to local changes in the tactical situation. This may well be the consequence of an inertia inherent in our multiple weapons system: is it not within reason that one of the tactical effects of weapons multiplication is that the addition of each new weapon tends to lower the relative local mobility of every other weapon?
The employment of machine guns in Korea, particularly by our attack, would seem to call for exploration of the question, though the phenomenal enterprise and mobility of the average BAR carrier is evidence to the contrary. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:41 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 勃朗宁轻机枪
中流砥柱
在朝鲜一般的步兵战斗中，勃朗宁轻机枪甚至比机枪更多地用来构建火力支撑点，其他步兵武器可在它周围展开行动，部队一致表达了这种看法。对勃朗宁机枪所发挥作用的充分肯定不仅仅来自对连级规模战斗的书面分析报告，将士们同样也有他们自己的评价。他们坦言，勃朗宁机枪是他们行动的主发条，无论是它的移动还是射击，只要有它出现，就会给步兵队伍带来新的活力。
第八集团军上上下下对勃朗宁轻机枪的赞赏重新肯定了二战欧洲、太平洋战场中使用同一种武器的经验。使这种反映更值得注意的是勃朗宁轻机枪在朝鲜的行动中比在二战中故障率明显要高，原因稍后解释。即使这样，普通步兵对这种自动步枪的信任也丝毫未减。它仍被认为是“不可缺少的”，士兵们一听到它最终将被别的某种武器取代就不寒而栗。他们不敢想象：没了它该怎么办。
勃朗宁轻机枪之所以被看作是战斗中的中流砥柱，就是因为朝鲜复杂多变的地形状况极大的妨碍了重机枪发挥作用。中共士兵是出色的机枪手，他们使用这种武器比其它武器都要老练。他们的射击持久稳定；虽然他们的机枪型号五花八门，但他们有保养机枪的诀窍；在进攻时，他们携带机枪到非常靠前的地方；此外，由于他们很善于将自己隐蔽在灌木丛和岩壁后面，因此在他们接近目标时仍难以被发现。报告中有很多中共军队的机枪在30—40码的射程内压制我方阵地时仍保持隐蔽的例子。要用我们自己的机枪反击这种火力，通常就需要带着它们到很靠前的地方，在搬运过程中和放置后不久就会发生机枪组人员的意外死亡。我们的机枪组在移动和放置机枪的过程中太容易暴露了。勃朗宁轻机枪是小得多的目标，而且它的单人操作者兼具勇敢和必要的隐蔽性，因此是我军主要的反击手段。
THE BAR
THE MAINSTAY
Under the conditions of the average infantry fight in Korea, the BAR, even more than the machine gun, provides the fire base around which the action of other infantry weapons builds up and the force expresses itself unitedly.
It is not alone the case that analysis of company operations warrants this appreciation of the weapon; the men also make this estimate of its effectiveness; they state frankly that it is the mainspring of their action, and that wherever the BAR moves and fires, it gives fresh impulse to the rifle line.
Appreciation of the BAR within Eighth Army therefore reaffirms experience with the same weapon in World War II operations both in the Pacific and in Europe.What makes this reaction all the more noteworthy is that there has been a markedly higher incidence of failure by the BAR in Korean operations than in World War II jighting,for reasons which will be explained later. Even so, there is no diminishing of general infantry confidence in the effectiveness of the automatic rifle. It is still considered “indispensable” and troops shudder at any suggestion that it might ultimately be replaced by some other weapon. They cannot imagine having to get along without it.
The reason that the BAR is rated as the mainstay of the fire base is because of the greatly modifying influence of the Korean terrain upon the utility of the machine gun. The CCF are good machine gunners; they are more expert in their employment of this weapon than in all else; they are persistent; their guns are of every type under the sun; even so, they have the knack of keeping them going; in the attack, they bring the gun in very close; but they are good at concealment behind brush, thicket, and rock ledge, and therefore the close-in target remains very elusive. The record contains many examples of CCF machine guns bearing on our positions at 30-40 yards range and continuing unseen. To counter this fire with one of our own machine guns usually necessitates bringing it far forward, with consequent sudden death, either in transit or soon after placement. Our MG crews are far more obvious in moving and in setting up. The BAR, which is a lesser target and usually has as its operator an individual who combines boldness with a requisite stealth, is therefore the main counteragent.
由于迫击炮的射程过远，而手榴弹的投掷距离又很有限，因此勃朗宁轻机枪的火力也就成了对付狙击手冷枪的最有效火力。如果一名勃朗宁轻机枪手表现正常的话，对付在局部出现的某一狙击手，他的射击火力会比五六支步枪所形成的散乱火力有更强的压制效果。
勃朗宁轻机枪手通常是节约弹药的模范。他们不会神经过敏、乱扣扳机，只有局势真正需要的时候他们才打连发。可能你会觉得这事难以琢磨，但勃朗宁轻机枪在朝鲜的表现一向是最为卓越的，这一点也是有案可查的。
在防御时，机枪通常被用来覆盖对面的平缓山地或其他对敌人实现其战术意图有利的通道。因为，当敌人展开进攻时，即使最初他们没有利用那一有利地形，但来自那片区域的威胁（敌军的进攻）差不多是经常性的，所以，对机枪的使用也就基本固定在那里了。
不过，在敌人的进攻面前，我们的防御也不是静止不变的。随着敌军的进攻给我们防线造成的压力的改变，我们会相应的对防线进行收缩和伸展；而为了对付来自一个新的进攻点的威胁，我们也会对人员和装备进行相应的调整和调动。
在这种战斗形势瞬息万变的惊涛骇浪之中，勃朗宁轻机枪是起到定海神针作用的关键武器。一旦步兵防线在一点被压弯，勃朗宁轻机枪就会被派往那里稳固局势。如果负责正面拦阻的机枪受到敌人通过射击盲区对它进行翼侧合围的威胁，勃朗宁轻机枪的火力常常能封闭机枪的火力死角，拯救机枪组于危难之中。在扫荡敌人的时候，勃朗宁轻机枪是压制散兵坑的主要武器。在防御中需要建立坚强的前哨阵地时，勃朗宁轻机枪也当仁不让。
BAR fire is also the chief depressant of sniper fire delivered from ranges which are too close in for the mortars and too far out for the grenade. One man with a BAR, if he is the right man, will have a stronger neutralizing effect upon a local sniper-infested area than the random fire of five or six riflemen. Almost invariably, BAR men are exemplary in their conservation of ammunition. They do not have nervous fingers; they sustain fire only when the situation truly demands it. Why this is so is something of a mystery; it is recorded here as fact because the BAR record in Korea is one of consistently strong performance by the operators.
On defense, the machine gun will usually be sited to cover a draw, the gentlest hill facing, or some other avenue of approach which seems particularly favorable to the enemy purpose. Because, as the attack develops, the threat from that quarter will continue more or less constant, even though the enemy does not initially take advantage of it, the employment of the machine gun is more or less rigid.
But under attack, the defensive dispositions seldom remain static; the lines contract and expand as the pressure changes; men and weapons are shifted as an excess of danger threatens from a new point. The BAR is the pivotal weapon in this eddying of the tactical situation. Should the rifle line begin to bend at one point, the BARS are sent there to stabilize it. If the machine gun, stopping the enemy frontally, is threatened by flankers circling toward it over dead ground, BAR fire is used to cover the corners and save the gun. During the mop-up, it is the main weapon for neutralizing foxholes; when, on defense, strong out-posting is required, the BAR is also given that assignment.
增加数量
在朝鲜的绝大部分步兵和指挥官认为，如果给步兵连配发双倍的勃朗宁轻机枪，同时相应减少M1装备步枪的士兵，那么它的战斗力将大大增强。这么做并不会给该联队的负载增加令人苦恼的负担。做出这种改变的最后一个理由是它会使这个步兵连的攻防力量更加平衡。
AUGMENTATION
In the view of the great majority of infantry troops and commanders in Korea, the fighting strength of the infantry company would be greatly increased by doubling the number of BARS, while reducing the number of Ml carriers proportionately.This could be done without adding an upsetting burden to the company load. The final argument for the change is that it would make more perfect the balancing of offensive-defensive strength within the infantry company. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:42 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 步枪
老伙计
在朝鲜的战斗中，步枪兵（包括装备卡宾枪的士兵）参与积极射击的比例明显要高于二战中的军事行动。
人们能察觉这一点但无法进行精确地计算，因此很难以精确的百分率表示这个增长。然而，根据调查所涉及的昼间和夜间军事行动的平均状况，研究人员认为无论敌人使用哪种武器，超过50%的部队都能够在交火时坚守阵地。
在朝鲜的军事行动中，手榴弹往往是初上战场的新兵的首选。然而，根据观察，一条几乎不变的法则再次得到验证：一旦我军士兵开始使用某种武器打击敌军士兵，他就会一直用下去，后来他就会积极主动地使用这种他擅长的火器。在朝鲜的昼间进攻中，部队经常以很窄的正面前进。因为山岭的棱线上缺少活动空间，所以连队以纵深队形行进。由于队列本身的限制，让所有人都毫无阻碍的使用手中的武器是不可能的。在某连中只有两三个班或许还有同等数量的重武器，能够进入阻止敌军进攻、控制战场的关键阵地。地形本身就减少了积极使用武器的人数，除非让各班轮流进入和撤出前沿阵地。
此外，向可从正面进攻的较低的小山岭突击时，步兵在登上山顶后通常立即靠拢，与他们随身携带武器的微弱火力相比，攀登中的士兵更需要火炮、坦克、多用途战车、迫击炮的弹幕射击把敌人赶下山去。在这种行动中，步兵很少实施行进间射击。在一般情形，这种射击打不中任何目标，因为在到达军事棱线前山坡的突出部会干扰交战双方的射击，它也从来没有牵制住敌人。当散兵线看到某个像目标的东西时都会停下来射击。但在这种行动中，步枪的用处不大，反之，手榴弹却可以大显身手。
THE RIFLE
THE OLD STANDBY
In the Korean fighting, there is manifestly a higher percentage of active fire participation by riflemen (including those armed with the carbine) than in operations during World War II.
This can be felt, rather than accurately counted, and therefore it is difficult to arrive at an accurate percentage figure indicative of the increase. However, averaging out the night and day operations which were covered in the survey, it is considered that well in excess of 50 percent of troops actually committed to ground where fire may be exchanged directly with the enemy will make use of one weapon or another in the course of an engagement.
The pattern of Korean operations is such that the hand grenade is frequently the first weapon employed by the novice in combat. But again it is observed as an almost invariable rule that once the individual uses any weapon against enemy personnel, he will go on then to become in future engagements relatively a self-starter with his personal firearm. In the daylight attack in Korea, troops frequently advance with an extremely narrow front, the company going forward in depth because of the lack of space for deployment in the movement along the ridge crest. This cramping of the formation by its nature often makes it impossible for all hands to use their weapons freely. Of a given company, only two or three squads, and perhaps the same number of heavy weapons, may be able to take position where they can bear against the enemy-held ground. In such instances, the terrain itself reduces the number who participate actively with weapons, except as squads are rotated in and out of the forward positions.
Again, in the assault upon the lower sub-ridges, which can be attacked frontally, the foot force is likely to close as rapidly as it can toil uphill, with the climbing men depending more upon the barrage fires of the artillery, armor, multiple mounts, and mortars to beat the enemy down than upon the relatively feeble power of their hand-carried weapons. In this type of action, marching fire is rarely given effective use by the infantry. In the average situation, it would serve no object, since the bulge of the hillside intervenes between the two forces until the military crest is reached, and the fire would not even serve to keep the enemy pinned. The rifle line will halt and fire when it sees anything resembling a target. But in this type of action, there is likely to be small practical use for the rifle, whereas the grenade may prove very handy.
夜间防御提供了证明M1加兰德步枪火力的最佳机会。是否能够在短时间内大规模发扬M1步枪的火力首先取决于识别目标的距离。如果敌军在我方开火前抵近并在交战的第一阶段出现双方互掷手榴弹的局面，那么即使防线位于高地、袭来的手榴弹威力不大，也不利于发扬步枪火力。对我方火力组遭受敌军投弹手的近距离压制的战斗的研究表明上述规律几乎无一例外出现在这些战斗中。在防御的第一阶段大量使用手榴弹抑制了其它或许是更有用的防御火力的使用。士兵们并不乐意从手榴弹换用步枪并在急需应对敌人的行动时又换回手榴弹。稳定的步枪战斗通常等到手榴弹互掷到了尾声才开始。在近战防御中，在使用双人散兵坑的场合，在同时需要手榴弹和子弹火力的情形，完全可以通过指定一人为专职投弹手、另一人为专职射手的办法建立有效的步枪火力。在三人或四人火力组中，一人应以投弹为主要任务。留意一下二战时的术语吧，他应该被叫做这个组的“爆破手”。
当敌人的进攻被阻止在自动武器能首先与之交战的射程之内时，它们的火力将会使步枪防线明显活跃起来，对M1步枪和卡宾枪的全面使用将持续到战斗终止。关于步枪的射击量，应当再次指出这与不同形式下的战术变化所造成的阵地战和运动战间的比率有直接关系。至于在步枪防线中的叫喊和欢呼，这是稳定的射击的结果，每个士兵都从中受益，叫喊和欢呼激发他的判断力，使他更加活跃，努力寻找最有效的开火位置。所有对夜战的研究的结论是：开火最激烈的部队会根据形势变化做出最迅速使用的战术调整，不给敌人喘息的机会。
The night engagement on defense provides the most favorable opportunity for Ml fire. Whether it can be developed quickly in considerable volume depends primarily on the distance at which recognition takes place. If the enemy gets in close before firing starts and the initial phase sees the two sides engage in a heavy exchange of hand grenades, the rifle firing is apt to develop raggedly, even though the defending line is on higher ground and the incoming grenades are doing little damage. The study of actions in which our firing groups are closely pressed by enemy grenadiers shows almost no exception to this. Heavy use of grenades in the first stage of defense tends toward the repression of other, and perhaps more useful, fires by the defense. Men do not shift readily from the grenade to the rifle and back again as enemy movement might seem to require. Steady rifle action will usually await the dying-away of the grenade exchange. In close defense, where the two-man foxhole system is used, it could conceivably build up the effectiveness of infantry fire as a whole to designate one man primarily as thrower and the other as firer, in any situation which calls for both grenade and bullet fire. Out of a three-man or four-man fire team, one man should be encharged with the main duty of grenading. To advert to World War I terminology, he should be the “bomber” of the team.
When the enemy in the attack is intercepted at such range that the automatic weapons can first engage him, their fire is highly stimulating to the rifle line, and general use of the Ml and carbine (provided the ammunition holds) is likely to persist until the action is concluded. In connection with rifle fire volume, again it should be noted that there is a direct relationship between the rate of buildup and mobile response to the tactical changes in situation. As with shouting and cheering along the rifle line, there is something about steady fire production, and participation therein by the individual, which enlivens his senses and makes him move about more, in the endeavor to see where the fire would be most useful. The entire study of night actions is conclusive to this end: the unit which engages strongly with fire will also make the most rapid and practical adjustment to the changes in situation and will leave the fewest openings to the enemy.
从十一月到次年三月的朝鲜战事中，实际上很少有部队（即使是排级兵力）在身体上被中共军队的进攻压垮。总的来说，我军步兵坚守阵地直至打光大多数武器的弹药；随后士兵们尽可能向后方阵地撤退。他们并未屈服于逃跑的欲望，那些幸存者是以相当良好的秩序撤退的。只有极少的战例中我军防线未进行强烈抵抗就被撕碎，这是因为散兵坑中的士兵遭遇了迅速的奇袭，当敌军在他们周围25至30码距离内开火才收到警报，他们“感觉被压得抬不起头来，无法射击”，由于缺少火力保护，阵地陷落了。
但是在我军更多的战例中，尽管一开始面临同样严重的不利局势，士兵们仍然保持信心并用M1步枪开火，因而成功守住了阵地。只要实施坚决的指挥，大声下达命令，无论离敌军多近士兵们都会作出反应。但如果当士兵们遭受猛烈奇袭的打击时，把他们丢给自己的装备任其自生自灭，那么他们就会无所作为，或者软弱无力地试图用手榴弹阻击敌军。报告中有一些关于这种差别的非常令人吃惊的战例。
In Korean operations from November to March, there were relatively few examples of units - even of platoon strength - being actually physically “overrun” by the CCF attack. Generally, our infantry stood its ground and fought until most of the weapons ran dry; the men then withdrew as best they could to positions farther back. They did not yield to the desire for flight; they went back in reasonably good order - those who survived. But in the rare cases in which the line was cracked apart without giving a strong account of itself, it was because the men in the foxholes were taken by swift surprise, getting their first warning as fire broke around them from 25 to 30 yards range. They “felt that they could not get their heads up to fire”; for lack of fire, the position fell.
But there were just as many more case studies in which our troops, taken initially at this same heavy disadvantage, still rallied and opened fire with their Mls and thereafter managed to hold the position. When strong direction was given, and commands were shouted, the men responded, no matter how close the enemy. But when they were left to their own devices, under the shock of dramatic surprise, they either did nothing or made feeble attempts to grenade the enemy to a halt. The record provides some very startling examples of this difference.
我军再次吸取了这个教训：即使近距离冲锋中的敌人也能被子弹火力阻止住，尽管他只要在运动中手榴弹就可能起不了多大作用。敌人的队伍退下去以后，可以把手榴弹滚下山或者直接扔向他的队列，那是一种完全不同的情形。但在近距离战斗中，手榴弹和子弹的合成火力依然比单独使用其中一种更为有效。
因为新兵在夜战中经常胡乱开枪，在战后总结里，就算特别注意细节，也不可能说出每个人使用武器的情况，甚至不可能了解谁积极参战了。那些检查武器和个人弹药供给之类事物的下级军官也不可能彻底搞清楚这个问题。在紧张的夜战造成的混乱中，有相当数量的人错拿了别人的武器；此外，下级军官也不可能总是在黑暗中检查是否每个士兵都发挥了积极作用。因此，关于个人行为的数据并非总是能够获取并加以证实的，必须认识到这一点：某些参战者阵亡或失踪了，所有的目击者都受到震动，他们提供的情报无论如何都会有相当大的误差。
然而，通过战后回溯战斗发生时的各个事件，加上点数士兵谁在战斗中使用了武器和谁积极参战，综合起来看，可以得出以下合理的估计：
在朝鲜，一个普通步兵连中有12%——20%的人员不但积极参与射击，而且还程度不同的主动在关键岗位上发挥领导作用，同时也从事了改善阵地形势、增加凝聚力的个人活动。
除了这支关键性力量，还有大约25%——35%的人员也不同程度地参与了整个射击行动，但并没有发挥出对战斗过程的标志性影响。
The lesson is again drawn that a charging enemy, even at close range, can be stopped by bullet fire, though the grenade is not likely to avail as long as he is in motion. After his line has gone down, and grenades can be rolled downhill or thrown against his line, that is a quite different situation. But in short range action, combining grenade and bullet fire is still more effective than either weapon used separately.
Because of the high incidence of panic firing among the unseasoned men during night defense, it was not possible in the Korean critiques, even when full attention was given to detail, to determine the total circumstances in which each man used his weapon, or even to be sure that he had been an active firer. That could not be finally ascertained even by those junior leaders who made a check of weapons and personal ammunition supply following engagement. There is considerable weapons-switching in the confusions of a strenuous night engagement; moreover, junior leaders cannot always determine, in the darkness whether each of their men is taking an aggressive part. Hence the data on personal action is not always obtainable and verifiable, and it must be recognized that, when some of the actors are dead or missing, and all of the witnesses have been shaken, there is a considerable margin of error which may apply either way.
However, from synthesizing incidents around which the fighting developed, and from the post-critique showing of hands on the questions of which men had used weapons in addition to those who had played a prominent part in the engagement, this estimate is supportable :
In the average infantry company in Korea, between 12 and 20 percent of the
men not only participate actively in the firing, but exercise varying degrees of initiative in on-the-spot leading and taking personal action of a type that betters the unit position and induces cohesion. .
In addition to this control force, there are between 25 and 35 percent of the men who take some part in the fire action, with varying degrees of consistency, but without otherwise giving marked impulse to the course of events.
研究人员认为这种表现说明我军比起二战时的平均水平有了扎实的进步。
在二战中，很容易遇到做出“我看见了敌人；我没有开火；我不知道为什么”这种回答的士兵。在朝鲜战场，这种回答奇怪地消失了。实际上，在战后总结中没有一个未开火的士兵做出这样的解释。
未开火的士兵给出的理由可能会是这些：
“我一直看不见敌军目标，我认为最好还是不开火。”
“手榴弹劈头盖脸地砸来，我抬不起头。”
“我面前有一座小土山，敌军隐藏在它后面，我看不见。”
“我还没看见任何人向我冲过来，就从背后被俘了。”
“机枪卡壳了，我在帮军士修理机枪。”
“敌军人数太多，我希望他们可能没注意到我，就没开火。”
“我的枪冻住了，又找不着别的枪。”
诸如此类。所有的解释在他们所处的形势下都是可以说的通的。但与二战时的经验相比，没有一种回答显示士兵的双手为某种根深蒂固的习惯所束缚。
从统计学的意义上说，没有出现那种回答的意义可能并不像表面看上去那么重要。我们甚至可以认为在一个普通连队中总有那么一些人串通好了掩盖真相。但这些答复强烈暗示，“参与射击是一种光荣的义务”的想法开始在步兵队伍中扎根，每个士兵都感觉到自己身负义务。
It is believed that this showing is a substantial improvement over the participation averages among World War II troops.
The infantry soldier, so commonly met with in World War II, who made the stock answer: “I saw the enemy; I didn’t fire; I don’t know why,” is strangely missing from the Korean scene. In fact, this reply was not returned by a single man among the non-firers at any critique.
Among the reasons given by the non-firers would be these:
“I didn’t see an enemy target at any time and I thought it best to hold fire until I did.”
“Grenades were coming in at such a rate I couldn’t get my head up.”
“There was a rise of earth in front of me which hid their people to view.”
“I was captured from behind before I saw anyone come against me.”
“I was helping the sergeant get the machine gun back into operation.”
“There were so many of them that I held fire, thinking they might pass us by.”
“My gun was frozen and I couldn’t find another.”
And so on. All of these explanations made sense in the situation. But in contrast to World War II experience, there were no answers returned indicating that the soldier’s hand was held by some deep-rooted inhibition.
Statistically, the absence of such answers may not be as important as it appears on the surface. We may even take it that there are a few such men in the average company, and that they are covering up. But there is a strong implication that the idea has become ingrained in the infantry line that fire participation is an obligation of honor, and the obligation is felt by the average soldier.
狙击
狙击战术在美军中应用最少。军官们一般都同意，战场上经常需要派神枪手在前哨阵地独立潜伏，等候打中目标的机会。敌军有时采用这种战术。我军从未系统化地应用狙击战术，通常只是一两人的即兴发挥而已。究竟是我军战术教学和训练中存在着某种局限，还是今日普通美国年轻人的天性中存在着某种自我克制，这真的很难说清楚。
第八集团军缺乏狙击所需的器材，特别是夜间执行任务必备的红外瞄准镜。在冬季战役中，部队配备的数量极少，充其量不过是团部人员新奇的消遣而已。步兵指挥官们表示如果他们能获得大量的器材则将会对夜间防御大有裨益。不过很难在单兵行动中发现任何数据支持这一评估。
在侧翼设置的前哨和警戒哨更依靠自动火力而不是一些专业人员用步枪操作的精密作业。当阵地面临的压力不断增强并开始收缩时，步兵更愿意撤退到能为机枪和勃朗宁轻机枪火力掩护的场所而非自动火力不能保护的邻近地区。尽管装备M1步枪的士兵的开火次数普遍增加，但未受重武器协助的步兵在稳定防御阵地中却很少起关键作用。
发挥个人主动性的突出战例主要是巴祖卡火箭筒射手，勃朗宁轻机枪手和机枪手创造的。当敌军在距我军防线75到200码的距离设置机枪并冒着火力将它前送的时候，在大多数情况下它将被有进取心的重武器射手而不是两三个移动中的敢做敢为的步兵歼灭。
在记录中发现的例外如此之少实在令人诧异，尽管你可能会猜想这是缺乏对狙击战术持续的教导所造成的。装备步枪的士兵在使用其单兵武器时很少表现出主动性，除非占领无论何时都能带给自己新的有利条件以应对敌军人员在开阔地上的移动的前沿阵地。个人灵活性加上枪法，再加上伪装的天赋，就构成了“狙击”行动的基础。
由于我军普遍缺少这样的行动基础（“狙击”行动的基础），同时，我军的步兵行动总是围绕或借助于战线中的某种重武器或者是别的什么优先前提而展开，因此也就从根本上减少了把所有火力作为一个整体沿防御正面平均分布的机会。这也是一个给每个步兵连配发双倍勃朗宁轻机枪的间接依据，因为从效用对比上看，双倍勃朗宁轻机枪的火力效果要好于双倍的M1步枪和卡宾枪的有效火力
SNIPING
There is minimal use of sniper tactics among American forces. Leaders are in general agreement that the situation would often lend itself to exploitation by individual sharpshooters working stealthily into the forward ground, taking independent cover, and there awaiting any target of opportunity. The enemy occasionally employs such tactics. It is never systematically done by our side, and such actual sniper tactics as are employed are usually an improvization of the moment by one or two individuals. Whether the limiting factor is the rigidity in our tactical teaching and training or some inhibition in the nature of today’s average young American would be hard to say.
The Eighth Army is short on special equipment for the sniper, particularly the infrared scope needed for night work. During winter operations these were present in such limited numbers as to be hardly more than a novelty for the amusement of the command at a regimental headquarters.
Infantry line commanders frequently expressed the view that if they could get the equipment in quantity, it would be a godsend in night defense. But it was impossible to find any data on individual usage in amplification of this estimate.
Outposts and outguards posted along the flank tend to rely more on automatic firepower than on precision work by a few marksmen with the rifle. When the position comes under an increasing pressure and begins to contract, riflemen incline to fall back toward the ground covered by the machine guns and BARS rather than to deploy toward the adjacent spaces which the automatic fire cannot protect. Despite a general increase of firing by those who are armed with the Ml, it is rare indeed that a knot of riflemen, unaided by one of the heavier weapons, plays a pivotal part in the stabilizing of the defensive position.
The examples of great individual initiative are generally provided by a bazooka man, a BAR carrier, or a machine gunner. When, for example, an enemy machine gun sets up somewhere within 75 to 200 yards of the defending line, and brings it under punishing fire, it will be eliminated in most cases by the enterprise of a firer with one of the heavier weapons, rather than by the mobile aggressiveness of two or three riflemen.
It is really astonishing how few exceptions to this are to be found in the record, though one suspects that it is by nature the case, in the absence of persistent indoctrination in sniper tactics. The rifle-armed individual can hardly express initiative in the employment of his personal weapon except by taking up forward ground whenever so doing gives him fresh advantage against enemy personnel moving in the open. This individual mobility, plus marksmanship, plus a talent for concealment, is the essence of “sniper” action.
Our general lack of it, and the tendency in our infantry to move with, and around, one of the heavier weapons in the line, or else forego all movement, materially reduces the chance that fire as a whole will be evenly distributed along the length of the defended front. This is a collateral argument for doubling the number of BARS per infantry company. In ratio, it might very well have the effect of doubling the useful fire from the Ml and carbine.
战术奇袭的缺乏
既然我军步兵中缺乏真正的狙击战术是因为我军的军事学说更强调团队精神，而不是因为美国人性格中有什么消极因素，产生另一项战术局限性的原因也应该在这方面仔细加以考察，尽管这与步枪并没有直接关系。
处于敌军压力之下的美军连队在夜间进行环形防御的时候，从未对敌军暴露的侧翼发动突然的反突击，甚至在局势完全有利于采取这项行动时也未能有所作为。这支连队会尽可能坚守阵地，如果全面压力变得难以承受，它将向中央或最强的侧翼收缩防线。如果出现夺取和利用主阵地线内的更有利战场的机会，这支部队的一些人通常能抓住。一旦敌人没注意到与主阵地毗邻的山岭的褶皱和缓坡，而从那里自动火力可用来打击敌人的侧翼，那么我军士兵将利用这种地形。
但是几乎所有的重要活动看上去都受到“如果不彼此靠拢也要保持不间断的联系”这一原则的限制
LACK OF TACTICAL SURPRISE
Since the lack of true sniper tactics in our infantry force appears to stem from doctrinal emphasis on the importance of unity within the group, rather than from negative characteristics in the American individual, one other of the constricting effects upon tactics might well be examined at this point, though it is not directly related to the use of the rifle.
The American company under pressure, during nighttime defense of a perimeter,is never inclined to throw a surprise counterpressure against the open flank of the enemy, even when the situation appears wholly favorable to such a design. It holds ground, if possible. It contracts toward the center or toward the strongest flank if the general pressure becomes uncontainable. If an opportunity affords to seize and use more advantageous ground within the outline of the general position, some part of the force will usually grasp it. Should the enemy overlook a fold or attenuation of the ridge, in juxtaposition to the main position, from which automatic fire can be turned against the enemy flank, weapons men will take advantage of it.
But practically all main movement appears to be circumscribed by the principle that all forces should remain continuously in juncture, if not contracting toward each other.
我军从未使用过这样的奇袭战术，即从主力部队中暂时抽调小股部队去执行挫伤敌军锐气、分散敌军注意力的任务。
设想一下这种局面：一个连队的兵力在岭脊上均匀地展开。敌军的攻势在正面和右翼发展迅速，看来这支队伍是输是赢完全取决于那个地段的态势。
左翼仍几乎未参战。虽然看不见任何目标，但这个扇区内的机枪一直在掩护前方的斜坡，步兵呆在散兵坑中，等待什么时候能帮得上忙。60mm迫击炮埋伏在山后，但是敌军已经从邻近我军散兵坑的右翼逼近…，这些迫击炮的火力已不能成为决定性的威慑力量。
看来这些迫击炮和所有未交火地带的武器都没有迅速地转移到远离敌人进攻路线的场所，并从他背后投射炽烈火力。机枪、轻机枪或除去底盘的轻迫击炮都能可靠地完成这种打了就跑的任务。他们本应在短时间内发挥奇袭作用，坚持到足以让对手动摇（就撤退），迫使他（从我军正面）调走部分兵力。
当炮火遮断整个战区的时候，缺乏这样的进取心还容易解释，但一项重要的事实是即使步兵独立作战它也从来没有尝试过实施奇袭，而只将生还的希望寄托在自身的武器和人力上。
局部奇袭在心理上的价值几乎与主力奇袭一样重要。然而，没有记录证明我军曾有系统地利用了这些战术手段。在这方面，正如缺乏真正的狙击战术一样，我军小部队行动的粗糙质量终将给敌军以可乘之机。敌军在与我军小股部队交战中，几乎可以指望自己不上当。
在大规模军事行动中，我军最大限度地使用了奇袭和欺骗，例如利用装甲纵队突围。为什么在我军的小部队战术教学中很少采用同样的原则呢？这个问题值得仔细考虑。在我们研究的所有在朝鲜的军事行动中，竟没有一个美国连队使用牵制火力的战例。然而，在许多战例中我们的中国敌人成功地以这种方式拓展了武器用途。
There are no surprise tactics in which some fraction of the force detaches itself temporarily from the main body with the object of creating a demoralizing diversion.
Take this situation : The Company is deployed along a ridge top with its strength distributed quite evenly. The enemy attack develops strongly against the front and right flank, and the whole appearance of the situation is that the line will win or lose according to what happens in that quarter.
The left flank remains practically unengaged. The machine gun in that sector continues to cover a forward slope, though seeing no targets, and the riflemen stay in their foxholes, awaiting the time when they can be useful. The 60-mm mortars are behind the hill in a draw, but because the enemy has closed in right next to the friendly foxholes, their fire is not a decisive deterrent.
It seems never to happen that any of these weapons from the quiet zone, or the mortar battery, will be moved out quickly into ground off the enemy avenue of approach with the object of throwing a shock fire across his rear. Such hit-and-run missions conceivably could be done either with machine guns, BARS, or light mortars minus base plates. They would be transitory by nature, done for surprise effect, and sustained just long enough to unsettle the opponent and make him divert some part of his force.
When artillery is interdicting the general area, the lack of such enterprises as these is subject to explanation, But the significant fact is that it seems never to be attempted even in situations where infantry is operating on its own, and its hope for survival depends upon what can be achieved with its own weapons and manpower.
The moral values in local surprise should be relatively as great as in major surprise. But it is not of record that we attempt systematically to explore them. In this, as in the lack of true sniper tactics, our small-unit operations have a gregarious quality which ultimately must provide some comfort to the enemy. In his grapple with the small unit he can pretty well count on not being bluffed.
In the larger scale of operations, we employ surprise and bluff to a maximum; for example, in the sorties made by armored columns. The reason why we are loath to work by the same principle in our small-group teaching should be well worth searching consideration. In all the operations brought under study in Korea, there is not one example of an American company attempting to use diversionary fire. However, there are numerous examples of the Chinese enemy successfully exploiting his use of weapons in this manner. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:45 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 网友saverage翻译
卡宾枪
鸡肋
在低于冰点的寒冷季节里，卡宾枪就不好使了。根据气温的不同，在实现正常的全自动射击前，无论你身处何处，都要对卡宾枪进行5至20次不等的试射预热。
因为卡宾枪被制造成了全自动的，所以它就很敏感。在大热天，哪怕是很少的一点灰尘和潮气混在一起就能使它哑火；而在严寒下，他比其他任何武器都更容易被冻住，也更难以被润滑到可以正常使用的程度。
弹仓是另一个麻烦不断的地方。只几周时间，弹夹边缘的子弹就被氧化和灰尘沾染的锈迹斑斑。痕迹非常明显。那些灰尘大的都能用指甲挖掉。当子弹进入弹膛，那些在子弹表面由于腐蚀而产生的金属污垢就会积留在弹膛内。就这样，它会逐渐的越积越多，最终形成一个大块污物，随后卡宾枪的部件就会（由于那个大块污物的存在）失灵。为了防止这样的失灵，除了频繁的退出和清洗弹仓内的子弹，别无他法。但这种方法所需的时间是耗不起的。
这种武器不够威猛。太骄气。他的日常使用随着季节变化，时好时坏。当射击调到半自动档的时候，还可靠些，如果时全自动档，简直是浪费弹药。在半自动射击时，它的精度还不足以对付一个中等距离上的目标。以上批评来自于朝鲜战争中使用过卡宾枪的部队。
“鸡肋”的名声比在二战包括太平洋战场中更加响亮。在太平洋战场，卡宾枪近乎无所作为。海军陆战队的批评比陆军更凶。陆战一师从上到下对这东西都没有好印象。他们在朝鲜战争中使用卡宾枪的经验就是完全失望。他们要求，要么彻底淘汰卡宾枪，要么就对卡宾枪进行改进，使之成为有可靠性的武器。第八集团军的绝大多数人对卡宾枪也是同样感觉。不过，偶尔也会有某连或某排对卡宾枪并无太强烈的感受，这种反映取决于该部队是否在战斗关键时刻使用了一定数量的卡宾枪，并同时遭受了惨痛的经历。通常部队中，配备卡宾枪的人属于少数，因此，在一场恶仗之后，某连并没有过多受卡宾枪连累而造成的伤亡，那也是有可能的。这也就使得人们的那种对卡宾枪几乎是一致的强烈反感完全变得更加出人意料。
不单单是步兵有这种反感，就是那些经历过几次在炮兵阵地上与渗透过来的敌军步兵近距离交战的炮兵连，他们也会以尽可能快的速度（撂下卡宾枪）拿起M1步枪。人们对卡宾枪进行判断和选择时所怀着的那种对卡宾枪的宿怨，可以用一个事例加以说明。1950年11月26日晚到27日凌晨，第27步兵团E连作为第25步兵师主力正面突出部一点，与敌军进行了殊死的战斗。虽然该连在人数上远远少于中国人，但是该连的作战是如此勇猛，以至于该连能一直坚守着他们的阵地，黎明来临之时，敌军完成了最后的进攻就撤退了。随后该连奉命撤到一个朝向南面的新阵地。敌军进攻的压力减缓。死者和伤者被从高地上移走。在进行战斗总结的过程中，当将士们做出解释和说明时，除卡宾枪以外的所有武器都被提及，并被给予了肯定。尽管在高地上，卡宾枪被扔的到处都是，可并没有人愿意把它们捡起来使用。我们发现，在战斗过程中，卡宾枪并没有遭到咒骂；因此我们猜想，那是由于卡宾枪没有给将士们帮倒忙。
由于这些卡宾枪的火力有助于敌人行动，所以没有多少声音要求一定要使用他们。在记录中的阵地战斗，也有几百件孤立事件涉及使用卡宾枪毙伤一个敌人的情况。这些非常有限的例子里，使用者都是在非常短的距离内用全自动档扫倒1，2个甚至4个敌人的。不过，卡宾枪能够通过近距离密集的火力削弱敌人的进攻意志的说法，还没有被敌方的反应情况所证实。没有清晰的案例支持这点，即由于卡宾枪密集的火力迫使敌人放弃进攻撤退的情况。这已经把夜晚战斗有限的观察条件和高度紧张的氛围考虑在内了。
此外，中国军队执着与夜间进攻也是部分问题所在。按道理来说，卡宾枪也能够在战斗初期提供教强火力。但只有少量弹药能够达到敌人的进攻出发地。如果不计射速慢的M1，这些火力不足以组织敌人接近到手榴弹距离。而当士兵们面对敌人冲到足够近的缓坡时，能够够到敌人的手榴弹之类的投掷武器似乎更能够保护自己。在平坦的平地上，情况会有所不同，不过，朝鲜更多的是复杂的山地。在高地战斗中，卡宾枪的火力不足以阻止敌人接近，而当敌人最后进攻时，卡宾枪又形同虚设。
在白天的战斗中。武器又要求另外的使用途经。需要的是半自动火力，火力洛点特别分散。事实证明，又没有多少目标能够让卡宾枪充分发挥自动火力的特点。
射程和杀伤力
没有充分数据支持卡宾枪的射程超过50码。记录中有极少数卡宾枪在这个距离或更远的地方撂倒敌人的情况。不过这个数量太少，不能够视为一般结论。卡宾枪的杀伤效果大约有95％发生在50码以内。因为在朝鲜的战术行动中，白刃战十分频繁，所以在如此短的距离内选择使用卡宾枪应该是一个不错的选择。
杀伤效果差也是一个重要的抱怨理由。一些战斗总结中，大约50次行动记录中，有7名目击者声称他们毫无疑问打中了敌人身体，可那些被击中的敌人士兵仍然可以继续冲锋。一个目击者是陆战1团的约瑟夫 R 费舍尔中尉。陆战一师认为他是一个杰出的连级指挥官。他在描述下碣隅里战斗时，有如下呈词。“大约有30％的卡宾枪给我们造成了麻烦，一些不能开火，一些冻住了。但是我们的人对卡宾枪丧失信心的最主要原因是当我们把子弹打进25码远的中国佬的胸膛后，我就遇到过这种情况，被击中者只皱了皱眉就继续前进了，这使我十分震惊。这些子弹打得很深。敌人还能继续行动。我们有半打人有同样的抱怨。有些人发誓他们至少打中3，4次，都不能使被击中者停下来。”
THECARBINE
ANVIL CHORUS
In subfreezing weather, the carbine operates sluggishly and, depending upon the degree of cold, will require anywhere from 5 to 20 warm-up shots before it will fire full automatic.
Since being made full automatic, it is hypersensitive. In hot weather, even small amounts of dust and moisture together will cause it to misfire. In cold weather, it is more sensitive to frost than any other weapon, and more difficult to lubricate in such a way that it will remain operative.
The magazines are a source of continuing trouble. After only a few weeks the clipped ammunition begins to corrode at the edges where it rubs the metal of the clip, and as the oxidization proceeds dirt becomes mixed with it. The discoloration is obvious, and the dirt can be scraped off with the fingernail. When the shell is injected, the fouled metal leaves its accumulation on the chamber. As this builds up, it gradually develops a block, and the piece goes out of action. There is no way to prevent such stoppages except by frequent unclipping and cleaning of the ammunition; time is insufficient for that.
The weapon lacks “power.” It is “too delicate.” Its day-to-day operation is (too variable,” according to changes in the weather. It was “more dependable” when it was semi-automatic. When fired full automatic, it “wastes ammunition.” When fired semi-automatic it isn’t sufficiently accurate for “aimed fire at moderate distances.”
. . . These are a few of the criticisms voiced by troops who have used the carbine in Korean operations. The anvil chorus is much louder than during World War II operations, including the Pacific, where the carbine was hardly an outstanding success.
The Marine criticism is even more harsh than that of the Army. From top to bottom, 1st Marine Division takes the dim view of this weapon; their experience with it during the Chosen Reservoir operation was the final blow to confidence. They want it either eliminated or made over into a dependable weapon. The clear majority of Eighth
Army infantry feels this same way about it. An occasional platoon or company can be found which does not feel particularly harshly about the carbine; the reaction ofthe average unit depends upon whether it has had a particularly costly experience with a number of carbines in a critical moment; since usually the carbine men are in the minority, it is possible for a company to go through a stiff fight without undue injury from carbine failures. That makes the almost unanimously strong feeling against the weapon all the more surprising. Not alone does the infantry feel this way; the artillery batteries, which have had several experiences with close-in defense of the gun positions against infiltration, are also going over to the Ml as rapidly as they can convert.
The rancor which attends this judgment of the weapon can be attested by one incident. On the night of 26-27 November 1950, Easy Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, fought a desperate action when serving as the point, well to the fore of the main body of the 25th Infantry Division. They were vastly outnumbered by the Chinese, but they held their ground with such valor that the enemy, after a last full-scale charge, drew back just as dawn came. The company was then ordered by higher command to fall back on new ground to the southward. The pressure had eased. Dead and wounded were removed from the hill. Also, as the men explained in the course of the critique, all weapons were brought out “except the carbines. They were scattered around the hill, but no one felt like picking them up. We had found during the fight that they were no d\*amned good and we figured they wouldn’t help the enemy.”
As to the possible effect of full automatic fire by the carbine upon enemy action, there are no sound criteria for attempting an evaluation. In the perimeter fights which are covered by the record, there are literally hundreds of incidents in which the individual relates how with aimed fire from the carbine he shot one of the enemy. There are other instances, limited in number, in which the firer, using the weapon automatically, brought down two, three, or four of the enemy in one burst delivered at exceptionally close range. But what the weapon accomplishes to discourage the enemy and deter his aggressiveness by putting out a considerable volume of fire in a short space, is not provable by the data on enemy reaction. There were no clean-cut examples establishing that, because of a high rate of fire from the carbines in a particular sector, the enemy became discouraged and drew back.
The conditions of limited observation and high nerve tension which attend nighttime engagement are generally exclusive of any such possible findings.
However, the persistence of the Chinese after-dark attack has a partial bearing on the question. The carbines produce their heaviest volume of fire in the earlier stages of the fight. They begin to run low on ammunition before there is any marked flagging in the strength of the enemy attack. Their fire does not prevent the enemy from closing to within grenade range of the defended ground, nor for that matter does the slower fire of the Ml. When men are pinned fairly close to earth by an enemy down slope at close range, the grenade thrown from the high ground has a good chance of finding its mark, whereas because of instinctive reaction to the desire for self-preservation, fire delivered from a shoulder weapon will likely go high. On flat ground, the tendencies would be different. But, there is relatively little fighting on an even grade in Korea.
In the hill fights, carbine volume does not prevent the enemy from closing, and when
his final rushes are made, the carbines are beginning to go empty. In the daylight attack, the weapon more nearly pays its way. Only then it is used more frequently in semi-automatic firing, and its power is more evenly distributed over the course of the engagement. Sufficient to note that this was not the purpose for which the carbine was intended or the object for which it was changed to full automatic.
RANGE AND EFFECT
There are practically no data bearing on the accuracy of the carbine at ranges in excess of 50 yards. The record contains a few examples of carbine-aimed fire felling an enemy soldier at this distance or perhaps a little more. But they are so few in number that no general conclusion can be drawn from them. Where carbine fire had proved killing effect, approximately 95 percent of the time the target was dropped at less than 50 yards.
Because of the frequency of hand-to-hand fighting in Korea operations, there has been a suitable opportunity for judging of the takedown characteristics of the carbine round when delivered at close range.
This is not a source of general complaint. However, there is some illuminating comment. In the approximately 50 infantry actions covered, there were in all 7 witnesses who said that they had fired at an enemy soldier under conditions where there was no doubt that the bullet had struck him in a vital part of the body, and that he had kept on coming. One such witness is 1st Lt Joseph R. Fisher, 1st Marine Regiment. He was speaking of the defense at Hagaru-ri. The 1st Marine Division regarded him as one of its ablest and most objective company commanders. These were his words:
“About 30 percent of our carbines gave us trouble; some wouldn’t fire at all; others responded sluggishly. But the main reason my men lost confidence in the carbine was because they would put a bullet right in a Chink’s chest at 25 yards range, and he wouldn’t stop. This happened to me. The bullet struck home; the man simply winced and kept on coming. There were about half a dozen of my men made this same complaint：some of them swore they had fired three or four times, hit the man each time, and still not stopped him.” 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:46 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/01/25 12:32pm 第 1 次编辑]
RECOILLESS WEAPONS
USE OF ARTILLERY AND RECOILLESS WEAPONS
These two subjects are considered together at this point because they are conjoint in operations against certain major enemy targets.
Among artillery officers in Korea there is heard the usual plaint against infantry that it calls on the artillery for fire missions which could be better carried out by their own weapons; not less frequently is heard the story that the infantry would get along better, and save more lives, if it called on the artillery more frequently when operating against targets too big to be reduced by infantry fires.
All of this has a strangely familiar ring.
But since the two ideas, however general their circulation in past wars, are mutually exclusive and therefore cancel out each other, neither provides a satisfactory approach to the problem of how infantry and artillery fires are best balanced in combination.The question is whether either fault is chronic in such measure during infantry operations in Korea as to indicate that infantry officers are insufficiently trained in knowledge of the potential, limits, and logistical problem of the other arm.
Because of infantry’s present possession of heavy weapons capable of producing heavy blast effects at long range, similar to the explosion of artillery shells, the need to conserve fires by both arms in conformity with sound evaluation of target areas is more pressing than ever. Employment of the recoilless weapons by the infantry is one of the new developments in Korean operations; whether the weapons are being employed in balance can only be assessed by reviewing certain aspects of the artillery problem.
The check of artillery fires called for and delivered in the infantry actions which were taken under study, as to the situation, the target, etc., indicates that the equation is kept in reasonable balance. The infantry does not tend toward over-exploitation of its artillery support. In the main, its requests are reasonable.
In the winter operations, the infantry was inclined to press hard for interdictory artillery fires for protection of the night position, and perhaps more shell was wasted this way than the situation sometimes warranted. However, it would be immoderate to view this as a fault in infantry appreciation of the artillery role and problem, for to do so would exclude the very human consideration that the first obligation of the infantry commander is to do all possible to relieve the anxieties and protect the position of his men, rather than to worry about artillery logistics. It is up to artillerymen to harden against this tendency when convinced that they have read the situation correctly. According to the data gathered for this study, our infantry in Korea was more inclined to take the casual risks of combat without crying for artillery help than during World War II. However, one infantry battalion commander, who had served almost one year in line, made this comment : “From what I observed, and what I learned from other battalion commanders, much of our artillery and air support was needlessly expended. We used both air and artillery in too many instances for outright insurance. I have called for air and artillery on hills which we were attacking, not knowing positively that there was any enemy within range. In combat, we seem still to place too high a premium on the worth of one human life. Ten enemy riflemen may sometimes hold up an entire regimental column until a battalion of artillery, tanks, and every supporting weapon within the battalion are ready to aid the advance of a few riflemen. The practice can become unduly expensive.” This was one man’s point of view.
在朝鲜，敌军的许多主要目标经常是难以确知的，为了确定敌军目标，表面上看我军似乎是不遗余力，用尽了手段。而尽管成倍的努力和投入不过是敌军目标和敌军对常规火力抵抗力极端坚韧的必然结果，可我军的这种做法还是受到了质疑，人们怀疑这是否有用。
中共军队利用沿岩石山岭的岭脊布置堑壕阵地的办法不断挫败我军重武器和空军的精确射击。重武器和空军竭尽全力去摧毁敌军坚强的支撑点，但经常除了造成强烈震动和歼灭一些部署在浅层工事的敌军以外，并不能取得决定性的战果。步兵还得接近敌军阵地，最终以自己的武器杀敌，敌军的重型工事有时能坚持到所有的防御者都被手榴弹炸死。
传统上，摧毁“大型目标”是炮兵的任务，步兵也从来都承认这是炮兵的特权。在目标方面，“大型目标”在朝鲜的军事行动中特别难以捕捉。如果炮兵能够发现和直接瞄准这种目标，那么摧毁它便是一个不错的战果。但是，地形条件使得他们很少有这种机会。
当中共军队拥有4到10天时间组织棱线阵地时，他们习惯把机枪掩体修的几乎与地面持平。他们在正、反斜面都有可能部署迫击炮，这取决于射程和能否有效掩护。步兵配置在散兵坑，掩护接近主要工事的通道。他们极少浪费兵力去防御较低的斜坡。
掩体内壁通常是用被缆绳捆在一起的双层粗原木搭建的，而掩体顶部可能本身就是山体的一个突出部(而它由4到8英尺厚的泥土和岩石构成)，于是，掩体便能经得住除8英寸口径火炮以外所有武器的猛烈打击。除非是直接命中，否则轻型火炮根本就奈何不了这样的敌军工事。考虑到敌军工事的特点，要想直接命中，概率只有千分之一。枪炮眼通常高14到30英寸，而且通常凹进掩体壁。这些隐蔽部通常被设置在顺着山梁方向的地褶内，与主抵抗线垂直而与射击方向平行。他们被这样配置是要阻止我军步兵从侧翼迂回并沿棱线走向进攻。
这意味着从前方观察，他们通常是完全隐蔽的。在一条山脊上，无论哪一处都可能会暗藏着2到6个那样的掩体。而数小时内，从敌军所在的主要区域一直可以射出稳定的重机枪火力。
此外，在1500到2000码的距离，训练有素的观测员也不能识别出敌军的特定目标或任何重大活动。
在表面上，这看上去是个主要靠炮兵的干预来解决的问题。炮兵认为情况正是这样，步兵也从来不会提出异议。但是在通常的情形，我军步兵占领的高地往往挡在炮兵和其目标之间。这种高地可能是一条或一连串的山岭。此时就需要间瞄射击了。在这种形势下，以野战炮兵的常规射击压制这些掩体的机会确实微乎其微。如果有人要搞清为什么会这样，他只需绘制出一门火炮向这样一个目标射出的炮弹飞行曲线就可以了。如果这条线偏移几英寸，那么炮弹就完全打不中目标。
在我们所研究的各次行动中，尽管以密集炮火轰击中国人的掩体，但还没有一个火炮以直瞄射击打中它们的战例。它们也能经得起火箭弹和凝固汽油弹的空中打击；报告中有空军直接将凝固汽油弹投到掩体顶部的例子。那一发凝固汽油弹滚落到了嵌壁枪眼的前方。尽管如此，防御者仍未被杀死，而且在简短的间歇后又恢复了射击。
In Korea, the baffling character of many of the main enemy targets has brought about use of a seeming excess of means in the effort to reduce them. But it is to be doubted that there is any help for it, duplication is the inevitable consequence of the extreme toughness of the targets and their resistance to normal fires.
The use which CCF make of dug-in positions along the rocky ridge crests is frustrating of precision fire by the heavy weapons, including air power. Going their best to destroy the enemy strong points, frequently in the end they bring off nothing more decisive than a strong shock effect and the elimination of a certain number of the enemy who are disposed in the more shallow works; it then remains for the infantry to close and make the final kill with its own weapons, with the heavy works of the enemy sometimes holding out until the occupants are killed with grenades.
Traditionally, it is the task of artillery to knock out the “big stuff,” and the infantry is ever ready to concede it that privilege. But in terms of target area, the “big stuff” in Korean operations is peculiarly elusive. It would be a fair mark for the guns, if they could see it and lay directly on it, but, such is the nature of the ground that they rarely have that opportunity.
When the CCF have as many as four to ten days in which to organize a ridgeline position, they customarily hinge it upon machine-gun bunkers built close to the skyline. The mortars may operate from either the forward or reverse slope, depending on range and the availability of cover. The riflemen are disposed in foxholes covering the approaches in relatively close juxtaposition to the main works. They rarely waste force in an attempt to defend along the lower slopes.
The walls of the bunkers are frequently double tiers of thick logs bound together by cable. The roof may be an overhang of earth and rock between four and eight feet in thickness; so being, it is shellproof to a collapsing fire from anything except an 8-inch gun. Except for a direct hit, light artillery fire cannot neutralize it, and in the nature of the position, direct hits are a l-in-1000 accident. The embrasures are between 14 and 30 inches in height and are usually recessed. Frequently these nests are sited in a fold along the facing of the ridge, putting them at right angles to our MLR and parallel to the fire issuing from it. They are thus sited to block the infantry advance when it moves in from the flank, attacking down the length of the ridgeline.
This means that they are almost perfectly hidden to observation from the front. One ridgeline may hold anywhere between two to six such bunkers. Persistent machinegun fire may be received from the general area for hours. Still, at between 1500 and 2000 yards range, the trained observer cannot pick up a specific target or see any significant activity.
On the surface, this appears as a problem to be solved mainly by artillery intervention. The artillerymen accept it as such, and the infantry is never inclined to say no. But in the average situation, the high ground held by the friendly infantry intervenes between the artillery and its target. This may be one ridge or a series. Therefore indirect fire is required. The chance that the bunkers will be neutralized through a normal shoot by field artillery under these conditions becomes very small indeed. One need only plot the curve of an artillery shell moving against such an object to see why this is so. If the line is only a few inches off, the effect is a total miss.
During the operations taken under survey, there was not one instance of an artillery shell scoring a direct hit on a Chinese bunker, despite consistent fires against these objects. They were resistant also to air attack both with rockets and napalm; the record includes examples wherein the air scored direct hits with napalm atop the bunker. The napalm rolled over and down the front of the recessed embrasure. Still, the occupants were not killed, and, after a brief interlude, resumed their fire.
The advantage which the recoilless weapons give infantry in firing against targets of this character from the opposing heights scarcely requires description. At ranges between 1000 and 1200 yards, the 75 recoilless is the only piece which can take them under direct fire, with a relatively good chance of hitting dead on and destroying the object in one round; pack artillery might do it if it were available, but in its absence, the recoilless weapons are the main hope. In this type of usage, they have justified themselves time and again. The 57 is too light for such work at ranges exceeding 1000 yards, though troops have wasted an excess of 57 ammunition trying to prove otherwise; because of the weight problem with the 75, it is often left behind during movement into the higher ridges, and the attempt is made to substitute the 57 at prohibitive ranges.
In the nature of the problem, the range of fire that is needed is quite apt to be in proportion to the height of the ground which is to be surmounted. In other words, troops are fighting across low ridges, operating distances are apt to be foreshortened. Thus under conditions which are less prohibitive to weight carrying, when the ranges are shorter and the 57 would do the work, the 75 is still very apt to be taken along because it packs the extra wallop. To this extent, there is an overlapping.
On the other hand, the 57 becomes invaluable during the closing infantry assault on an enemy-held high hill mass. Always a few bunkers remain in operation; those which were protected from the long-range fires by the folding of the ridge are likely to be almost unscathed. Falling back toward these works, after quitting the outer line of foxholes, enemy skirmishers are apt to seek protection in small caves and behind rock outcroppings. The 57 can blast them out from cover which would provide immunity to bullet fire.
对武器的评价
士兵们在迫切需要无后座力武器的情形下使用它们的次数越多，对它们的评价就越高。无一例外。他们会被问到：“你觉得75mm无后座力炮怎么样？”他们的回答可能是否定的。经过调查，你会发现他们一次也没有使用过这种炮：他们不喜欢它，因为它太沉重。但是，在使用者中只有一种反应：热情赞扬。他们发现这种武器无可挑剔，并为它的能力感到惊奇。
在美国本土，军方人士对75mm无后座力炮尾端的火焰颇为关注，有一位将军觉得这使得它成了一种给步兵带来危险的武器。在战场上，这些疑虑并没有得到响应。士兵和指挥官们一致认为这种闪光在实战中并非一个问题。他们通常以这样的回答来解除疑虑：“为什么担心？他们（敌人）知道我们在哪。”有一位军士答道：“我部下的有些士兵担心火焰和反向冲击波，因为他们读过很多这方面的报道。但当我们开火时，他们就镇定下来了。”一般而言，这不是一个影响战斗组士气的关键因素。他们觉得如果可以在开火后转移一小段距离，这就足以提供充分的保护了。
反坦克
在我们所研究的军事行动中，没有使用这种武器打击敌军坦克的战例。在两个战例中，75mm无后坐力炮被用来打击敌军自行火炮；在这两个战例中，它都击毁了敌军火炮。然而，第7海军陆战团叙述它曾在早期军事行动中使用75mm无后坐力炮打击敌军坦克。
在一个战例中，我军以75mm无后坐力炮击毁了4辆隐蔽中的敌军坦克。荷马 利曾伯格上校及其属下军官提交的战后总结中提到：在反坦克行动中，75mm无后坐力炮“从没有令本团失望。”但这次经历证实了与坦克战斗时，“在目标非常接近前不开火很重要，否则75mm无后坐力炮便不能击毁它们。”作战参谋威廉 R 厄内上尉给出了对这种武器有效性的非常有启迪作用的评估：“我们不把75mm无后坐力炮当作单用途武器；杀伤敌军人员是它的巨大价值之一。因为它弹道扁平，在小山顶的战斗中可以用它对付碉堡，敌军集群，机枪，还有其他武器难以奏效的洞口。我们发现它实现以上这些全面用途的时候十分轻便。”
“在一个地势非常糟糕的地点，我军两个连为坚守一条300米高的棱线而艰苦备尝，我们需要能击毁峡谷对面1300码远的中国人的碉堡和机枪的武器。我前往反坦克组，找到了威廉 L 维克中士率领的小组，它们有一门炮和40发弹药。这两个连的退路已被切断，但是反坦克组还是成功地挤了进去。敌军再次从后方合围了我军，隔绝了这个阵地。这两个连一直坚守了整个晚上。
“破晓时分，维克主动地去查找敌军的炮位并向它们开火，打了15发弹药。此时，中国人开始搜寻他。他把这门炮转移到了一个隐蔽的位置，等到敌人来到距炮200码远的地方时，将10发高爆弹打进敌军的一个连队。这样，他便以一门炮粉碎了这次进攻，同样，战况也证实了这种武器的机动性。这次战斗发生在柳潭里的正南方。”
长津湖战役和三个月之后的“打桩机行动”提供了很多75mm无后坐力炮参战的战例。所有这些战例都证实了这种炮不同寻常的精确性以及它全面的战斗价值。
在敌军对下碣隅里的围攻中，我们发现75mm无后坐力炮对于击退夜袭特别有效。它被用于击毁从相当远的距离外向我军步兵队伍开火的机枪和迫击炮。我们发现75mm无后坐力炮发射的白磷弹最适合执行这项任务。
在这些夜战中，尽管阵地周围敌军火力很猛烈，75mm无后坐力炮也没有转移。士兵们在75mm无后坐力炮周围掘壕固守。
至少这些记录传达了一种印象：不熟悉75mm无后坐力炮的性能是妨碍士兵们在朝鲜的战斗中更广泛地应用这种武器的唯一因素。应当强调的是：山岭越高，武器重量对其应用的限制性就越大。在突越高于地面300米以上的山岭时，通常存在一个问题：75mm无后坐力炮可能发挥的作用能否证明运输它所需的人力是划算的？在狭窄的山路或光滑的地面上的任何移动肯定都存在风险。第2步兵师和第24步兵师都有士兵在试图前运75mm无后坐力炮时摔伤了脊背。
APPRECIATION OF WEAPON
Appreciation by troops of the recoilless weapons is exactly in proportion as they have been given employment in those situations for which they were intended. There was no exception to this. Troops would be asked: “What do you think of the 75 recoilless?”The answer would be negative. Inquiry would then develop that they had never once used the gun: they disliked it because it was heavy. But among the users, there was only one reaction - enthusiastic approval. They found no fault whatever in the weapon and were amazed at its capabilities.
In the ZI there has been considerable concern about the flash, and a general feeling that this made it a dangerous weapon for infantry. These doubtings have no echo in the field. Unanimously, troops and commanders said that flash was not a problem in actual operations. This feeling was usually resolved in some such answer as: “Why worry ? They know we’re there.” One sergeant replied: “Some of my men were concerned about flash and back-blast because they had read so much about it.But when we opened fire, they settled down.” In general, it is not a factor in the morale of operating crews. They feel that if they can displace a short distance after firing, that affords sufficient protection.
AGAINST ARMOR
In the operations studied, there were no examples of these weapons being used against enemy armor. In two instances, the 75 had been employed to fire on an SP gun; in both cases, it had knocked out the gun. The Seventh Marine Regiment did, however, recount its experience with the 75 in earlier operations against enemy armor.
In one case the gun had been used to knock out four nesting tanks, the closest being
15 yards and the farthest 75 yards. In the critique attended by the commander, Co1
Homer Litzenberg and his officers, it was stated that the 75 had “never once failed the
regiment” in action against armor, but that experience had proved that when fighting tanks “it is necessary to hold fire until the target is very close or the 75 will not knock them out.” A very revealing estimate of the weapon’s usefulness was given by Capt
William R. Earney, S3, in these words: “We do not regard the 75 as a single-purpose
weapon; one of its great values is in use against personnel. Because of its flat trajectory, in hilltop fighting it can be used against pillboxes, enemy groups, machine guns, and cave entrances when no other weapon will suffice. We have found it sufficiently portable for this general purpose.
“In a particularly bad spot, with two companies having a hard time holding a ridgeline about 300 meters high, we needed something that could knock out Chinese pillboxes and machine guns as far as 1300 yards away across the valley. Me went to the AT section, got a group under S/Sgt William L. Vick, one gun and 40 rounds of ammo. The two companies had been cut off, but the section managed to squeeze through. Then once again the enemy closed across the rear, isolating the position. The companies remained there through the night.
“At first light, on his own initiative, Vick located the enemy emplacements and
fired on them, using 15 rounds. Then the Chinese came looking for him. He moved
the gun to a concealed position, waited until they got within 200 yards of the gun, and
then fired 10 rounds of HE into about a company of the enemy. That one gun broke
up the attack; also, the circumstances speak for the mobility of the weapon. This action took place just to the south of Udam-ni.”
There are many more examples of the gun in action supplied from the Chosen Reservoir operation, and from Operation Punch, three months later. All bespeak the unusual accuracy of the gun and it’s all-around combat worthiness.
In the siege of Hagaru-ri, the 75mm recoilless was found to be especially useful in repelling the night attack. It was used to knock out machine guns and mortars firing on the infantry line from relatively long range. The 75’s WP shell was found to be most suitable for this work.
During these night actions, the gun did not displace, though there was heavy enemy fire around the position. The men dug in beside the gun and stayed there.
Lest these notes convey an impression that, unfamiliarity with the weapon is the only drag on greater use of the 75 by troops in the Korean fighting, it should be emphasized that the higher the ridge, the more prohibitive the weight factor becomes.In fighting across ridges in excess of 300 meters above the LD, it’ is always a question whether the possible use of the gun justifies the manpower required to move it. It is a positive danger in any movement along narrow trails or over slippery ground. Both in the 2nd and 24th Divisions men have had their backs broken in falls while trying to get the 75 forward.
作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:49 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 网友saverage翻译
ROCKETLAUNCHERS
A MARGINAL WEAPON?
Due to the enemy’s lack of armor in winter operations 1950-51, this group of
weapons had little decisive effect in the local fighting, except as CCF contrived to
capture some of our weapons and employ them against our metal. They did not prove
inexpert in exploiting the opportunity. There are a number of examples in the record
of CCF using the rocket launcher against our tanks, field pieces, and vehicles at comparatively
short range (15 to 50 yards) and scoring killing hits. The tank-killing weapons
all involve this special jeopardy; no other materiel can be converted more quickly and
decisively to enemy use upon capture, particularly when armor, being unopposed by
its own kind, relaxes it’s normal precautions.
火箭筒
边缘武器？
由于敌人在1950-51年的行动中缺乏装甲兵器，火箭筒这种兵器在实际战斗中并没有发挥巨大的作用。当然中共军队操作缴获的我们的火箭筒来打击我们的情况除外。事实证明，他们专长于利用这样的机会。比较我们的使用情况，有很多的中共战斗例子表明，他们用火箭筒在极近的距离（15到50码）打击我们的坦克，战地目标，和机动车辆并获得很多战绩。这种坦克杀手武器造成了极度危险，没有任何一种其他武器能够被敌人缴获，并且被敌人很快使用并且成为他们的主要武器。特别是对我们的装甲车辆，自以为无敌，放松警惕的时候。
In the winter fighting, our bazooka fire was used mainly against machine guns,
buildings where enemy skirmishers had taken cover, and other large objects. There
was less of a tendency to employ it at short range against enemy personnel, in substitute
for mortar fire. The data are insufficient to warrant saying whether the launcher justifies
its place in the infantry company weapons system under the conditions in which the
CCF was engaged by our line during the winter. There are some graphic examples
of its killing effect in the crises of a number of local engagements; these are well outnumbered
by the operational narratives in which the launchers are accounted as present,
but have no influence upon the course of combat. From the data - which are admitt’edly
an inconclusive sample - it is indicated only that the launcher is a marginal
weapon when the enemy lacks armor. With few exceptions, its telling shots could have
been contrived by some other weapon present with the line. In other words, it did
not have unique advantages in infantry-against-infant’ry action, as it was used in the
average tactical situation.
在冬季战斗中，我们的巴祖卡主要用来摧毁敌方机枪，敌方占据的建筑物和其他大目标。并没有将其作为迫击炮的替代火力用于短距离战术对抗中的趋势。在冬天中共军队突破我军防线的战斗中，也缺乏数据证明火箭筒在步兵连武器系统中是否处于恰当地位。有一些例子说明在战斗关键时刻他的杀伤效果影响了局势。不过，现在的火箭筒战斗的描述非常夸张，实际上却并没有影响战斗的过程。从数据看——在一些不确定的例子中——当敌人缺乏装甲力量时，火箭筒实际上成为边缘武器。只有少数例外，火箭筒和其他武器一同在战场上使用。换句话说，在其被使用的战术行动中，他并不是步兵对抗中独一无二的优势兵器。
By t’he account of our average line officer in Korea, under the conditions of the
fighting there, the 3.5 launcher is of greater utility in any situation than the small
bazooka, and he sees no argument for retention of the latter within the infantry weapons
system. It becomes excess baggage as soon as the 3.5 is in good supply. But the question
cannot be resolved that easily. If it is true that the small bazooka is an effective antipersonnel
weapon, but that its potential has not been adequately exploited because of
a hiatus in training, then its extra portability may give it advantage over the 3.5 in
particular situations, for the same reason’ that the 60-mm mortar is useful, though the
81 has greater killing radius. Further light on the subject may come from study of an
incident in which the small launcher was given decisive use against human targets.
在我们普通韩国战地指挥官的考量中，结合这里的战斗条件，3.5寸的火箭筒在任何情况下都要比小巴祖卡有用的多，他们认为没有必要在步兵武器系统内列装后者。这造成，大量3.5寸火箭筒补充充裕。问题的解决可没那么容易。如果说巴祖卡作为一种有效的反单兵武器是正确的，也会因其操作手缺乏训练而限制其潜力的发挥，但由于其优于3.5寸超级巴祖卡的便携性，使他可以很好的替代超级巴祖卡——依据同样理由，尽管，81毫米的杀伤效果明显好，60毫米的迫击炮的使用更方便。这个项目的进一步明朗可能要取决于89毫米火箭筒是否能够在对抗步兵目标时取得绝对性作用研究。
THE BAZOOKA AGAINST MEN
用巴祖卡对抗步兵攻击
In the attack of the 1st Marine Division from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, the 5th
Marines assumed defense of the whole Hagaru-ri perimeter as the column got underway.
To ease the initial progress of the column, it was necessary to gain the high ground
east of the camp which had been held by CCF throughout the siege. The Regiment’s
Second Battalion was given the mission and soon won the heights. Prior to the action,
it had been reckoned that the Division as a whole would be able to clear Hagaru-ri by
nightfall. But fighting along the road had delayed the 7th Regiment and the Division
trains, so that the lead elements of the 5th Regiment had still not cleared by dark.
在陆战一师从Hagaru-ri到Koto-ri的攻击战斗中，陆战五团负责防守整个Hagaru-ri以掩护主力通过。为了让先遣车队通过，有必要占领营地东侧被中共军队占领的山林高地。五团二营负责执行这个任务，并且很快占据一些制高点。在行动前，预计傍晚时分全师可以通过Hagaru-ri。但一路上的战斗迟滞了陆战七团和师车队。导致陆战五团到夜间也未能撤离。
Easy Company held ground eastward of the river from a point approximately
700 yards north of the Hagaru-ri bridge around to the bottom of the main hill and
back along the railway track for about 200 yards. The right flank of the Company
ran along the railway approximately 400 yards east and north of the bridge. Between
1800 and 2000, the Chinese attacked from the high ground toward the bridge with the
apparent object of cutting off troops manning the western half of the perimeter.
Easy’s rocket team had been so stationed by Capt Sam Jeskilka that it could
fire straight up a draw which ran halfway up the hill then forked off into gullys. This
was the natural approach from the hill, as it was otherwise barren of cover. The Chinese
pressed forward along the alley, and during an attack which persisted in strength for
two hours and recurred intermittently through the night, this key feature was defended
by rockets.
E连占据的高地在河东侧约700码处，Hagaru-ri桥北边靠近主要山地的山脚，背后离铁路线大约200码。连的右翼沿铁路线400米延伸到桥的东北侧。在18时到20时之间，中国人从山林高地上冲下来，通过桥梁意图消灭环形防线西半部的守军。E连的火箭筒组正好由山姆 杰斯克里卡上尉指挥能够直接打击半山腰的溪沟。这里比较靠近山顶，没有多少植被。中国人沿着小路向上冲，一直持续了整整2个小时，并且在整个晚上也要反复冲锋。火箭筒守住了关键阵地。
On the following morning, CCF pulled back into the hills. Co1 R. L. Murray,
commander of the 5th Regiment, and Lt Co1 Hal Roise entered the draw and made a
cursory examination of the damage done by the 2.36 fire. There were more than 50
bodies on the ground, scattered anywhere from 20 yards to 200 yards from the launcher
position.
到次日清晨时，中共军队被迫退回到山里去。于是，陆战五团的指挥官R L 马里上校和哈尔 罗易斯中校草草视察了使用89毫米火箭弹的战场。发现沿着火箭筒位置从20码到200码的距离上有超过50具尸体。
Murray’s most amazing comment on the result was that his inspection of bodies
convinced him that practically all of the Chinese had died from burns - that WP
rounds had set their padded clothing afire. Jeskilka estimated more conservatively
that 60 percent of the deaths were due to burns and the rest to concussion and fragmentation.
His crew had fired quite a few HEAT rounds from the launchers. Jeskilka
said that while the Hagaru-ri affair was Easy’s outstanding use of'; the launcher, the
Company had become habituated to using it as an anti-personnel weapon at every
opportunity. It was therefore normal for the men to have final confidence in it in an
extreme emergency.
马里对大部分中国人尸体致命伤的检查结果十分震惊——这些伤口都是都是由于衣服的燃烧造成的。杰斯克里卡保守估计大约有60％的死者是由于烧伤，其他的则是冲击震荡和碎片杀伤。他的部下发射火箭弹时也有一些被尾焰烧伤。杰斯克里卡说由于在Hagaru-ri中，E连使用火箭筒的效果，这个连现在变得一有机会就用这种对抗步兵目标的武器。因此，人们对使用火箭筒有极高的热情和信心。
In the November fight against CCF along the Chongchon River, one of the most
mobile and aggressively successful defenses conducted anywhere along the American
line was the action by Company F, 38th Infantry Regiment. From a detailed and
lengthy narrative of this action, the following extract is made to illustrate the effect
of one 3.5 round upon the engagement:
在11月，沿Chongchon河，与中共军队的战斗中，38团F连的战斗是诸多美军防线随处可见的成功融合机动性和进攻性防御案例之一。从一份详细描述这支部队战斗的报告中，如下的描述是一个反应了3.5寸火箭筒情况的简报
“When the squad on the right flank of 3rd Platoon was withdrawn by Sgt Smith
because of the buildup of CCF fire against the nose of the ridge, that action left the
machine gun on the left flank of 1st Platoon’s position as the chief block to the enemy’s
main advance up the draw. There was a native hut to the right and forward of the
machine gun. Lt Lemuel English, who was in command of 1st Platoon, had one of his
BAR men, PFC Cleo Wachel, dug in right next to the house along the right rear corner.
Wachel was thus in line to assist the machine gun in covering the draw, and in fact,
as the fight developed, he bore the brunt of the defense. There were sandbags revetting
his foxhole. He could deliver a grazing fire right down the gut without unduly exposing
himself.
由于中共军队的火力点在山脊前伸处建立起来，3排右翼的那个班在斯密斯中士的指挥下撤退，只留下一挺机枪在1排的左翼阻止敌人的进一步进攻。在机枪的右前侧有一间小屋。1排排长莱弭尔 英格兰中士手下有一个巴祖卡发射手，一等兵克莱奥 瓦彻尔。他在房屋的右后侧挖了一个散兵坑。这样，瓦彻尔可以协助机枪手火力覆盖，事实上，当战斗激烈时，他也一同承受进攻的压力。有一些沙包堆积掩护了他的散兵坑，这样他可以在腰以下的高度发射而不用暴露自己。
“English deployed three riflemen to the rear of Wachel; they were told to fire
in time with Wachel and to cut down any skirmishers making a sneak run toward his
position. As the Chinese came up the footpath, Wachel was first to open fire on them.
He had to be pretty delicate about it. Some of the GIs from 3rd Platoon had been withdrawing
along this same path, and he wasn’t sure that they had all cleared. So, in the
darkness, it was a problem to make certain that he was firing on an enemy target.
英格兰部属三名步枪手在瓦彻尔的后侧，他们被告知和瓦彻尔一同行动，并且切断任何迂回瓦彻尔攻击位置的偷袭行为。当中国人开始从小路上冲时，瓦彻尔率先开火。他必须十分小心。3排的其他士兵都从这条路上往上撤，而他不能肯定他们都上来了。特别是在由于晚上。他很难确定是否准确打中敌人目标。
“The Chinese got to within 25 yards of the BAR. Wachel challenged them, and
they opened fire with two tommy guns. Then Wachel let them have a burst. Even
so, they did not go flat. Only a few moved at a time, and they came on in short rushes,
taking cover behind the rocks or at the far side of the house, but remaining standing.
Immediately after the first skirmishers moved up, the Chinese set up a machine gun
on the flat ground directly in front of the BAR position. Both Wachel and the riflemen
behind him took the gun under fire, but they couldn’t get a clear idea of its position
though it was less than 100 yards distant, and it continued to fire away. More of the
Chinese worked up to the house and took positions next it, with only the building separating
them from Wachel. Grenades began to come in on 1st Platoon’s left flank, but
the throwing was inaccurate and the explosions didn’t worry the men. Then WacheI
had a sudden idea; he set the house ablaze by firing into the roof. The thatch burned
brightly and the scene became well illuminated. Together, the light and the heat drove
back the Chinese who had moved in next the house. The machine gun kept firing.
当中国人离巴祖卡只有25码时，瓦彻尔开火攻击，而敌人也用两支汤姆冲锋枪还击。然后瓦彻尔发射了一枚火箭。然而敌人并没有卧倒，而是持续冲锋，又冲了一段后，找岩石掩护，在离房子较远的距离，则仍然是站着的。第一波散兵攻击一开始，中国人就在巴祖卡前面平坦的地方架起了机枪。瓦彻尔和他后面的步枪手用枪还击，但他们对前方100码以上的目标没有任何概念。只是持续开火。越来越多的中国人冲到房屋边上，并且占据了这个和瓦彻尔只有一墙之隔的有利位置。手榴弹开始投到1排的左侧，只是精度不够还不足以威胁到他们。这时瓦彻尔有了奇想，他点燃了屋顶。屋顶迅速被烧亮并且照亮了周围的情况。光和热驱退了那些冲到房屋边的中国人。机枪又开始持续开火了。
“In a few minutes, from ground to the rear of the machine gun, the Chinese
opened fire with a 60-mm mortar against 1st Platoon’s left flank and the CP position.
Very quickly, they unloaded about 20 rounds on this critical area. Lt Stevens, Lt
Coleman, Lt Benson, and five enlisted men were hit by the mortar fire. Lt John N.
Knight moved one of the Company’s 60 mortars out to the left of the platoon’s line and
opened fire on the enemy mortar; for several minutes there was a direct duel between
the two pieces, with both crews serving their weapons about equally. Then the Chinese
dropped one round right amid the mortar crew. Three men were wounded, and though
the tube was not damaged, it ceased fire temporarily. Sitting a little way up the slope
from Wachel and the machine gun was Sgt Paul West, with a 3.5 launcher in his lap.
几分钟内，从开阔地到机枪巢后面，中国人用60毫米迫击炮打击1排的左翼和中部防线。很快他们就在这狭窄的地域投下20发迫击炮弹。斯蒂文中士，克莱曼中士，拜森中士和其他五名士兵立即中弹负伤。约翰 N 莱特中士移来一门连直属的60毫米迫击炮到排阵地的左外侧，开火压制敌人迫击炮。双方炮击位置互相对射了几分钟。随后中国人的一发炮弹准确命中炮位。虽然炮没有被打坏，不过三名炮兵都负伤了，直接导致迫击炮哑火，在瓦彻尔和机枪点后面斜坡上一点点距离是保罗 维斯特中士，他的手边正好有一具3.5寸火箭筒。
He had been watching the action, but so far had taken no part in it. So he raised the
launcher and let. go one rocket,. His first round hit the Chinese mortar dead on - at
225 yards range. It was the luckiest kind of a fluke shot. That cooled off the enemy
force attncking up the draw. When the mortar and crew were knocked out, their
machine gun went silent. The pressure was then deflected to an entirely new quarter.”
他观察了整个过程，但并没有参加战斗。于是他举起火箭筒，发射了一枚火箭弹。第一轮就命中了225码远的中国人迫击炮位。十分幸运的射击。这直接压制了敌人的进攻。随着迫击炮和迫击炮组被敲掉。他们的机枪也沉寂下来。压力缓解了一刻钟。
l In the defense of Hagaru-ri, Company I, 1st Marine Regiment, knocked out
two Hotchkiss machine guns at 150 yards range, using the 3.5 launcher at night. One
other gun was knocked out at somewhat shorter range. The crew commented that
they had to light> matches to set the sights on the launcher. They said that luminous
sights are badly needed for night operations.
在Hagaru-ri的防御中，陆战1团I连在夜间150码的距离上用3.5寸火箭筒敲掉两挺哈开斯奇重机枪（可能是日制6.5mm三年式重机枪）。还有一挺是在近一些的距离上。火箭筒手评价说，他们只有划亮火柴来照亮火箭筒，而在夜间行动中，这样的亮光是十分需要的。 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:50 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/01/25 12:33pm 第 1 次编辑]
迫击炮
迫击炮族
我军迫击炮族的整体表现卓越。这几种迫击炮能够充分地服务于战术意图。所有这三种口径——4.2英寸，81mm和60mm的迫击炮都得到了广泛应用。在由朝鲜地形所造成的各种环境中，每一种口径的迫击炮在支援火力的合理规划中都扮演了独特的角色。
比起二战中我军的军事行动，在朝鲜的步兵战斗中可能更典型化地体现为激烈的迫击炮战。步兵指挥官们了解了更多迫击炮的相关知识，也比以前更有把握发挥迫击炮的全部潜能。
朝鲜——无穷无尽、层峦叠嶂的崇山峻岭——是迫击炮大显身手的天然舞台。因为中国敌人在夜袭中努力于近距离压制我方阵地，而当我军知晓敌军发动进攻时，敌军散兵线已经隐蔽起来预防我军炮击了，所以迫击炮就被赋予了多种多样的决定性射击任务。
限制迫击炮在战斗中发挥作用的主要因素通常是弹药不足而非运用生疏。每一级指挥官都能充分了解迫击炮的作用。
产生这种限制因素的原因已经很清楚了。步兵营，某些时候是个别的步兵连，坚守阵地，要在主抵抗线上与其他部队的分遣队保持联系。这支部队可能在其最近的支援单位左右1500～000码，支援它的野战炮兵前2000～4000码的地方。这支部队的阵地通常位于前线的山顶或山脊，或位于能掩护河床和公路的一夫当关、万夫莫开的隘口。最近的补给站要将补给送上这些山头，也必须进行长途拖运。因此，由于弹药装载量的限制，被投入战场的是威力多少有些小的60mm迫击炮。如果81mm迫击炮也被前送，那么一般情况下它们将会短缺弹药。
通常60mm迫击炮的阵地位于我军高地反斜面的洼地或山脚下。在防御时，通常在指挥所附近设置迫击炮群。在进攻时，当我军尖兵向地平线前进时，需要在洼地或山沟寻找一处接近地平线的阵地以隐蔽迫击炮。当进攻局部阵地时，中共军队几乎从不使用从后方全力冲击的战术，他们习惯于沿正面或侧翼的缓坡（特别是覆盖着树木和灌木丛的缓坡）发动进攻。因此，对我方连队的伴随迫击炮最主要威胁是敌方迫击炮的火力。
然而无论将迫击炮配置在作战半径内还是大部队的后方，较重型的迫击炮总能从远距离支援作战。由于朝鲜是个多丘陵的国度，而且敌人缺乏空中支援和强大炮兵，这便是一项实实在在的火力优势。
对方的炮兵如果给我军的迫击炮带来危险，步枪防线后数百码内也总是有可隐蔽地架起迫击炮的地方。常常出现这种情况：只要地面最适合安置迫击炮，能以水平视角向敌军占据的山头发射炮弹，且在敌军发射子弹的火器的有效射程之外，81mm迫击炮和4.2英寸迫击炮就大胆地架设在空旷地。
81mm迫击炮，4.2英寸迫击炮，75mm无后坐力炮，有时包括多用途防空武器，在一个炮兵群内从同一位置向一个宽大目标实施集火射击，这种情况也不少见。这是在白天的战斗中为进攻提供支援的火力配置方式。这种紧密协同的联合射击中各武器的激烈竞争往往导致弹药的过度消耗。
MORTARS
THE FAMILY
The general performance by the family of mortars has been excellent. The several mortars serve the tactical need quite adequately. All three -the 4.2, 81-mm, and 60-mm - are given extensive use. Under the conditions imposed by the Korean terrain, each type has its particular role in the development of a balanced program of supporting fires.
Strong mortar action is perhaps more generally characteristic of the pattern of infantry fighting in Korea than of our operations during World War II. Infantry commanders have greater awareness of the mortar and are more likely to make full use of the mortar potential than previously.
Korea - being an unending complex of steep hills and sharp-faced ridges -is natural mortar country. Because the Chinese enemy in the night attack endeavors to smother the position at close range and his attacking line is frequently in defilade to our artillery fires by the time the attack is sensed, the mortars are given a wide variety of decisive fire missions.The limiting factor in mortar operation is usually the availability of ammunition rather than a failure at any command level to appreciate what the mortars can do.
Why this is so is readily seen. The battalions, and sometimes separate infantry companies, hold ground in relative detachment from other components of the MLR.
The unit may be 1500-3000 yards from its closest support on right and left and 2000-4000 yards forward of the supporting field artillery. Its position will usually be a hilltop or a ridge crest, if it is in the front line, or a defile covering a stream bed or roadway, if it is “blocking.” The hilltops are a long haul from the nearest supply point; the distance can be covered only by human carriers. Consequently, the 60-mm mortars are carried into the ground somewhat light as to ammunition load. If the 81s are also taken forward, in the average situation their ammunition, too, will be in short supply.
The usual 60-mm position is in a draw on the rearward slope of the friendly hill or at the base of it. On defense, the mortars customarily set up approximate to the CP. In the attack, they seek a position in defilade in a draw or ridge fold somewhere short of the skyline against which the rifle point is advancing. CCF almost never press an attack on the local ground in such way as to make a main impingement on the rear; habitually, they either attack from the front or from the flank via the gentlest slope (particularly if it is covered with tree and underbrush). In consequence, the main threat to the mortars which close with the company is the enemy mortar fire.
But however the unit is armed as to mortars operating from directly within the perimeter or setting up on the heels of the body in the attack, the heavier mortars are generally able to support the action from a distance. This is one of the very genuine fire advantages deriving from the hilliness of Korea and the enemy’s lack of air support and a competent artillery.
Within a few hundred yards to rear of the rifle line, there is always ground where the mortars can set up in defilade, if there is any danger from counter battery.Frequently, the situation is such that the 81s and 4.2s set up boldly in the open, wherever the ground is best for emplacing, and fire away in plain sight of the enemy-heid hill, out of practical range of his bullet-firing weapons.
It is not unusual to see the 81s, 4.2s, 75 recoilless, and sometimes the AA multiple-mount weapons all firing in battery from the same location against one broad target -this in support of the attack during daylight operations. The highly competitive aspects of this combined firing in close juncture tend to develop excessive expenditures.
严寒中的破损
“在朝鲜的步兵战术说明”这份文件已经涵盖了这个课题的很多细节。当气温在0℃ 到32℃之间时，迫击炮操作状态良好，没有什么特别严重的问题：地面仍有充分的弹性能缓冲对底盘的冲击力，升降螺丝杆也没有过度松动或磨损。当气温在-10℃到 -30℃之间时，情况就变得严峻了，如果迫击炮长时间以高速率发射，撞针还有特别是底盘的破损率就会使迫击炮报废。除了陆战一师在长津湖战役中的资料，我们在朝鲜的战斗经验中没有广泛的基本资料以进行这种对比。
长津湖战役是迫击炮长时间（12～14天）在零度以下的环境过度发射的唯一冬季战役。总的来说，各型迫击炮的耐用性在朝鲜冬季战役的过程中经受住了考验。在陆战一师，士兵们并没有抱怨过迫击炮的报废记录；尽管战役结束后，大多数迫击炮不得不整体或部分更换，虽然这一事实提醒我们备用零件的储备是在零度以下开展军事行动的先决条件，将士们依然觉得这并不反映出三种口径迫击炮中的任何一种缺乏耐用性。他们坦承高破损率是严寒条件下的过度发射所造成的，而不是因为武器结构存在什么缺陷。
BREAKAGE IN EXTREME COLD
This subject is covered in some detail in the document, “Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea.”During operations in temperatures ranging between 0℃ and 32℃, the mortars stand up well, and there are no extraordinary problems; the ground is still sufficiently yielding to cushion the shock to the base plates, and there is no undue loosening and wearing of the elevating screws. In temperatures ranging between -10℃ and -30℃, this condition appears to alter radically, and if the mortars are fired for prolonged periods at a high rate, the rate of breakage in firing pins and particularly in base plates becomes disabling to operations. Other than the data from the 1st Marine Division during the Chosen Reservoir operation, there is no broad basis from the Korean experience for the making of this comparison.
This was the only winter campaign wherein the mortars were fired excessively for prolonged periods (12-14 days) under sub-zero conditions. Over-all, the durability of the mortars in all sizes was well attested during the course of Korean winter operations. Troops had no complaint on this score; within the 1st Marine Division; despite the fact that most of the mortars had to be replaced in whole or in part when the operation was completed, the commanders and crews felt that this did not reflect a lack of serviceability in any of the three weapons, though it did warn that a surplus of spare parts was a prerequisite for sub-zero operations. They said frankly that the rate of breakdown was due to excessive firing in extreme cold rather than to any fault in the structure.
4.2英寸迫击炮
这种武器在朝鲜的步兵战斗中像驮马一样任劳任怨。没有任何一种更新式的武器被应用于更广泛的用途或在部队中赢得了更多的宠爱。士兵们众口一词地表达了对它的热爱。4.2英寸迫击炮既精确又耐用；它的一次炮击具有和一发105mm炮弹轰击相当的冲击力；在连续执行任务和显著缓解紧急情况方面，它可能比步兵团中其他任何武器作用都大。一大批营长、团长评论到：他们希望看到步兵团里配备双倍的4.2英寸迫击炮，并觉得由此带来的战斗力增长，在任何地形和气候条件下都绝不会仅仅证明增加这点负担是必要的，（它必然会产生更多的战术价值）。在古土里防御战中广泛使用4.2英寸迫击炮之后，刘易斯 普勒上校作了如下评论：真是完美武器。我们有敏捷而训练有素的迫击炮组，他们让八门迫击炮同时开火，我们发现他们可以在第一枚炮弹爆炸之前向空中打出96发炮弹。
THE 4.2
This weapon is the workhorse of infantry operations in Korea. None of the
other relatively new weapons has been put to more general usage or found greater favor among troops. The enthusiasm for it is unanimous. The 4.2 is accurate and sturdy; the round packs as much wallop as a 105-mm shell; for continuity of performance, and visible impact upon an emergency situation, it is valued perhaps more highly than any other weapon within the infantry regiment. A number of battalion and regimental commanders commented that they would like to see twice as many 4.2s within the infantry regiment, and that they felt that the gain in fighting power, under almost any condition of terrain and climate, would more than justify the added burden. This comment was made by Co1 Lewis Puller, after extensive use of the 4.2 in the defense of Koto-ri: “It is a beautiful weapon. With a fast and well-trained crew and with all eight mortars firing, we found it possible to put 96 rounds in the air before the first one burst.”
81mm迫击炮
在朝鲜战争的历次战役中，这种迫击炮如特洛伊城的卫兵一般守护着我军阵地。在朝鲜的战斗里，它发射的照明弹在有限的补给消耗殆尽之前效果特别良好。因为一般的连级阵地缺乏60mm照明弹的补给，所以81mm照明弹就要执行比在二战时更多的任务。81mm迫击炮照明弹为抵御夜袭的步兵连提供近距离火力支援时，可能比155mm炮弹更加有用，因为后者制造的光圈覆盖的面积太大，为进攻者提供了某些便利。
下面这个典型的战报摘录涉及1951年2月进攻440高地时实施81mm迫击炮火力的情况。这支部队是第27团的重火器连。指挥官弗兰克 L. 迪特里希中尉的记述如下：“我们在2月4日16点45分进入阵地，在那一晚并没有开火。在2月5日4点30分，我收到在我们右翼的第35团遭受敌军进攻的消息。为了支援第35团，我们向高地发射了155发炮弹。我们地图上的数据相当精确，弹着误差不超过100码。天亮以后不久，我们开始射击以支援第3营（第27团的第3营正在从左翼沿着山脉走向进攻440高地）。我们不停地向2800—3000码远的目标射击。在那个白天，我们一共打了500发炮弹，用弹药运送车补给了两次，消耗了可载重1吨拖车载弹量的3/4。其中，57发是白磷弹；两次齐射的效果都很糟；还有七八发臭弹。由于校正机损坏，我们也有几次哑火。在这次战斗中， L连的SCR 300电台出了故障；我们改用营里的有线网络，直到另一部无线电台在那里恢复工作。否则，那将是一次理想的射击——尽善尽美。这个炮兵连里有一门炮参与了朝鲜战争爆发以来所有的战役。”
在这个战例中，81mm迫击炮被用来轰击440高地中央的敌军步兵群，以其火力覆盖沿着山势通向敌军后方的狭窄的石路。当美军发展攻势时，4.2英寸迫击炮被用来向高地发射烟雾弹。M16半履带式自行高射机枪与81mm迫击炮的发射阵地基本相同，但其活动射角要大得多，可通过修正诸元使其弹着保持在我军先头散兵前约50码。这种高射机枪既可执行4.2英寸迫击炮发射烟雾弹的任务，也可执行81mm迫击炮发射高爆弹的任务
那天的天气完全适合使用烟雾弹。出现了预期的烟云效果，烟雾停留在山脊上很长时间。步兵需要30分钟掩护冲击距离的烟幕，这一措施对于减弱隐藏在440高地岩壁上的中共军队掩体内的机枪火力很有效果。但在所有武器冲出烟幕之前，这些烟幕只掩护了冲击距离的一小半。这位指挥官谈到这个问题“这都是由于缺乏经验。我们在一开始，甚至在我军尖兵进入合适的位置之前，放了太多的烟雾弹。我信任烟雾弹的使用价值，特别是它在进攻中的使用价值。但这次是我来到这个战区以后第一次用迫击炮发射它。因此，我削减了迫击炮弹药的供应量，结果当需要使用它们的时候，弹药就不敷分配了，甚至在必须完成机动的那段时间也是如此。”
THE 81-MM
This mortar has done trojan service throughout the Korean campaign, and its illuminating round was used with particularly good effect during the Korean fighting until the scant supply petered out. It is given relatively more work than during World War II because of the short supply of 60-mm shell in the average company position.For close support of the infantry company withstanding night attack, the 81 mortar illumination is probably better than the 155-mm artillery shell because the circle of light created by the latter often covers too large an area, yielding some advantage to the attacker.
This typical extract covers operation of the 81s during the attack on Hill 440 in February 1951. The unit was Heavy Weapons Company of the 27th Regiment. The description is by Lt Frank L. Dietrich, commanding: “We went into position at 1645 on 4 Feb but we did not fire that night. At 0430 on 5 Feb I got word that the 35th Regiment on our right was under attack. We fired 155 rounds against the Hill in support of the 35th. Our map data was almost exact; it came out within less than 100 yards. Shortly after daylight we began firing in support of the battalion (3rd Battalion of 27th Regiment which was attacking Hill 440 along its length from the left flank). We were firing at’ 2800-3000 yards range. During that day, we fired 500 rounds, resupplying twice with carriers, using 3/4 tons with one-ton trailers. Of this amount, 57 rounds were WP; two salvos were altogether bad; seven or eight other rounds failed. We have also had misfires from breakage of the projector that the charge fits on. During the operation we had one radio failure - the SCR 300 in Love Company; we changed over to the battalion wire net until we got another radio up there. Otherwise, it was perfect fire all the way through - right on the button. There is one barrel in the battery which has served all through the Korean campaign.”
The 81s in this case were employed to fire against the central mass of Hill 440, covering the narrow, stony passages along the heights and leading back to the enemy’s support area. The 4.2s were used to smoke the hill as the American attack developed. The AA quad-50s, firing from approximately the same ground as the 81s traversed over a much wider arc, adjusting so that their fire kept approximately 50 yards ahead of our most forward skirmishers. The artillery was used both to augment the 4.2 in smoking the hill and further the HE missions of the 81s.
The atmospheric conditions were just right for the use of smoke. The first cloud effects were promising; the smoke held fairly well to the ridge crest. The infantry needed about 30 minutes of smoke to cover the distance with relative immunity to the CCF machine guns firing from bunkers tucked away among 440’s rocky ledges. But they had bounded not more than half the distance before all weapons ran out of smoke. The commander said this about it: “It was all due to lack of practice. We laid the smoke on too heavy in the beginning even before we had moved into the right area.I believe in the use of smoke, particularly in the attack. But this was the first time I’ve used it - with mortars - for screening since I’ve been in the Theater. Consequently the mortars had cut down on the amount they carry for our support, and when called on to use it, they couldn’t apportion it, evenly, according to the time required to work out the maneuver.”
建议采取的改进措施：
为改进81mm迫击炮，使其在步兵团中发挥更大的战术校能，多位指挥官提出了如下意见：
尽一切办法减轻重量，以增强其越野机动性；
改进结构，使长炮管可拆解更换为短炮管，这样就可以在保留强大的近程冲击力的同时减轻负重；
分段铸造底盘，使负重均匀分布；
改进升降螺丝杆的冶炼或设计，升降螺丝杆的损坏和迅速磨损现在是这种武器主要的结构缺陷。
SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS
Among the suggestions put forward by various commanders for modifying the 81-mm so as to make it more useful to the infantry regiment there were the following:
Lighten it in “any manner possible” to increase its cross-country mobility.
Build it so that it could be broken down from a long barrel to a short barrel, thus making a lighter pack possible while preserving its heavy punch at the short ranges.
Sectionalize the base plate so that the load can be distributed.
Alter metallurgically or in design the elevating screw, the breaking and rapid wearing of which is now the chief structural weakness in the weapon.
60mm迫击炮
60mm迫击炮有几种型号的弹药性能不可靠，这种武器在朝鲜的军事行动中所受的主要批评都是因此而起。1951年1月在临津江畔试射60mm照明弹时，第25步兵师发现这种弹药的35%存在缺陷。这些照明弹能飞出炮管，但不能发光。
11月的会战中，在更寒冷的环境下，陆战1师在古土里和下碣隅里战斗中发射这些照明弹，80%到90%的炮弹照明效果都很糟。
60mm白磷弹的表现也劣迹斑斑。在报告中，60mm白磷弹比81mm白磷弹出的故障要多。在冬季的军事行动中，即使保守地说，每5发60mm白磷弹中也至少有1发臭弹。
THE 60-MM
The unreliability of 60-mm ammunition in several types is the cause of chief criticism of the weapon in Korean operations.
In test firing of the 60 illuminating shell along the Imjin River in January 1951, the 25th Infantry Division found that the ammunition was approximately 35 percent defective. The round would leave the tube but would not produce a light.
Firing in combat, under more extreme cold, the 1st Marine Division at Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri got 80 to 90 percent negative results with the same round in the November battle.
The WP round has also performed spottily; more failures are reported with the 60 than with the 81 WP. It is conservative to say that during winter operations at least one in every five WP 60-mm rounds failed.
作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:51 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 手榴弹
主要武器之一
格兰特的部队在维克斯堡战役中偶然发现了手榴弹的价值，与之相似，由于朝鲜的地势，敌军对手榴弹的使用也要求我们用这种武器回敬他们，朝鲜的战斗中手榴弹的重要性在不断增长。几乎毫无例外，所有在朝鲜的战斗中都有手榴弹的使用。与消耗的手榴弹数目相比，美军在朝鲜使用手榴弹的方式与一战或二战中的使用方式别无二致，（毫无进步）。
因此，我军在训练方面准备不足。在早些时候，对手榴弹和枪榴弹的评价都偏低；极少有投弹专家准备好了去训练他人；在班里，士兵们不知道怎么组织一个投弹组，系统地进行战地投弹；对手榴弹的供给缺乏或根本没有管理，这导致了巨大的浪费。通过从实战检验和失误中学到的经验教训，上述局面已经逐渐改善。
总之，手榴弹是当前战斗中的主要武器之一，但是我军的训练却从没有预料到这样的情势。不幸的是，从差不多自1918年以来这种武器的训练记录来看，我军练习投弹时几乎把全部精力都用于准备堑壕袭击战和清除障碍物，（而忽略了其他方面）。“既然一个普通美国人都知道怎么扔石头，那么把大量精力投入到手榴弹技术上只是浪费训练时间”，近年来，受到这种理论或多或少的影响，我们继续沿着老路走下去，（缺乏创新）。
因此，虽然49% 的美国士兵有良好的臂力可用于投掷，我们的投弹战术却在很大程度上只能算是普普通通，尽管到处都有偶尔的出色表现。
在高低起伏的山地国家，投弹的实际效果与对付一个堑壕体系或加强的灌木篱墙没什么不同。在这种地形下，敌方存在射击盲区，这个区域可以为爆破手提供保护。一个膂力强劲的投弹手可以肃清前方20—35码远的所有地域。当他抬起身体投掷手榴弹的时候，他所在小组的同伴可为他提供掩护。他能通过接力传送的方式得到补给。在手榴弹爆炸的掩护下，这个小组可趁机跃进。这个程序并不复杂，但必须组织好人员去实现它，它成功与否与关键人员的选择联系紧密。在白天进攻顺着山脊延伸的堑壕阵地时，在战术上除了接近敌军防线上最近的缺口之外没什么别的东西。即使这样，我军步兵在山顶的战斗中仍然没有广泛应用这种方法，因为他们中没有人被教授过。仅仅在偶尔的情况下，某个有灵感的下级军官或某个行动坚决的班凭经验实施了这种战术并发现它的确有效。
在夜间防御中，有效使用手榴弹本来可以在对付中共军队的早期战役中给美军以极大的利益。中国人把自己当成了掷弹兵；他们也幻想：美军被这种武器吓破了胆，手榴弹能严重挫伤美军的士气（这是从十一月的会战中缴获的中共军队秘密文件得知的，这份文件是关于在进攻中的武器使用的，它绝对地陈述了那些看法。敌人的战术完全遵循这些教条也证实了这一点）。但是正如在早先的战斗中一次次地证明的那样，敌人的这两条都错了。中共士兵作为投手臂力孱弱，在身体上并不适合攻击性地使用这种武器。我军士兵曾轻蔑地划线标记中国人的（轻木柄型）手榴弹的投掷距离。
敌人的这些战术选择，再加上他们缺乏执行它们的天赋，本来可以在随之而来的依靠臂力交锋的战斗中给与我们一项宝贵的优势。要是我军士兵曾准备过这种战斗，为此进行过训练， 了解开始和发展战斗时如何补给，（他们就能够取得这种优势）。然而实际情况却不是这样。的确，对于任何一种武器，如果只对它进行一般地、肤浅地而不是坚强有力、富有想象力的训练，士兵们就会低估它潜在的战斗价值，忽视“未与敌军接触时应节约弹药”的原则，而且，在战斗开始后不能迅速领会如何根据形势使用武器。除非战士们特别接受过投弹教学，他们便不能以投弹手的思维考虑问题。迄今为止在约30年的时间里，陆军低估了系统地进行投弹训练的价值和在每个步兵连里配备数名投弹专家的极度必要性。在朝鲜，我们不得不为这项疏忽付出代价。
当我军与中共军队交战时，他们从未准备好在近距离内换用不同武器。枪榴弹发射器早早被丢弃。在行进间，士兵们粗心大意地投光了手榴弹。需要在该地重新使用手榴弹时，再教导该连“节约弹药以便发现合适目标时能及时投掷，而不要在空旷地上炸出一声巨响。”已经太迟，不能保证在夜间防御中自始至终都能有效地使用手榴弹了。如何使手榴弹和子弹形成合成火力，士兵们知道得很少或根本不知道。给臂力强劲和活跃的投手分配较多的手榴弹，可能会对该连取得最好的结果有利，但我们没有发现这种情况。所有对手榴弹的使用都是不协调的、随意的。
未接受过投弹训练的下级军官在夜战中不能认清战术形势，不能根据形势下达使用照明枪榴弹、手榴弹和近距离杀伤弹的命令。因此，他们也就没有急迫地要求上级提供这些弹药。等到士兵们开始了解到这些可能使用的战术手段并临时准备使自己的投弹发挥更大的效力的方法时，数周时间已经过去了。
从朝鲜战役中得到的主要教训之一是：陆军应当恢复投弹教学，并以和一战时差不多的方式促进士兵在服役期间系统地、明智地掌握这种武器。
GRENADES
ONE OF THE MAIN WEAPONS
As happened with Grant’s troops in the Vicksburg campaign, the hand grenade has become of ever-increasing importance in the Korean fighting because the ground and the enemy’s use of it necessitated a return to this weapon. Practically without exception, all in-fighting in Korea is attended by hand-grenade action. In comparison to the numbers engaged, use of the hand grenade by American troops in Korea is manifold what it was in either World War I or II.
For this our forces were ill-prepared in point of training; in the early stages, appreciation of the usefulness of the grenade (both hand and rifle) was at a low ebb; there were few specialists at hand who were prepared to coach others; within the squad, men did not know how to organize as a grenade team for the systematic bombing-out of ground; there was little or no control over grenade supply, which resulted in large wastage. That the situation has gradually improved is due to what has been learned through combat trial and error.
In sum, the grenade is one of the main weapons of the fighting, but training had never anticipated any such condition, Unfortunately, that has been pretty much the training history of this weapon since 1918, when grenade practice, in anticipation of trench-raid operation and the clearing of traverses, was rather thorough. In more recent years, we have proceeded more or less according to the theory that since an average American knows how to throw a rock, it is a waste of training time to devote any large amount of attention to grenade technique.
In consequence, though approximately 49 percent of American troops have good throwing arms, our grenade tactics are for the most part mediocre, with just here and there an occasional brilliant performance.
In its practical effects, grenading in uneven hill country is not unlike going against a trench system or a fortified hedgerow. There is dead space which can be used for the bomber’s protection. One strong-armed thrower can clean out, all ground 20-35 yards to his fore. Part of his team can cover him when he rises to throw. He can be kept supplied by relay. Under cover of the explosion, the group can bound ahead. There is nothing complex about this procedure; but men do have to be organized for it, and its success usually hinges around the selection of the key man. In daylight attack against dug-in positions along the ridge crests, there isn’t anything else in tactics which is more likely to close the last gap. Even so, there is no general application of this method by our infantry in the hilltop fighting because none has been taught. Only now and then an inspired junior leader or a determined squad empirically puts it into effect and discovers that it works.
In night defense, efficient use of the hand (and rifle) grenade would have given American forces a heavy advantage in the early stages of the campaign against CCF. The Chinese fancy themselves to be grenadiers; also, they were suffering from the illusion that American troops were unduly fearful of this weapon and that it had an extremely demoralizing effect upon them, (This is known because of the capture, during the November battle, of a secret, CCF paper on weapons usage in the attack which categorically stated these propositions, and because the tactics pursued followed this instruction absolutely.) But the enemy was mistaken on both counts, as was proved time and again in the early fighting. The CCF were not physically suited to aggressive use of this weapon, being weak-armed throwers. Our troops had toward the Chinese grenade (light potato-masher type) a scorn bordering on contempt.
The enemy’s election of these tactics, combined with his lack of natural aptitude for them, would have given us a priceless advantage in the arm’s length fighting which followed, had our men been prepared by training and the state of their supply to recognize the opening and exploit it. Such was not, the case. It is true of any weapon that when training is generally of superficial character, instead of being vigorous and imaginative, troops will put a low estimate on the probable fighting value of the weapon, be careless of its conservation when not in contact with the enemy, and, after the fighting starts, will be slow to see how use of the weapon should be applied to the situation. Men in battle cannot think as grenadiers unless they have been specially schooled as grenadiers. For almost 30 years now the Army has discounted the value of systematic grenade training and the pre-eminent worth of having a few grenade specialists in each infantry company. The price for this neglect has been exacted in Korea.
When our forces began to engage CCF, they were in no wise prepared for the exchange at short range. Rifle-grenade launchers had been thrown away. The troops had carelessly disposed of their hand grenades during the advance. When re-issue was effected on the spot, it was too late to school the company in the efficient use of the grenade in night defense toward the end that the weapon could be conserved for timely use against suitable targets instead of exploded to make noise over relatively empty terrain. The troops knew little or nothing about how to use grenade fire and bullet fire in combination. It was not seen that for the good of the company the best results would ensue if a larger share of grenades were given to the strong-armed and active throwers. All that was done with respect to employment of this weapon was uncoordinated and haphazard.
Not, having been grenade-trained, junior leaders did not recognize that the tactica1 situation in the night fight was made to order for the illuminating rifle grenade, the hand grenade, and close-range fragmentation bombing of the revealed targets. In consequence they did not press upon higher command any demands for these materials. Weeks passed before men within the squads began to recognize these possibilities and to improvise methods which would give greater effectiveness to their own grenading.
One of the main lessons of the Korean campaign is that the grenade school should be restored by the Army and used in about, the same way as during World War I to promote systematic and intelligent understanding of the weapon throughout the service.
寒冷天气时的操作
在零度以下的战斗中，手榴弹对使用者自身是个非常严重的威胁。因为寒冷，手榴弹的栓销很难拔开，因此在投弹前必须脱下手套。只要握住这些冰冷的金属几秒钟，手指就会冻僵。尽管使用者的握持时间只足以使栓销松动并将手榴弹投出，在多个步兵连中仍因此产生了冻伤。此外，在冬季战斗中，放在开在散兵坑侧面的泥搁架上的手榴弹，很快会从半冻结的地面上吸收潮气因而失效。很多连级军官得出这样一个结论: 由于上述原因，目前的这些手榴弹在零下20℃或更低气温下是无用的。
COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS
In sub-zero operations the hand grenade is a source of deadly danger to the user. The pin is hard to extract because of the cold; therefore the mitten must be removed prior to throwing. The cold metal, held in the hand for only a few seconds, will freeze the fingers. Infantry companies took frostbite losses from this cause even though the users held the bomb only long enough to work the pin loose and get the grenade away. Furthermore, in the winter fighting, grenades placed on a dirt shelf cut into the side of the foxhole soon absorbed moisture from the half-frozen ground and became inoperative. Many company officers reached the conclusion that for these reasons the present grenade is useless during in-fighting in temperatures running -20 and lower.
总体效能
在进行夜间环形防御时，不可能去评估美军投弹对敌军行动的影响有多大。询问参战人员的结果只表明：在一般性的射击中使用了过多的手榴弹，结果当活动目标在近距离出现的危急关头来临时手榴弹就不足了。在近距离战斗中敌军战斗群被我军集中使用的手榴弹明确阻止或摧毁的战例很少，在非常适宜使用手榴弹的情况下发挥领导才能指导士兵们协同使用这种武器的战例则更加罕见。
在朝鲜，手榴弹并不像在二战时那样广泛地用于扫荡残敌。除了因为敌军的山顶掩体经常在投弹手接近它之前就已被我军的平射武器摧毁，还因为敌军严重缺乏重装备。然而，当步兵别无他法只能依靠直接攻击夺取阵地时，投进敌军掩体枪眼的那些手榴弹的轰鸣通常才是致命一击。
没有使用枪榴弹的战例。在这项分析涉及的所有军事行动中，我军都没有使用过这种武器，只有我们的敌人中共军队使用过它。在山顶的战斗中，枪榴弹可能会非常有效，交战双方的距离与它的射程正好匹配。可是，我军士兵早早就丢弃了枪榴弹发射器。
在朝鲜的战斗中，除了严寒中的军事行动，发给部队的爆破型手榴弹大体能够满足战术需要。
更有经验的士兵们评论道：不管在何种情况下，带锯齿的改进过的蛋形手榴弹在攻防作战中更加实用，只要让一个一般臂力的投手攻击性地使用它就可以了。这个人可以是玩过棒球的或者在高中以后有打橄榄球的相当经验的士兵。一个连队里总有这样的人。他们可以很自然地使用这种武器，而且更有可能击中目标。
在我们所研究的连级战斗中，都使用了手榴弹，还没有出现美军因己方手榴弹火力伤亡的实例，不论是因为手榴弹过早爆炸还是因为距弹着区太近。
除严寒天气以外的战斗中，我军手榴弹的哑弹率如此之低令人觉得有些不可思议；而在另一方面，数据显示20%至30%的中共军队的手榴弹因为机械故障或操作不当未能爆炸。
GENERAL UTILITY
Under the conditions of the night perimeter defense, it is impossible to make any estimate of the effectiveness of American grenading upon enemy action. Interrogation shows only that perhaps an excessive percentage of grenade is used in genera1 fire, resulting in subsequent shortages during the crisis when there are live targets within close range. There are very few clean-cut examples of an enemy group being stopped or destroyed by concentrated use of the grenade during close action, and even fewer examples of leadership directing coordinated use of the weapon in situations well suited to it.
The grenade is not used as extensively for mop-up purposes in Korea as during World War II operations because of the enemy’s general lack of heavy installations, other than the hilltop bunkers, which are usually knocked out by flat-trajectory weapons before the grenadiers can close in. However, when the infantry has no recourse but to take the position by direct assault, the sing of a few grenades through the embrasures is the accustomed coup de grace.
There are no examples of the use of rifle grenades. The weapon was not used during any of the operations included in the analysis, except by the CCF enemy. Rifle grenades could have proved useful in the hilltop fighting; the distance between the engaging sides was usually such that its range was appropriate. But the launchers had been thrown away.
Except for operations in extreme cold, the issue explosive-type grenade is generally satisfactory to the tactical need in the Korean fighting.
The more experienced troops comment, however, that the serrated, modified Mills bomb is more practical for both offensive and defensive uses, so long as it is employed offensively by an average strong-armed thrower. This would include individuals who have played baseball or have had considerable experience with passing the football in their high school years or later. There are always such men in a company. They can use the weapon in a natural way and they are more likely to get it on the target.
In the company actions taken under study, all of which made some use of the hand grenade, there is no instance of an American casualty resulting from our own grenade fire, either in consequence of a premature explosion or from being too close to the impact area.
The percentage of dud grenades is so small as to be inconsequential except in extreme cold weather; on the other hand, the figures indicate that somewhere between 20 and 30 percent of CCF grenades do not fire because of defects either in the mechanism or in the handling. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:54 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/02/22 12:40pm 第 1 次编辑]
十一月会战
从步兵那里了解到的事实
获得可靠情报除了能对制定建设性的公共政策产生积极影响以外，还能增强战斗行动中的效率。
步兵，在正常情况下作为战争中的主力，要与敌军的战斗部队做最持久的接触，可以把他比作获取战斗情报的机器的天线。
他最接近敌军，擅长收集各种敌情，并且准备好了应用这项资源使全军尽可能地获益。以上这些步兵的天职应该是不言自明的，完全系统化的，而且应通过在训练中投入更多注意力得到增强。
以下是第27步兵团G连对它在1950年11月清川江以西战斗所作叙述的摘录：
THE NOVEMBER BATTLE
FACTS FROM THE INFANTRY
Quite apart from the effect of sound information procurement upon the forming of constructive public policy is its influence toward increased efficiency in combat operations.
Infantry, being the body which under the normal situation in war maintains the most persistent contact with the fighting parts of the enemy, is the antenna of the mechanism of combat intelligence.
Being closest to the enemy, its receptiveness to all phenomena pertaining to the enemy, and its readiness to use this resource toward the fullest possible benefit to the total force, should be almost axiomatic, thoroughly systematized, and made acute through increased attention to the problem during training.
The following is an extract taken from the narrative of George Company, 27th Infantry Regiment, concerning its operation west of the Chongchon River in November 1950:
马文 P. 马丁上士——1排面对的山坡几乎完全被森林所覆盖，但在我们所在散兵坑的正前方高地有一段距离是无遮蔽的。
SFC MARVIN P. MARTIN - Facing 1st platoon, the slope was almost a forest, but directly in front of our pits, the rise was bare for a short distance.
约翰 F. 兰德中尉——我们都进入工事隐蔽。那里原来有些旧散兵坑，它们太小，美国兵很难钻进去。所以我们拓宽、加深了这些散兵坑。周围的泥土很新鲜。散兵坑的尺寸以及泥土的新鲜程度是告诉我们“敌人就在附近”的第一个警告。
LT JOHN F. LAND- We were well dug in. There were old holes up there. They were too small for a GI to fit in. So we widened and deepened them. The earth around was fairly fresh. The size of the holes and the freshness of the earth was the first tip-off that the enemy must be somewhere close around.
杰克 麦凯利上尉——我开始到处察看。随后，我就发现了树林中驮畜留下的粪便。我曾估计这些散兵坑是五天之前挖的，但这些粪便很新鲜；在当时滴水成冰的天气里，这些粪便还没有冻硬，所以我推断它们是刚刚拉出来的。
CAPT JACK MICHAELY - I began looking around. Then I found dung from pack animals down among the trees. I had estimated that the holes had been dug five days before.But the dung was fresher; the weather was freezing but the dung had not hardened. So I concluded they had pulled out quite recently.
马丁——在我们阵地前方，树林的紧右边，有一幢框架结构的建筑。它伪装良好，看上去像是个观察所。这个区域的某些地方已被凝固汽油弹烧焦。或许这就是敌人被赶走的原因，或者可能是多尔文特遣队迫使他们撤退了。
MARTIN - There was a frame building in front of our position and right next to the trees. It was well camouflaged and looked like an OP. Some of the area had been burned with napalm. Maybe that was what drove them or maybe TF Dolvin had made them retire.
约翰 w. 肯尼迪上士——我们在那幢建筑物里发现了一些葫芦。敌人曾用这些葫芦当碗。几颗米粒还粘在“碗”沿上。我用指头按了按，它们还很柔软。
SFC JOHN w. KENNEDY- We found gourds in that building. They had been using the gourds for eating bowls. There were small particles of rice still clinging to the sides of the bowls. Under the pressure of my fingers they were still pliable.
此次以及其他类似事件，暗示出美军士兵具有出色的但（目前只是）潜在的侦察才能，这种才能可通过在训练中进行某种强化得到发扬。它将在非正规作战中发挥巨大价值。
This incident, and others of the same sort, suggest that in the US soldier there is a marked but latent talent for scouting that could be developed through somewhat more emphasis in training. It would be of great value in irregular-type warfare.
除了在游击战中，我们在本世纪的其他军事行动并不是特别需要侦察才能。因此，在训练中它被给予较少的关注，因此我军将士不得不在很大程度上依靠自己的主动性去发挥搜集情报的本领。
甚至当连级部队已有些明白依靠这些原始的方法获得的情报的重要性时，他们也不大可能向上级报告这些情报。除非通过训练，他们牢记：“当敌军威胁到全军的利益时，无论入伍多久，哪怕是一个新兵都应该去了解关于敌军的出现、移动和习惯的情报”。
我军有一个由来已久的缺点：在战斗中，步兵侦察队所了解到的情报的最至关重要的部分从未反馈到营级。
在野战中，步兵应该是关于敌军战术、武器使用、战勤体系、习惯和一般本性的情报的最具创造性的来源。
陆军是否认识到了步兵这项任务的真正意义并准备好了去有效利用它？这确实是个问题。
我军情报参谋的工作程序是按这种目的设计的：榨干任何一个落入我军步兵手中的敌军士兵所知道的情报。他们几乎没有认识到：要了解敌军，从我军士兵在队伍中看到的、听到的和感觉到的情报中可能会收获更多。
我军在这个情报领域，并没有稳定的析取情报的方法。只有将情报综合，进行图上分析，然后推断出教训。因此就丧失了时间，本来能预测的事物也只能靠碰运气，很多机会也就被浪费了。
在第八集团军内对步兵所获取的情报进行分析最初存在阻碍，但这个阻碍为一个主要的有利因素所补偿。
这个阻碍就是：委员会里只有一名军官负责分析步兵战斗并在十一月会战中迅速地穿行于第八集团军和第十军共六个师的前线，而这项使命本应由至少六名受过专项训练的军官组成的参谋部来完成。有利因素就是第八集团军参谋部，特别是作战部副部长威廉 布洛克上校和情报部副部长兼战斗情报处长罗伯特 G. 弗格森上校无条件的支持。所有的下级军官都全心全意，甚至是狂热地配合工作。
除了更加强调军事行动的后勤方面以及详尽调查我军在战斗中体察到的与敌军有关的一切情报之外，这个工作程序和二战后陆军战史专家们的标准工作程序没什么明显的不同。
步兵连和炮兵连是讯问的主要对象。委员会还会见了负责制定行动计划、作出影响决策的评估的重要高级军官。
要对比步兵和炮兵队伍中发生的真实情况与二线人员对局势的感觉，除此之外别无他法。
首先，在从战斗连队那里了解到的情报的基础上，对中共军队的战术、部署方式、装备、武器使用、火力效能、侦查手段、信号、补给等方面有了确切的评估。这些情报很快由第八集团军司令向所部发布；它们的密级低，所以可以在排级传播，在这一级别可以产生最大利益。除了对中共军队的分析，报告中相当着重与敌军接触过的我军步兵的激烈战斗。因此，第八集团军参谋部认为有必要立即向部队下发这份报告，尽管依照分析家的观点，当时这项工作还远没有完结，这份报告只包含了对战斗中出现的症结所作的一定精度的取样，而不是对整个前线的全面调查。然而，第八集团军参谋部的判断被证明是完全正确的。在以后的军事行动中，更深入地进行分析后，没有使最初的发现的任何关键之处失效的新发现。“歪打正着”。
因为先前出版的备忘录《朝鲜战争步兵战斗注解》中已作了对小战术资料的评价，在这里就没有必要讨论它了。然而，从对第2步兵师的最初讯问中得到了原始状态的情报，它具有某些额外的价值，我们还没有就这次讯问提交完整的记录，因此应当（在下文）摘要复述它。
Except for bush-whacking expeditions, our other operations in this century have not particularly required it. Hence, it is given little training attention, and the men have to develop this intelligence faculty pretty much on their own initiative.
Even when troops at company level have some grasp of the importance of information which they have obtained by these primitive methods, they are not likely to communicate it to higher authority unless through training they are fully impressed with the fact that whatever new a private soldier may learn with respect to the presence, movements, or habits of the enemy becomes of value to the entire Army.
It is a chronic fault in our service that much of the most vital part of what is learned by the infantry screen during combat never gets back as far as battalion.
During field operations, infantry should be the most productive source of information pertaining to the enemy’s tactics, use of weapons, combat supply system, habits, and general nature.
It is a fair question whether the Army recognizes the true significance of this role and is established to make optimum use of it.
Our G-2 processes are designed to drain dry any enemy soldier who falls into infantry hands. They take little cognizance that perhaps more is to be learned of the enemy from what has been seen, heard, and felt by our own soldier in the line.
There is no steady winnowing of this field of information. There is adding it up, analyzing it across the board, and then deducing its lessons. So time is lost, matters which are calculable are left to chance, and many are wasted.
This infantry analysis within Eighth Army had one initial handicap, which, however, was offset by one factor of main advantage.
The handicap was that the Committee comprised one man; to analyze the operations of infantry accurately and expeditiously across the six-division front of the Eighth Army and X Corps in the November battle would have required a minimum staff of six officers already trained in the work. The advantage was the unqualified support given to the project by Eighth Army Staff, in particular, Co1 William Bullock, Asst G-3, and Co1 Robert G. Fergusson, Asst G-2, Chief of Combat Intelligence. All lower commands co-operated fully, and even enthusiastically.
The process was not markedly different from the SOP followed in World War II by the Army combat historians, except for increased emphasis on all logistical aspects of operations, and exhaustive search as to everything which could be learned of the enemy from what our troops had experienced during battle.
Infantry companies and artillery batteries were the main subjects of the interrogations. Higher commanders were interviewed to the extent necessary to develop the general frame of operations and the estimates which led to the taking of decisions.
There is no other way than this to contrast the reality of what occurs along the rifle and gun line with the sensings of situation in the rearward echelons.
In the beginning, on the basis of what was learned from the combat companies, certain estimates were arrived at as to the CCF’s tactics, manner of deployment, armament, use of weapons, fire effects, methods of reconnaissance, signals, supply, etc. These were immediately published to the Eighth Army by its commander; the classification was down-graded so that the information could be circulated at platoon level, where it would do the most good. In addition to its analysis of the CCF, the report had put considerable emphasis on the high action of our infantry forces which had engaged the enemy. It was therefore deemed advisable by Eighth Army Staff to rush the report to troops with the least waste of time, although, from the viewpoint of the analyst, the work at that time was far from complete and comprised only a reasonably accurate sampling from the crux of action rather than a comprehensive survey across the front. However, the Staff judgment of what action should be taken proved to be wholly correct. Nothing occurred in later operations, or further along in the analysis, to invalidate any material point in the initial findings. The “shot in the dark” proved to be fairly well on the target.
Because the evaluation of data as to minor tactics which was made in that early period has been published in the Memorandum, “Notes on Infantry Operations in Korea, “there is no need here to discuss it. There were, however, certain additional values of an intelligence nature deriving from the first interrogations of 2nd Infantry Division which have not been wholly committed to writing and which would therefore warrant recapitulation. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-25 11:56 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 B连
敌人怎样开进这个国家？他用什么方法隐蔽了如此众多的军队？他怎样完成突击部署？他成功地使我军的部分兵力落入圈套是因为我们太冒失还是因为他特别的聪明才智和精心谋划？这些神秘的谜一旦解开，我们就能够合理调整反击行动的形式。
对于战前形势只需简要叙述：11月25日前，第八集团军几乎未遇抵抗地向北推进，偶尔与敌军轻装部队接触。这些交火发生在远距离，敌军的散兵或小型巡逻队迅速地撤退、消失，似乎只顾逃命。这种冲突并无一定规律，没有迹象显示这些敌兵并非散兵游勇，或证明他们是执行指定任务（比如为大军执行侦察和斥候任务）的战术控制部队。大部分交火的距离都太远，不能确定那些步兵是北朝鲜人还是中共士兵。
在最初的接触中，这些游击部队通常在山脊的最高处挖工事，并且在后撤时沿高地撤退。同时，空军发回了许多发现并攻击敌军小部队的报告，这些小部队都在沿着高地挖工事。但是并未发现给人深刻印象的机动部队。空军报告：敌军控制区内通过德川的主要公路被迅速拓宽和轧平，似乎在准备繁忙的运输。除此之外，没有迹象显示第八集团军正在向敌军大部队移动。
尽管还有其他细节，上述这些便是到第八集团军发动进攻时为止出现的主要迹象，这次进攻被形容为结束战争的最后努力。此时，距中共军队在清川江西北地区首次伏击第八集团军纵队，过了约一个月。
11月25日上午10点，第9步兵团B连开始攀登219高地，这是清川江东岸的一个制高点。当该连走完到山顶三分之一的路时，敌军的5枚手榴弹砸向2排1班，炸伤了劳伦斯 史密斯上等兵的大腿和罗伯特 A. 基乔纳斯中尉的脚。尽管该连当时还不知道，这是清川江会战的第一次交火，也是中共军队在主要战线上进行机动、开展大规模反击的开端。
在这里，手榴弹在史密斯和基乔纳斯身边爆炸的那一刻，局势来了个180°的大转弯。前些日子，敌军部队只在远距离开火，然后脱离战斗。这支敌军却等候B连进至短距离内，此后也没有脱离战斗。从早到晚，敌军不断地在20～40码的距离以手榴弹和自动火力向B连射击，在夜幕降临的时候敌军依然占据着219高地，B连在较低的山包整顿队伍，敌军散兵不停地沿着这些山包向B连的环形防御阵地投射袭扰火力。在219阵地上的决斗一直持续到11月26日，当日B连接到团里下达的撤退命令。
但是，（第2步兵师的指挥官们）并没有认识到战役初期B连经验的真正意义。沿着与B连相同路线进军的其他几个连遭遇到掘壕固守的敌军部队的抵抗，这些敌军都展现出了不同程度的决心，（指挥官们）也没有认识到这一点。随后，他们也没有判断出：敌军沿一条特定的战线迅速集结并增强抵抗标志着整个战术形势已完全逆转。直到25日24时左右，师部才感到战事发生了危急的转变，尽管炮兵指挥部在18点左右已得出结论，但它还没有积极向上级反映自己对局势的判断。
到了午夜时分，毫无疑问，军事行动已进入一个全新的周期。该师的整个正面都开始与敌军交战。战地指挥所和一线补给站遭到了侵袭。某些炮兵阵地被突破。某些步兵连被切断，上级对它们境况还一无所知。
在B连前方进行坚守以后，敌军继续有节奏地开展反击，这大体上暗示敌军在根据事态发展调整其行军。中共军队有一项计划；这个计划只有通过这种抵抗才能奏效：在我军主攻击线上的高地配置正面宽度窄但抵抗顽强的掩蔽部队。
但由于我军“处于攻势”，而且B连的战斗被作为孤立事件，未与敌军态势的主要改变联系起来考虑，各步兵连在当天下午继续沿同一条战线展开。
该师的作战地幅展开过宽，其中部分连队，当中共军队在夜间逼近他们时与最近的友军相距2300码之多。要是敌军真地了解这些情报，并且其勇猛程度有许多新闻记者所形容的一半的话，那么我军的这些部队将无可挽救地片甲不还。
BAKER COMPANY
The mystery of how the enemy had come into the country, by what means he had contrived to conceal himself in such large numbers, how he had managed his shock deployment, and whether the success of his entrapment of part of our force was the consequence of our consummate blundering or of his phenomenal cleverness and a carefully engineered design, was the riddle which, if once solved, would regulate the form of our own counter operations.
The situation requires only this brief summary: Prior to 25 November the Eighth Army had been advancing northward almost unopposed. There had been occasional brushes with light forces of the enemy, such firing as took place occurring at long range, with the enemy skirmishers or small patrols promptly fading back, as if concerned mainly with saving their own lives. There was no general pattern to this interference, no indication that these were not random fragments, or that they might be tactically controlled groups serving an assigned mission, such as reconnaissance or screening for a larger force. Most of these exchanges were at too great range to ascertain whether the riflemen were NK or CCF.
On initial contacts, these guerrilla-type groups were usually dug in along the ridge tops, and when they fell back, they withdrew along the high ground. The air, during this same period, made numerous reports of having sighted and engaged small enemy groups similarly dug in along the heights. But no impressive maneuver bodies were seen. There was nothing to indicate the Army might be moving toward an enemy mass, except several air reports that the main road running through Tokchon in enemy country had been suddenly widened and re-surfaced, as if in preparation for heavy traffic.
Though there are other details, these were the main indications up to the hour when Eighth Army launched its attack which had been described as the final effort which would end the war. Almost one month had passed since the first CCF ambushes were sprung against Eighth Army columns in the area northwest of the Chongchon.
At 1000 on 25 November, Baker Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, started the ascent of Hill 219, a commanding piece of ground just to the east of the Chongchon River. It got one-third way up the hill when five grenades showered down on its 1st squad, 2nd Platoon, wounding Sgt Lawrence Smith, Jr., in the thigh and Lt Robert A. Kjonaas in the foot. Although the Company did not then know it, this was the first fire in the battle of the Chongchon and the beginning of the CCF maneuver to counterattack in mass on one main line.
Locally, the situation took a 180” turn at the moment the grenade exploded near Smith and Kjonaas. In the preceding days the enemy groups had traded fire at long range and then faded back. This body waited until Baker came within a few yards and thereafter did not fade back. Continuing to engage Baker with grenades and automatic fire at 20-40 yards range throughout that morning and afternoon, it was still holding the height of 219 when darkness came, and along the lower knobs, where the Company had fixed itself, its skirmishers were putting a harassing fire upon the perimeter. The duel between the forces on 219 continued until mid-morning of 26 November when Baker withdrew on regimental order.
But the early experience of Baker Company was not seen in its true significance, nor was the fact that other companies moving up toward the same line as Baker became engaged later in the day by dug in enemy groups expressing their force with varying degrees of determination. To rearward it was not appreciated that this sudden coalescing and hardening of resistance along one particular line signaled that the general tactical situation had become wholly transposed. It was not until around 2400 on the 25th that the division command sensed that affairs had taken a critical turn, though the artillery HQ had reached that conclusion by about 1800, still without presenting its conviction forcefully to the higher HQ.
By midnight there was no room for doubt that operations were in a wholly new cycle. The Division had become engaged all along the line. CPs and first-aid stations had been struck. Some artillery positions had been overrun. Some infantry companies had been cut off and their situation remained unknown.
From the holding of Baker Company onward, the enemy’s counter-movement proceeded with a rhythm which suggests mainly that the march was keyed to this event. CCF had a plan; it could have pivoted only upon the resistance offered by a somewhat narrow but unyielding screen manning the heights above our own MSR.
But because we were “on the offensive,” and the Baker Company fight was taken as an isolated incident unrelated to any major change in the posture of the enemy, infantry companies continued to deploy toward this same line during the afternoon.
Such was the overextension required by the width of the division sector that certain of these companies were as much as 2300 yards from their nearest friendly neighbor when the CCF attack closed down around them that night. Had the enemy in fact been well informed, and had he but possessed one-half the ferocity attributed to him by many of the press correspondents, nothing could have saved our forces from being destroyed in whole. 作者: 中国士兵1942 时间: 2006-1-26 10:22 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 沙发！顶作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-26 13:07 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 未完待续中，原文共167页，只能节选翻译了作者: yanq 时间: 2006-1-26 14:54 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [这个贴子最后由yanq在 2006/01/26 03:05pm 第 1 次编辑]
这个帖要被删，看朝鲜战争可以到到战史沙龙，比较全面http://www.fightersalon.net/bbs/forumdisplay.php?f=16
朝鲜战争(李奇微回忆录)
http://www.warstudy.com/history/cold_war/korean_war/index.xml
朝鲜：我们第一次战败
http://www.warstudy.com/history/cold_war/kwar_firstlost/index.xml作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-26 15:54 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 我相信版主不会随便删除这个贴，如果是因为“与论坛研究方向不同”，那样我欣然接受，当然50年代与7、80年代的步兵战斗存在着传承的关系，并不是全无关联的。多了解当年对手的看法有好处。比我们装备先进的对手仍然十分重视基本技术，我们更没有理由扔掉。
我很赞同金一南少将的观点：
金一南：今天的作战过程中优势在转型。过去的优势是什么？兵力优势，我人比你多，几倍于你之兵力就能打败你。人类战争发展到机械化战争后，兵力优势就转型到火力优势，火力猛也可以打赢。现在，火力的优势正在转入信息优势，像中国孙子说“知己知彼，百战不殆”，这就是说数字化部队建设。
我们讲数字化部队时，有时把它讲的神乎其神，非常复杂。实际上，美国陆军参谋长斯库梅克是陆军最高军衔的领率人物，他认为，数字化部队实际上核心就解决三个问题：第一个我在哪里？第二个友邻在哪里？第三个敌人在哪里？过去这是不可能的，但是，今天由于信息技术的出现，战场正在变的透明，这种透明如果被一方掌握了，一方不掌握，战场就成为一种单向透明，战争的天平会发生巨大的倾斜。
这样的话，传统的训练方法、训练模式还有没有用？我认为即使在信息化战场的情况下，传统的战法依然起着重要作用。当我们拥向信息化建设，论证信息化的时候，很容易丢掉一些传统的战法，忽略一些传统技能的作用。伊拉克战争期间，英美方面表现出了非常高的信息作战能力、远程精确打击的能力，但是，我们看当时的电视镜头，任何一支英美军队到了某一个地方，第一个动作是什么？挖战壕，每一个单兵掘一个又深又大的战壕，单兵坑或者伞兵坑，然后自己躺进去睡觉，每个人都挖的非常认真！我们也能看到，伊拉克军队在做防御工事时，很多城镇的沙包又小又薄，堆了几个沙包就叫防御工事了，我觉得就像荞麦皮枕头一样，上去一脚都能把它踹蹋了！
当时，英美军队具有绝对的空中和地面炮火优势，空中和地面都很难对它形成威胁，但他仍然感到威胁，第一个动作就是挖战壕或伞兵坑钻进去。挖战壕对于一般的陆军来说也叫土工作业，它一直是传统步兵的五大技术之一，是非常重要的一条。但是今天，这个土工作业已经被大多数军队所抛弃，为什么？因为看到信息化的发展，认为这个招数不太灵了，没有用了！在一些信息程度并不是很高的军队抛弃了土工作业时，美英军这些信息化程度很高的军队依然在顽强的坚守着这些最基本的技能！
一个军队，即使在已经逐步迈向信息化的今天，一些传统的东西也不能丢掉。美国在伊拉克战争打的比较顺利，超出了大家的预料，绝不仅仅是技术层面的胜利，而是伊拉克军事制度存在非常大的问题。伊拉克的师以上的指挥官全部被对方收买，美军中央总部的司令弗兰克斯就讲，我今天就知道，对手伊拉克军队有几个师的领导不在岗位，他们的共和国卫队师以上军官的电子邮件、手机、家庭私人电话全部被美军掌握，他说，武器要精确投放，贿赂也要精确投放！要双向瓦解伊拉克军队。
这是美军技术层面胜利了吗？不是的！因为美军对准了一个军事制度趋于腐朽的军队，这支军队没有能力和决心与你拼死一搏。我们看，俄罗斯军队不失为一支现代化军队，俄军在攻占格罗兹尼的时候，格罗兹尼的车臣叛匪是各个地方溱起来的，世界各地的恐怖分子都有，就是人们形容的乌合之众吧！似乎和全副武装的、训练有素的伊拉克共和国卫队根本不值一提。但是我们不得不承认，格洛兹尼攻防战的时候，车臣叛匪虽然武器装备非常简陋，但是这帮家伙做战意志非常顽强，给俄军造成了极大的伤害，几个月攻占不了格罗兹尼，俄军死亡人数将近三千人死亡，打不下来！
我们认为，伊拉克的失败绝不在武器装备层面的落后，格罗兹尼的车臣叛匪用的就是就是AK-47和40火箭筒，由于意志顽强，他们能够组织一场充分的巷战，使俄军长期不得占领。巴格达城防战中，伊拉克军队一触即溃，集体蒸发了。美军在巴格达市内缴获了几个伊军大军火库，打开军火库一看美军大吃一惊，里面存放着崭新的美制陶式反坦克导弹，美军不知道伊拉克军队竟然有陶式反坦克导弹，因为这能够给美军的M1-A1和M1-A2坦克造成非常大的伤害。后来美军查出来这是从约旦走私过来的，美军很后怕！
一方面，美军的坦克在巴格达横冲直撞，如入无人之境；另一方面军火库内崭新的陶式反坦克导弹封存在这，一具都没有运用。伊拉克军队，这样一个腐朽的军事制度彻底崩溃了，做为一个军队来说，伊拉克军队的精神垮掉了！
金一南：伊拉克战争的结局，和我们很多人的评论差别都比较大。为什么会这样？当我们仅仅凭借两支军队的现代化装备，来估计战争进程时，我们忽略了一点，装备后面都是人，信息化的设备再怎么也是一个设备，需要人去驱动、指挥、运用。当然，即使不忽略的话，我们也不可能真正的掌握这些人的情况，尤其是伊拉克的军事机制出了这么大的问题，指挥官毫无斗志，带来军队的总体崩溃!这一点,实际上对我们是一个非常大的提醒，即使在今天新军事变革的推动之下，未来的较量核心也是人与人之间的较量，武器只不过是人的素质、意志外在的物化表现形式，而核心还是人。
记者：中国特色的军事变革首先应该解决哪些问题，我军存在的瓶颈问题是什么？
金一南：从狭义角度来看，就是国防投入问题，武器装备改善的问题，部队编成问题，三军联合的问题，新的作战思想的问题等等。从广义的角度来讲，是一个社会总体素质提高的问题。1997年我在美国学习时，对有件事印象非常深的。当时，美军第一个数字化旅的旅长科因斯少将调任到美国国防大学任武装力量工业学院院长，他讲组建信息化部队的时候曾受到美国国会置疑：信息化部队的士兵要多长时间才能掌握这个装备，值不值？科因斯将军讲，这个问题找两个士兵来回答。后来，两名士兵在国会回答了国会议员的质询，他们说，我们用几周时间就能够掌握部队的数字化装备。议员们感到非常吃惊，这么复杂的装备，你们怎么这么快就能掌握？两个士兵的回答，我们在家里都玩过，学校计算机也学过，跟我们玩的游戏基本一样，所以很快就能学会它！
这就是一个军队在搞现代化建设中人员素质的基本组成，我们军队入伍的新战士，虽然我们讲了城镇入伍的要高中毕业，农村入伍的要初中毕业，可有些战士来了，我们要从什么是电？什么是交流电？什么是无线电？什么是集成电路？什么是大规模集成电路？一步一步开始，这样一来，军队信息化建设的负担就非常重。如果社会基础层面文化素质非常高的话，一个现代军人所具有的基本素质，在地方全部获得了，不用到了军队从头学起，全部学完要一年两年时，又到了复员时间了！
记者：我们看到，我军军官的文化程度距发达国家军队也是有一定的差距的，现在大专以上文化程度的军官仅占71.8%，而外军军官大部分是具有本科以上学历的，美国军官100%拥有大学本科学历的，还有40%的军官具有硕士和博士学位。俄罗斯也有98%军官具有大学本科的文化程度，文化程度起点差距是否会影响我军推进中国特色军事变革进程呢？
金一南：其实这些数字，提示了我们两个层面的问题，第一，我军官兵的文化素质，比起发达国家的军队来说差距还是比较大的，我们必须要奋起直追的，我们作为国防大学的一位教授，要肩负起这个使命；另外，全社会对武装力量的认识也是不够的。我们不仅仅要把军队的文化素质全面提升，更重要的是要提升全民族对武装力量的认识。在美国成为一个军官可是非常不??全国的统一考试，又要通过ACT的测验，叫知识测验，还要通过SAT的测验，叫能力测验，比如说西点军校的，还必须有国会议员的推荐。当时我们也提过这个问题，议员推荐会不会带来一些别的问题，比如有走后门现象？美国人就给我们讲，议员推荐程序对他们每名议员都形成非常大的压力，因为西点军校淘汰率很高，你推荐这个人是不是社区最优秀的？这个人如果到军校被淘汰了，就形成很大的丑闻，以后没有人投你的票了！每一年，入选西点成为陆军军官，入选安纳波里斯海军军官学校成为海军军官，对于家人来说，在社区都是非常光荣的事情，报纸要登他们的家庭，他们的父母是干什么的，他们的兄弟是干什么的，这是一件非常骄傲的事情！一个民族把自己最优秀的青年推入到军队，表现出民族尚武的精神。
相比而言，我们这个社会对武装力量的认识存在一些误区。很多人认为，军人就是头脑简单、四肢发达，没有文化！他们要那么多文化干什么？没有用！他们能操枪弄炮就行了！不怕死就行！这些都是对现代军人素质认识是肤浅的!所以就形成这样的现象，很多人报考军校是为什么？因为地方大学收费太高，军校是免费的，或者因为地方大学分数高，考不上，那我考军校。
美国西点军校在每一年美国大学的录取过程中，都是排在第三或第四名。第一是哈佛，第二有时是耶鲁，有时是麻省理工学院等等，西点军校的录取率从来没有超过10%。就往往是100个人里报名，只能有9个人录取。而且录取之后，毕业必须保持淘汰率的25%。这些作法，就是保证美国要从民族的一流力量中选出最优秀的青年，组成武装力量和别人对抗，实现美国的国家意志。而我们很多一流的人才，宁愿在美国帮着别人涮瓶子、洗碗碟，也不愿意加入到武装力量中来。我认为，新军事变革要求提高部队文化素质，但更重要一点就是一个民族整体要对自己武装力量的提高认识，这关必须得过去，一定要用民族的一流的人才组成武装力量才能打得赢！
记者：从这点来看，新军事变革不仅仅是军队的事情，而是整个社会的事情，整个民族的事情！关于军队的人才问题，我们现行的义务兵役制对城镇籍青年要求是具有高中以上文化水平的，农村籍战士要求是初中以上文化程度的，您认为这个文化程度的起点，是否会制约我们推进中国特色军事变革的进程？
金一南：当然，这对我们来说制约还是很大的，我们现在一定要注意，不要以为一个战士，他就是只会操刀弄枪就行了，会站岗放哨就行了。在我们军队现代化建设的过程中，我们经常能看见一些一两年的士兵手中操纵着几百万元，甚至有上千万元的装备，他未来担负的任务都是极其重大的。我军士兵的文化素质，说一句不客气的话，不能满足我们军队现代化的要求！但是，今天我们要客观冷静的看一下，我们提出过高的要求，从整个国家的现状是难以满足的，这和我们国家城市化的进程应该是一致的。我们今天农业人口占总体人口70%的情况下，大量的新战士必然来自于农村，因为这是我们的基础。美国的农业人口占他总体人口的4%，它入伍的大都是来自于城镇。我们正在经历一个过程，我们现在可以预计，当中国的农业人口，由70%降为60%、50%、40%的时候，我们国民的素质整体提高，我们军队的资源，整体素质必然要往上去的！
记者：现在一些国家实行大学生中服兵役的制度，您认为这种方式我们能否借鉴一下？
金一南：这种方式很多国家都采取，比如说，上大学之前必须入伍，或者上大学的时候必须有几年在部队服兵役，为什么要采取？比如说国家人口少，或适龄青年人数比较少，这种情况下强制性的东西比较多。对于中国来说，人口基数比较大，适龄青年很多，还不需要走到强制那一步。我们军队的规模正在压缩，适龄青年的数量还非常大，在这一点里面，对我们军队来说其实是个优势，挑选的余地还比较大，我们尽量要挑选素质高的青年进入我们的军队！
记者：人才问题是一个很宽泛的问题，肯定不仅仅局限于士兵或者是初级军官，最近您所在国防大学招收了十几名军师职领导干部任教官，别看这么一个小的举措，应该说这种理论和实践相结合的方式，改变了我军教官队伍知识结构。既然部队主官能到大学任教，教官是不是能到野战部队任职？
金一南：现在，部分军队的指挥员来到国防大学，担任战略、战役、军事指挥等专业的教官，他们来自于部队第一线，最了解一线部队的需求，一线部队的现状和一线部队的发展，对于改善国防大学教员队伍知识结构无疑会起到重要作用。当一名教员在一个学校任职时，实际上把掌握的东西都倒出来了，除了书本上的理论之外，非常难以了解前方发生的事情。发达国家的军队往往采取这样的方法，就是军校的教官轮换制，他们没有单纯的教员，教官到部队任职是非常正常的一件事，我军是否能够真正实现教官、军官双向轮换，还需要一个过程。
美军装备世界一流，军事基地遍布全世界，但是我们有点忽略他的军事教育体制，他的陆军指挥与参谋学院是陆军非常核心的一个学校，专门有这么一个中心，他叫Militle lessons ，我们翻译成军事教训中心或失败中心，这个中心有七、八十个人，专门搜集一线部队的作战情况，拿最新鲜的东西来教学，比如说阿富汗战争正在进行，不等前方指挥官把战报报回来，他就派人到前方去了解战斗发生的情况。美军毫不隐晦这一点，他们认为前方指挥官自己报来的情况，总是不由自主的要夸大成绩，掩盖缺点。所以拿前方指挥官报来的案例作为教学，有失客观！军校的Militle lessons的信息搜取员到最前方，看战斗怎么进行的，单独记录数据，尤其是记录那些失败的、吃亏的仗。这场战争还没有完，院校已经开始阿富汗战争的战例教学，怎么吃亏了，美国人怎么让人消灭了，下回要注意什么，非常鲜活的东西很快进入教学内容。
记者：据了解，在外军的教学内容里，侧重于讲授失败的战例，而我军的教学里侧重于讲成功的战例，他们失败的战例可能要讲很多次，甚至几十年，而我们一个成功的战例要讲很多次，几十年。您怎么看待这种现象？
金一南：这个问题可能触及到了我军教学中存在的一些问题。这个问题要两方面看，任何一支军队都有光荣的传统和历史，这要看你怎么用他，用不好了就成为包袱，前进起来必然是步履蹒跚，用的好了就是资源，给你未来制胜做出一个关键的指导，关键是对传统怎么吸收的问题。我们军队存在这种现象，比如说，我们讲过去的战例，怎么取胜的，这绝不仅仅是我们陶醉在过去的光荣里面睡大觉，这是我们对过去战争的总结。但是，我们也必需注意，外军的院校对失败的研究确实对我们是个非常大的提醒。
1997年，我在美国国防大学学习的时候，1991年的海湾战争战例居然没有进入他的国防大学的教学。当时参联会主席叫克林鲍威尔，他就讲过海湾战争太理想了！理想的战争、理想的敌人、理想的设施、理想的地形和理想的条件，这些理想以后重复很困难，以后很难再现这个理想，所以在研究海湾战争时应当格外当心，不要把它作为一般指导。海湾战争的战例没有进入教学，可是越南战争的战例仍然是他的教学战例，从1975年越南战争美军全面溃败，到1997年有22年时间，还在那里非常沉痛的检讨，讲当初是怎么一步一步深陷泥潭的，不得自拔的，当时的军事教训现在还在那检讨。
经历了朝鲜战争、越南战争的美国人在总结自己的经验时，表现出了一种极大的谨慎，生怕掉入一个误区，实际上它对失败的重视，表现出一种强烈的求胜精神，力图要取得下一次的胜利。这点里面，我们讲，其实败战给一支军队提供最佳的营养，这也是我军的下一步教学中必须加强的！
战史沙龙我去过，我感觉它与“全面”相去甚远。
那两本书我都看过，特别是后一本翻译很糟糕，居然将“砥平里”翻译成“奇永里”
除了那两本，日本人和韩国人的《朝鲜战争》我也看过，美方资料最全面的还是《朝鲜战争中的美国陆军》，http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/collections/USAKW.htm作者: 血总是热的 时间: 2006-1-26 22:48 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 较为客观与理性的分析文章,有学术性的,我支持.作者: plr 时间: 2006-1-26 22:49 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 楼主辛苦作者: 甜酥墙皮 时间: 2006-1-30 01:02 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 终于看完, 巨佩服啊。
不只是翻译者（们?）的巨大心血，更是高度专业水准和严谨态度的结晶。
已经超越一般网文了, 但愿楼主不只是发表在这里, 其实更应该发表在正式刊物上, 包括专业刊物上。
越发觉得不论哪一种政治立场的人, 只要具备该文作者和译者十分之一的冷静、严谨(及智力), 网上也不会有那么多烂文。
比如人云亦云地说中国人“人海战术”；比如盲目推崇美军从不吝惜弹药。作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-1-30 12:55 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 我的翻译还有很多错误，多亏了小隐在线和战争艺术上的网友指点，等全翻译完了再全面修订。我认为我军的内部资料还是客观严谨的，只是一般人看不到，所以道听途说、人云亦云的就多了。
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参谋与指挥部门的假定
在研究主力会战开始之前一段时间敌军发起进攻的预兆的基础上，也因为这些行动是以晴天霹雳、暴风骤雨的方式完成的，关于中共军队如何部署以及他们的反击配置怎样达成使我军如此失衡的效果，部队里的高级指挥官们立即推导出了某些假定。
因为通讯系统的崩溃、对指挥体系的直接打击、部队的分散以及迅速展开救援的需要，这场会战伴随着反常的混乱。因此，情报参谋和关于这次战斗的情报非常令人不满，以致这些猜测简直是盲人骑瞎马。不管怎样，在大战术方面，对中共军队的观察着重于以下这些提纲挈领的特点：（1）敌军的战前侦查体系几乎完美无缺；（2）敌军隐蔽在清川江两岸的工事内，美军11月25日晨的进攻触动了敌军防御地带的外壳，给敌军提供了警报。
推导出这些结论的理由也十分清楚。首先，在前些日子观察到的敌军的所有迹象显示，当两军遭遇时他会沿着高地挖工事。其次，在黑暗中，空军无法观察敌军配置，而且总部不得不根据与敌军交战中的几个步兵连得到的有限印象做整体判断，看来中共军队通过高地推进了它的整个正面。第三，中共军队差不多一开始行动，就打击了我军纵深像指挥所、战地救护站、炮兵阵地这样的敏感部位，他们显然蓄意地迂回了这些目标前面的某些步兵连。
得出下面这种完全不正确的结论也是很自然的：中共军队确切了解这些目标的位置，并在指定时间内径直向它们发起进攻，他们精心算计着来自背后出其不意的打击将使进攻中的整个第八集团军瓦解。
因此，一个非常敏感、好斗和反应敏捷的对手的粗略形象就勾绘出来了。但真的是这么一回事吗？那些致力于推测敌军的本性和图谋的人进行了这样的想象，本应立即引起注意和向这种想象提出挑战的是，在山岭并不集中连续的野外，一支沿着高地部署的军队，必然在一个宽正面、大纵深的地区展开。因此，这支军队在整体上动作迟缓，集结缓慢，不能对枪声做出迅速的反应和紧急进军。由于这些基本原因，研究中国人可能收到警报的时间与攻击发起时间的间隔就变得十分重要了。
STAFF AND COMMAND HYPOTHESIS
On the basis of the meager signs seen of the enemy in the days which preceded the main battle, and because of the manner in which the storming occurred in one great thunderclap of action, the higher commanders of the troops which were immediately engaged reached certain tentative conclusions as to how CCF had been disposed and how their counterdeployment had managed to achieve such crippling effects.
The battle had been attended by abnormal confusion, due to breakdown in communications, the direct strike against command structures, the scattering of units, and the subsequent need for quick extrication. It was therefore not unnatural that the G-2 and operational data on the fight proper was quantitatively so unsatisfactory that these surmises were made pretty much in the dark. Be that as it may, the view of CCF effectiveness in grand tactics emphasized the following characteristics, which were held in common by nearly all concerned : (1) The enemy system of reconnaissance prior to combat was little short of perfection itself. (2) The enemy army had been concealed within works on the high ground to either side of the Chongchon, and the American attack on the morning of 25 November had alerted the forward crust of this defensive belt.
The reasoning which led to these conclusions is also substantially clear. First, all that had been seen of the enemy in prior days had indicated that when met, he would be dug in along the high ground. Second, in the darkness, when it was impossible to view the deployment from the air, and the over-all pattern had to be judged from the limited view of what an HQ gets from a few of its rifle companies in the middle of engagement, it had seemed that CCF had moved forward their general front via the high ground. Third, almost at the outset of action, the enemy had struck deep against sensitive points such as CPs, aid stations, and artillery gun positions, while apparently, with full intent, by-passing some of the infantry companies forward of these installations.
It was a natural though wholly erroneous conclusion that CCF must have had exact knowledge of these locations and gone straight to them in the assigned hour, calculating that the blow to the rear would collapse the whole body of attack.
Thus the somewhat sketchy portrait of an unusually perceptive, aggressive, and swiftly reacting opponent.
But was it true to life? What should have immediately drawn the attention and challenged the imaginations of all who were interested in fathoming the nature and design of the enemy was that an Army ，disposed mainly along the high ground in a countryside where the ridges are not continuous or massive, is necessarily spread over a wide and deep area. It is therefore torpid as a whole, slow to assemble, and incapable of swift reaction and immediate march to the sound of fire. For this elementary reason, the study of time intervals between the possible Chinese alert and the onset of attack became all important. 作者: 元帅 时间: 2006-1-30 18:09 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 长见识了 作者: 射天狼 时间: 2006-1-30 18:35 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [这个贴子最后由射天狼在 2006/01/30 06:47pm 第 4 次编辑]
第2级是设在堪萨斯州利文沃思堡的指挥与参谋学院（US Army Command and General Staff College）。除了接受校级军官外，从1933年开始也接受部分资历较老、任职时间较长的尉官。一般约50%的陆军少校有机会进入该学院深造。未被选中的虽然可以继续服役，但一般升到中校就已经到顶了，个别人能升到上校。如果要获得将星的话，利文沃思指挥与参谋学院是必经之路。在这里的38周学习中，他将学习一个师的指挥以及军、师战术指挥方法。在这里学习紧张，竞争十分激烈。50年代以后，陆军开始鼓励军官在职业生涯中期接受民间高等教育机构深造以开拓职业军官的视野，以利民间学术界的各种新思想进入军队。科林·鲍威尔将军就曾经在华盛顿大学取得MBA学位。此外，一些辅助兵种军官职业生涯中期的学习多是在民间院校完成的，比如军医、兽医、宪兵、军法、检察这些兵种的军官，在职业生涯中期到地方院校的相关专业进修硕士学业。
指挥与参谋学院校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...y.mil/index.asp
第3级也是最高一级是位于迈尔堡的陆军军事学院（Army War College）。该学院创办于1901年，是美国陆军最高军事教育机构，也接受其它军种以及联邦政府、CIA等的学员。进入该校的一般是中校以上军官，并要求有海外任职经历，在指挥与参谋岗位上均有阅历。在这里他将学习军、集团军的指挥、陆军统帅部的工作和组织、国家的战略、政策与战争计划等，毕业后就任旅以上职务。所开的政治、军事、艺术、历史等课程在于开阔学员的眼界，使学员全面地了解美国的军事战略、国家政策与各国的基本情况。学习气氛也较为宽松、平等。1940-50年，陆军军事学院因为大战影响，停办了十年，而直到朝鲜停战后，教学才转入正常。与50年代成立的国家军事学院（National War College）相比，陆军军事学院偏重于陆上指挥艺术，而国家军事学院更侧重于各军种联合作战。
陆军军事学院校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...lisle.army.mil/
战后，美国又设立了国家军事学院、合成部队参谋学院（Joint Forces Staff College）、武装部队工业学院（the Industrial College of the Armed Forces）、国防信息学院（Information Resources Management College），合称国防大学（National Defense University），实施高等军事教育，培训高级和中级指挥参谋军官、联邦政府官员，并对国家安全战略问题进行综合研究。
国防大学校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...://www.ndu.edu/ 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-2-2 15:55 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 连级研究中收集的资料
从步兵连的战后总结中收集的资料提供了研究和评估敌军战役企图的基础，情况逐渐清楚了：战场真相不仅与参谋和指挥部门的假定有差异，而且和它南辕北撤。
[研究人员]调查了13个步兵连。从幸存的目击者的口述中提取了它们的战斗经历。关于各连遭遇了哪些情况、这支部队作为整体获悉了敌军的哪些情报，他们讲述了相当完整的经历。在这13个连队中，有2个连曾被作为预备队，在中共军队进攻一个炮兵阵地时它们参加了战斗。
在整体上概括地讲，12场局部战斗中（各连的环形防御阵地相距甚远，因此它们的战斗具有孤立的性质），只有两场战斗里中共军队的行动路线和攻击发起方式显示它预先了解目标的位置并被特别派遣去占领该处。
在两个例外情况中，那些连队犯了（违反规定）在宿营的时候点火的错误，并且也没有采取任何防止敌军逼近时发现该连阵地的措施。在其他连队里，毋庸置疑，局部接触都是偶然和意外发生的。敌军是暗中摸索的。有充分的证据证明这一事实。在七个战例中，靠近友军侧翼的前哨向已通过的敌军纵队的末尾射“回马箭”引发了该连的全程战斗。在其他战例中，当敌军误打误撞，闯进我军的散兵坑防线时还保持着纵队队形。总之，在整个步兵防线上发生的战斗具有遭遇战的性质。
敌军对与它最接近的我军单元的移动如此缺乏了解，我军的后方支援单位与其距离更远而且稍后在战场上已进行必要的靠拢，有理由去相信敌军对这些后方支援单位的位置有更精确的认识吗？看来没有。
然而，上述结论有几处看上去与涉及局部防御战斗的资料相冲突。也许最具启发性的事件就是11月25时约18：00敌军对球场（在清川江东岸，所谓“中国帽子”岭正西）以北第61野战炮兵营阵地的进攻。11月25日晨，第61野战炮兵营和其他支援单位从球场向北往该阵地转移，以便给第23步兵团更好的支援，第23步兵团将超越第9步兵团，于11月26日发起进攻。因空间狭小，这些火炮直到当天中午才进入发射阵地。没有它们在第9步兵团前线试射的纪录。
第23步兵团，欠2、3营，在16：00接近了同一地域，并在该炮兵阵地左侧建立了一个改良的环形防御阵地，它基本沿清川江展开。该团处于支援位置，扎营多少有些不严格，但它在该处接受了一条以前的守卫者已挖好的散兵坑防线。
因此，在炮兵阵地建立与准备在它旁边扎起步兵营帐之间有一个短暂的间隔。
再次列出各事件发生的时间表：
10:00，第9团B连在北面开始与敌军交战。
14:30，第61野战炮兵营在狭小的发射阵地架设好了火炮。
16:00，第23步兵团在第61野战炮兵营旁边扎营。
18:00，第23步兵团和第61野战炮兵营遭受清川江对岸密集的步枪和自动武器火力的压制。
30—40分钟内，炮兵阵地被突破，幸存的炮兵向后方撤退。
敌军的突击部队涉水越过清川江，尽管气温接近零度，但敌军士兵们大部分双腿赤裸，用手提着鞋袜和裤子。
在接下来的一个半小时内，突破炮兵阵地的中共部队，以及在右翼径直闯入第23步兵团营地的中共部队，都已被第23团1营的两个连消灭或驱散了。
这是怎么发生的呢？
DATA FROM COMPANY STUDIES
As the data collected during the infantry company critiques began to provide the base on which to study and evaluate the operational design of the enemy, it soon became apparent that the facts of the battlefield were not only discrepant with but flatly contradictory of the off-hand assumptions of the staff and command.
Thirteen infantry companies were interviewed. Their battle experiences were drawn from the surviving witnesses; they told a reasonably complete story of what had happened to each company, and what the force as a whole had learned of the enemy. Included in the 13 were 2 which had been in reserve and had joined action during CCF attack upon an artillery position.
When the whole was recapitulated, it showed that out of 12 localized actions (the defensive perimeters were so far apart that each company action partook of the nature of an isolated fight) there were only two in which CCF moved in such a way, and fixed its assault in such a manner, as to indicate that it knew beforehand that the target was there and was set to blanket it.
In the case of the two exceptions, the companies had made the error (against orders) of lighting squad fires during bivouac, and there was nothing to prevent the enemy from seeing the position in outline during his approach.
In the other companies, engagement occurred in such way as to leave no room for doubt that the local contact was by accident and not design. The enemy was groping. There was abundant proof of that fact. In several instances, the full-length fight by the company was the consequence of an outpost along the friendly flank taking a Parthian shot at the tail-end of an enemy column which had already gone past. In other instances, the enemy force was still moving in column when it blundered into the defending foxhole line. In sum, when examined superficially, the whole battle along the rifle line partook of the nature of a chance-meeting engagement.
Was it within reason to believe that a force thus badly informed about the movements of the hostile combat elements closest to it would have almost precise knowledge of the locations of the rear support which was farther distant and had necessarily closed somewhat later on the ground where it was attacked? It did not so seem.
However, there were certain points in seeming conflict within the data covering the local defensive actions. Perhaps the most instructive incident is the enemy attack upon the position of the 61st FA Battalion to the north of Kujang-dong (on the east bank of the Chongchon and just west of the ridge called “Chinaman’s Hat”) at approximately 1800 hours on 25 November. The 61st FA Battalion and other supporting units had displaced northward from Kujang-dong to that position during the morning of 25 November in order to give better support to 23rd Infantry Regiment, which was to pass through the 9th Regiment, and attack on 26 November. The guns, seriously cramped for space, did not get in firing position until about mid-afternoon. It is not of record that they registered fires on the 9th Infantry front.
The 23rd Infantry, less its 2nd and 3rd Battalions, closed on this same ground at about 1600 and set up a modified perimeter defense to the left of the artillery position and in general extension of its line along the river. The camp was more or less relaxed, being in a support position, but the infantry took over a line of foxholes dug there by some previous occupant.
There was thus a relatively brief interval between the setting up of the artillery and the preparation of the infantry camp beside it.
To again show the chronology of events:
At 1000 Baker Company, 9th, had become engaged to the northward.
At 1430 the 61st Battalion set up in its cramped fire position.
At 1600 the 23rd Infantry made camp next the 61st.
At 1800 the 61st-23rd area was brought under intense rifle and automatic fire from the far bank of the Chongchon.
Within 30 to 40 minutes the gun positions had been overrun and the surviving artillerymen had taken off to the rear.
The enemy assault force had waded the river; the men, bare-legged for the most part, though the weather was near zero, had carried their footgear and trousers in their hands.
Within the next hour and one-half, the CCF which had overrun the artillery, as well as the Chinese on the right who had come directly into the 23rd’s camp, had been killed or dispersed in total by the action of two of the battalion’s companies.
How had it happened?
地图：第二次战役西线
发起卷击
按照我军步兵的说法，多数越过清川江的敌军士兵并未装备轻武器，但携带了用来炸毁火炮的不同型号的特制炸药包。当敌军士兵发现自己闯入我军步兵的营帐，紧接着又遭到步兵反击时，他们大惑不解，而且也没有进行有效的抵抗。
中共军队以七路纵队越过清川江，最初投入的兵力约为共军第94团① 的两个营。我军抓获了数十名俘虏。他们讲自己曾被告知此次行动的目标是“破坏火炮”，但没料到会碰到步兵。他们并未被指派冲破炮兵阵地之后应去完成的第二任务。因为他们没有料到会与步兵交战，（据他们讲）只有一半突前人员携带了轻武器。这次讯问处处显示这些俘虏或派遣他们的人掌握了美军火炮架设在“中国帽子”高地附近的确切情报。然而，在回顾中，这可被视作关键性的疑点。第八集团军的前线到此时仍不知道整体形势已发生突变。如果这次表面上针对炮兵的局部推进实际上是中共军队的固有计划的一部分，那么对形势的评估就会有极大的不同。
然而，在这次战斗后十天，以肤浅的信息和此次行动自身的外观为基础，对“中国帽子”高地事件发生的原因，我军的参谋和指挥部门仍然坚持以下分析：（1）关键在于中共军队在高地上良好的观察（2）敌军发现火炮抵达（3）敌军未能发现步兵扎营（4）中共军队安排了一次带有明确目标——打击第61野炮营的特别行动（5）由于敌军的目标是局部性的，我军步兵的抵达对于（炮兵阵地）的防御者是一个幸运的转折。
炮兵战报总结道：“当第61野炮营抵达时敌人正好俯视着那条隘路，敌人通过出色的观察了解到何时应向该阵地进攻。”简言之，甚至在“中国帽子”高地上的步炮协同行动实施之后，情况看上去与主要的假定（敌人在局部探测我军当时构成的战线上的缺口和弱点之后，以一种“抓到什么就是什么”的方式发展进攻）并不矛盾。
我军认为中共军队向“中国帽子”高地的进攻只具有局部意义，而与中共军队当时已开始执行的整体计划没有联系，这种有些狭隘的见解可能是正确的。
但是由于缺乏任何明显的证据，其他可能也不应排除——敌军已经发起卷击，其总攻开始的时间选择正好与美军进入“中国帽子”地区的时间相符。
指向这个方向的证据中主要的一项是：中共军队进攻炮兵阵地的钟点与中共军队的机动打击部队向我第9、第38步兵团的前线发起总攻的时间是一致的。我军在清川江东西两岸的一般阵地在此前并没有受到来自正面的沉重压力。
当天，在第2步兵师和第25步兵师正面相距很远的三处，拒绝放弃山顶堑壕阵地的中国人进行了激烈的战斗，并以肉搏战来抵抗。但敌军从这些阵地后方向前席卷、沿最短路线淹没整个地区的第一波反击没有持续到18时和19时之间。
值得注意的是这些机动部队是刚抵达现场的生力军，他们绝不是那些沿山顶组成坚强的防御屏障的部队自身的预备队。
因此，关于“中国帽子”高地的战斗，疑点在于：这支突击部队的行动更像对当天黄昏敌军所取得进展的扩张，而不符合一项预定的全面反攻计划的特征。中共军队选择的主战场明显缺乏草场和其他平地。在另一方面看，在上述平坦地形出现的敌军人员出于巧合构成了对我军的欺骗。尽管中共军队的观察所没有发现任何东西，但带着特制炸药包被派去进攻炮兵阵地的营可能对这些火炮的位置就在 “中国帽子”高地附近充满信心。
（中共军队）联系到第八集团军的步兵已展开进攻，考虑到在步兵战线后面缺乏其他平坦的空地，（他推断出）美军支援炮兵便别无选择——不得不在清川江和“中国帽子”高地之间建立阵地。
此次战斗的整体表现显示敌人尽管在某些方面是二流对手，但他足够机敏，能认识到上述情况。
SET TO ROLL
By the account of our own infantry, the greater number of enemy soldiers who had crossed the Chongchon were not equipped with small arms, but were carrying special charges of varying types expressly to destroy the artillery pieces. When they found themselves in the infantry camp, and were in turn counterattacked by infantry, they became completely nonplused and offered no effective resistance.
The CCF had crossed the Chongchon in seven columns, total initially committed strength being about two battalions from the 94th CCF Regiment. Several score prisoners were taken. They said they had been told “to destroy artillery” at the objective, but hadn’t expected to find infantry. No secondary mission had been assigned them toward which to turn after overrunning the artillery. Because they had not expected to engage infantry (they said) only about half of them had carried small arms in the advance. The interrogations nowhere reveal that these prisoners or those who sent them forth had acted on the basis of positive intelligence that American guns were setting up near Chinaman’s Hat. Yet in retrospect this can be seen as the decisive question. The Eighth Army front was as yet unapprised that its general situation had radically changed. If the seemingly local advance against the artillery was in fact part of a “set piece,” that made a vital difference in the reckoning of situation.
However, ten days after the battle, on the basis of surface information and the look of the action itself, our staff and command still held to the following analysis of why things had happened as they did at Chinaman’s Hat : (1) CCF’s superior observation from the high ground was the key. (2) The enemy had seen the artillery arrive. (3) He had missed seeing the infantry make camp. (4) CCF had mounted a special expedition with the express object of hitting 61st FL4 Bn. (5) Since the enemy object was localized, the arrival of the infantry was just a lucky break for the defender.
Said the artillery operations report in summing up: “They were looking right down the throat of 61st FA Bn when it arrived and because of superior observation they knew how and when to advance on the position.” In brief, even after the minutiae of the infantry-artillery action at Chinaman’s Hat had been examined, it did not appear to conflict with the major assumption that the enemy had developed his onfall in a catch-as-catch-can manner after a local sensing of gaps and weaknesses in the battle line which we were then forming.
It is perhaps possible that this somewhat narrow view of the CCF attack on the position at Chinaman’s Hat, which gives it a purely local significance unrelated to a general plan of the enemy already then in execution, is the correct one.
But in the absence of any clear proof, the other possible alternative should not, be excluded - that the enemy force was already set to roll, and, its timing being part of a general movement, just happened to coincide with the arrival of the American force in the Chinaman’s Hat area.
One main item in proof points straight in this direction: The CCF attack against the artillery position coincided to the hour with the initiation of the general assault by the mobile hitting forces of CCF against the forward line manned by the ,9th and 38th Infantry Regiments. In the general position lying west and east of the Chongchon River, there had been felt no heavy forward pressure from the enemy until that time.
During the day, at three widely-separated points along the front of 2nd and 25th Divisions, there had been hard fighting by Chinese who refused to yield their dug-in positions on the hill crests and accepted hand-to-hand combat. But it was not until between the hours of 1800 and 1900 that the first main wave of the enemy’s counter-offensive rolled forward from behind these positions and proceeded by the shortest routes to inundate the whole area.
It is noteworthy that these maneuver bodies were fresh arrived on the scene and were not simply local reserves of the units forming the rigid defensive screen along the hilltops.
Therefore, as to the fight at Chinaman’s Hat, the question is whether the attacking force wasn’t committed in conformity with an already set, general counter-offensive plan, rather than being an improvization based upon the developments of the late afternoon. That it looked otherwise to the men on the ground could have been a deception arising from sheer coincidence. CCF had chosen a general battlefield notably short of any meadowland or other flat spaces. The battalions which had been sent forward with special charges to attack an artillery position at Chinaman’s Hat could have proceeded with full confidence that the guns would be there, even though their OPs hadn’t seen a thing.
In relation to the Eighth Army infantry attack which was already unfolding, and in view of the lack of any other flat spaces to the rear of the infantry line, there was no alternative for the supporting artillery-it had to take position between the River and Chinaman’s Hat.
The general appearance of the battle suggests that the enemy, though in some respects a second-rate opponent, was smart enough to realize that.
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①应为４０军１２０师３５９团作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-2-10 23:19 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 敌军进攻的特点
根据我军步兵连的战斗经验的描述，中共军队的进攻在运转中有这些共同点，所有这些特点当相互联系起来分析时显得特别重要：（1）中共军队总是从北面沿倾斜方向接近美军的环形阵地；（2） 我军发现中国人在接敌行动中行军方向与河床、公路或小径平行；（3）他们以密集纵队接敌；（4）在许多情况下，虽然这些纵队保持快步行进，但看上去仍十分有活力；（5）每个敌军士兵都是自给自足的个体，携带自身的给养；（6）敌军通过低地实施战术退却；（7）在整条战线上，他们的几次总攻都发生一个相当短的时间段内。
当中共军队向横跨清川江两岸的第八集团军进攻时，敌军看上去是沿从西北到东南的轴线运动的。在局部攻势中，由于地势走向和初战有时以意外方式爆发，他们在战术上可能背离这一方向， 但这种背离出现的次数极少。在第八集团军作战地幅的最右端，南朝鲜第二军崩溃之后，（中共军队）从北、东北和东面向我第38步兵团施加压力。但当主力会战开始后，敌军也是按照规定好的路线行军的。
参照地图（图块“德川 6433-IV”），清川江谷地从东北向西南割裂该地区，直达黄海。在紧靠球场北面的村庄——第2步兵师的炮兵基地——西侧的支流向东南方汇入清川江。但在清川江东岸，支流和小溪向西北方汇入干流。
敌军在清川江西侧支流河谷并在第八集团军西北方的任何集结、增援和脱离（如11月25日的情况），是沿流向清川江的水流方向的，并且敌军在横越该河时，将继续沿着最有利于徒步行军的方向前进，通常沿东南走向的轴线，这样他们一开始就将同时打击第2步兵师的步兵和炮兵阵地。
至此，讨论到的这些战术现象清楚地揭示了中共军队是如何发动及发展进攻的。关于中共军队迂回第2步兵师右翼之前粉碎该师正面的首次突击，不存在相抵触的资料。在当天同一小时，中共军队对第25步兵师位于上九洞以北的正面实施的进攻是从相反方向施加压力的，这是他们发动协同进攻的又一项情报。上九洞差不多在球场正西，位于清川江的一条主要支流——九龙江附近。隐蔽在这两条河流谷地中的中共军队向同一条分水岭的两侧发动了方向完全相反的卷击。
下图是概略图而不是地理意义上的地图，绘出它的目的也仅在于粗略地揭示中共军队酝酿其攻势时最可能采用的手段：
第八集团军正面几个地段上的战术发展同时发生，在回顾中考虑到这一点特别给人以启发。11月25日10时，位于第2步兵师最前线的第9步兵团B连遭遇到了坚定顽强、寸步不让的中共掩蔽部队。在同一小时内，第25步兵师的前锋游骑兵连进攻清川江西岸的8号目标时也有同样的经历。游骑兵连到黄昏仍未夺取该高地，最后我军不得不以密集炮火轰击敌军的堑壕阵地，才击破他们的固守。此外，敌军机动打击部队突破第25步兵师正面的进攻发生在当天18时，与此同时，敌军也攻击了第2步兵师。
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY ATTACK
From the descriptions of the combat experience of the infantry companies there were drawn these other common denominators of CCF movement in the attack, all highly significant when related one to the other: (1) CCF almost invariably approached at an oblique to the northward-facing American perimeters; (2) when seen in movement during the approach, the Chinese were following stream beds, or roads or paths parallel to them; (3) they made the approach in solid columns; (4) these columns, though in instances proceeding at double time, appeared fairly fresh; (5) each was a self-sufficient unit, carrying its own supply; (6) when in tactical retrograde, they withdrew via the low ground; and (7) along the whole front, their several general offensive movements all occurred within a relatively limited time bracket.
In the CCF attack against Eighth Army astride the Chongchon, the enemy appeared to be moving generally on an axis running from NW to SE. In the local attack, there would be tactical deviations from this, according to the fall of the ground and the accidental manner in which initial engagement sometimes took place, though these deviations were relatively few in number. On the far right of the sector, after the collapse of II ROK Corps, attack against the 38th Infantry was pressed from the North, Northeast, and East. But when the main battle opened, the line of march was as stated.
Referring to the map (map sheet Tokchon 6433-IV), it will be seen that the Chongchon River trench cuts through this area running from Northeast to Southwest all the way to the Yellow Sea. In the country immediately to the North of Kujangdong -2nd Div’s Arty base - the Chongchon’s feeder valleys to the westward run Southeast toward the river. But along the east bank, the feeder valleys and streams run Northwest to their confluence with the main river.
Thus if any enemy concentration, built up and hidden away in the feeder valleys west of the stream and to the Northwest of the Eighth Army’s northward-facing front as on 25 November, was to proceed via the line of water flow toward the Chongchon and, on crossing the river, was to continue its advance along the avenues most favorable for quick movement by foot, it would proceed always on a Southeast-running axis, and so doing would come in against both the infantry and artillery positions of 2nd Infantry Division initially at a Northwest to Southeast oblique.
The tactical phenomena heretofore discussed suggested clearly that this was how CCF had mounted its attack and then proceeded to execute it. As to the opening blow which crushed the front of 2nd Division prior to the turning movement against its right flank, there are no discrepant data. That the attack against the 25th Division front North of Ipsok, on the same day at the same hour, was pressed from the opposite direction is one more item in corroboration. Ipsok is almost due west of Kujang-dong, near the Kuryong-gang - a main tributary of the Chongchon. The CCF, from their hidings in the feeder valleys of the two streams, were simply rolling down the opposite side of the same watershed.
The following chart is diagrammatic rather than geographical and its purpose is only to give a rough indication of the manner in which the CCF offensive is most likely to have matured:
The coincidence of tactical developments along the several parts of Eighth Army’s front becomes especially instructive when considered in retrospect. It was at 1000 on 25 November that Baker of the 9th Infantry, in the forefront of 2nd Division, encountered the tough, unyielding screen of Chinese which fought for its last yard of ground. At exactly the same hour, the Ranger Company, at the forefront of 25th Division, was having an identical experience in its attack on objective No. 8 west of the Chongchon. The Rangers did not take the hill until just before dark, and finally the Chinese hold had to be broken by an intense artillery shelling against the enemy’s dug in positions. Again, the attack of the mobile hitting forces of the enemy broke against 25th Division’s front at 1800 hours on that same day, just as it did against 2nd Division
完全从研究步兵连战斗经验而得出的这些资料和一般性现象，（使得研究人员）做出了下列试验性的推论。并将其呈递，供高层司令部考虑：
（1）中共军队的主要作战兵力并未配置在高地，而是组成了一个机动集群，这个集群在夜间沿主要公路推进，隐蔽在主攻击线两侧的支流河谷中，并在那里准备应对我军向干流河谷的进攻（或前进）。
（2）这个集群可能由许多散布在相当广大地区的小型机动部队组成，但在任何情况下单个部队都保持紧密集中，准备就绪，可迅速运动。
（3）他们未被我军的空中侦察发现，由此显示他们系统地运用了某种形式的表面掩护。
（4）因为缺少茂密的林区，北朝鲜的村庄看来是唯一适合达成此目的的掩护。
（5）中共军队的纪律或许要求所有的机动打击部队在分段进军期间白天都要保持隐蔽。
（6）（中共军队）很可能也以同样的方式利用了矿坑、洞穴等地形。
（7）中共军队实施了与其机动集群具有战术联系的掩蔽防御，这些掩蔽部队在干流两岸的高地或其他通道上驻守。
（8）因此，中共军队沿特定战线的抵抗突然增强意味着：进攻者进入了危险的时刻和区域，面临着遭受向心攻击的威胁。
（9）中共军队的这道防御屏障既是发起进攻的“击发装置”又是迟滞部队，为它的主力提供了出发和推进所需的时间间隔。
（10）我军未发现任何证据支持以下假定：中共军队的机动反击部队在集结起来准备进攻之前，是部署在山顶的守军的一部分。
（11）对时间间隔的研究显然排除了上述假定的任何可能。
（12）因此，比起散布在山顶和岭脊的工事，更应当到低地去寻找敌军主力。尽管失败会削弱中共军队攻势的机动性和信心，但敌军是会逐渐恢复过来的。
（13）这项关于敌军可能采取的总体部署的展望暗示了我军空中行动应采取的方式。
（14）在我军侧翼实施远距离巡逻行动的必要性一目了然。
（15）关于中共军队是否集中在村庄地区，（指挥官）应慎重对待空军提交的否定的报告，空军的报告只有通过战术检验才能作为最终结论加以采纳。
From these data and general indications, arrived at exclusively from the study of infantry company experience, the following tentative deductions were made and forwarded for the consideration of higher command:
(1) CCF’s main battle strength was not being disposed to the high ground but was composed of a maneuver mass, which, being brought forward by night along the main roads, was at the appropriate point marched by the flank, concealed in the feeder valleys off the MSR and there held in readiness for our attack (or advance) up the main river valley.
(2) This mass was probably composed of numerous small maneuver groups distributed over a fairly wide area, but in any case the individual groups remained closely concentrated and ready for prompt movement.
(3) They had not been detected by our air reconnaissance; therefore the systematic employment of some form of surface cover was indicated.
(4) In the absence of any thickly forested area, NK villages seemed to be the only cover suitable to this purpose.
(5) CCF discipline probably required that all such mobile hitting forces remain under cover throughout daylight during the staging period.
(6) Mine shafts, caves, etc., were likely to be employed in the same manner.
(7) CCF employed a screen defense put forth in practical tactical relationship to this maneuver mass and established on the high ground on both sides of the main river valley - or other approach avenue.
(8) Any sudden hardening of CCF resistance along one definite line was therefore a signal that the attacker was in the danger hour and area, under threat from concentrations drawn up off his flanks.
(9) The defensive screen was in effect both a trigger mechanism and a delaying force, providing the main body with the interval needed to mount up and get forward:
(10) No warrant was to be found for any assumption that CCF counter-hitting mobility derived from garrisons which had been disposed along the ridge tops prior to assembly for the attack.
(11) The study of time intervals appeared to exclude any such possibility.
(12) The main body of the enemy army was therefore to be sought on low ground, rather than in works scattered among the hilltops and ridge crests, though as defeat began to reduce CCF offensive mobility and confidence, the pendulum would swing gradually in the other direction.
(13) This outlook as to the probable general dispositions of the enemy suggested the pattern which should be taken by our air operations.
(14) The need for wider-ranging patrol actions toward the flanks was plainly indicated.
(15) Negative air reports concerning CCF concentrations in village areas should be treated with a considerable reserve, and should be accepted as conclusive only when confirmed by tactical proof. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-2-22 12:24 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 这个“案例”的论据最初是由军事行动研究中心主任埃利斯 约翰逊博士口头提出，他随后又将它简化成著述。后来，对陆战1师在长津湖附近与中共军队的历次战斗的研究以更完整的细节证实了该理论。因为长津湖会战是一个漫长的事件，（研究人员）有充足的机会去观察中共军队各机动部队之间的关系，中共军队沿高地构筑的工事形成了一道防御屏障，中共机动部队驻守在这道屏障附近的村庄内。北朝鲜间谍前来报告中共士兵楔入了村舍内，好像鱼进了罐头。尽管如此，空军侦查了这些位置，报告“未发现目标”。最终，由于地面部队指挥官们确信：关于村子的情形这些北朝鲜当地人肯定讲了实话，他们命令实施针对这些村庄的轰炸。当炸弹开始落下，村子像花盆一样被掀开，到处暴露出敌军士兵。中共士兵如此顽强地坚持村庄掩护，以至于飞行员观察到：甚至在执行轰炸任务的飞机返航之前，幸存的敌军士兵就返回了被炸坏的临时营房。
最后，再次强调：这些主张属于对地面战斗中的敌军的更进一步的判读，它们完全是在步兵排级单位收集和核对的情报基础上加工成形的。而且，它们逐渐演变为事后的反思和对一项分析步兵线上直接交火的战斗中敌我效能的研究的副产品。从我方情报来源了解到的处于原始状态的情报与从中共军队战俘那里得到的战场情报并不完全吻合。这项工作无人可用，而且(指挥官们)还没有完全预见到该项工作的重要性。因此，审问工作并未侧重于这项特定目标，而且我方很多可能的丰富情报来源（例如，在德川以南被击败的南朝鲜部队）还未被发掘。
因此，（研究人员）认为该项工作呈现出的情况是不完整和令人不满的。尽管连队的资料都具有相同的指示性，但关于敌军如何集结的真实情况，它们还不是最终结论，还有很多问题没有得到解答。
The argument for this “case” was first presented orally and was then reduced to writing by Dr. Ellis Johnson, Director of ORO. Subsequently, the study of operations by the 1st Marine Division against CCF in the vicinity of the Chosen Reservoir substantiated the theory in rather complete detail. Because the battle there was a prolonged affair, there was ample opportunity to observe the relationship of the maneuver groups which holed-up in the nearby villages to the defensive screen dug in along the high ground. NK agents (friendly to us) came forward and reported that CCF troops were wedged into the village huts like fish in a can. Still, the air, reconnoitering these locations, reported “negative.” Finally, air bombing operations were ordered against the villages because the ground commanders became convinced that the Korean natives must be telling the truth about the situation. When the bombs began to drop, the villages opened up like flower pots, spilling enemy troops in all directions. CCF’s hold on village cover was so tenacious that pilots observed surviving enemy soldiers returning to the bomb-shattered hutments even before the planes used in the strike had withdrawn from the vicinity.
In conclusion, it is reemphasized only that these propositions, appertaining to the larger design of the enemy in ground operations, were formed exclusively on the basis of information collected and reconciled at the level of the infantry rifle platoon.
Furthermore, they evolved only as an afterthought and as the minor by-product of a search which was pointed directly at the analysis of enemy and friendly effects in the direct-fire engagement along the rifle line. What was learned from our own sources was, in the nature of the case, imperfectly integrated with the battlefield information gained from CCF POWs. There was no personnel available for the work and, furthermore, the importance of the object had not been adequately foreseen. Hence interrogations were not slanted to the serving of this specific end, and many perhaps fertile sources of information on our side (for example, the ROK units which had been beaten south of Tokchon) were not explored.
The exposition of the subject is therefore considered incomplete and unsatisfactory. Though the company data all point in one direction, in so far as the nature of the enemy buildup is concerned, they are not conclusive, and many questions remain unanswered. 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-2-22 12:25 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 战术协同
对连队的采访也揭示出第八集团军某些步兵部队采取的主要安全措施中存在一项由来已久的弱点——没有对前线和第一线编队侧后实施协调、有力的巡逻。前哨不切实用，徒有虚名。部队所谓的“前哨阵地”在主要散兵坑防线前仅15到20英尺也不经常设置。在行军中，距先导步兵排如此之近的尖兵并不会使主力更安全。
这些显而易见的缺点在该战区的记录汇编中引起了司令部的关注。营级部队同样地缺乏机动也是我军防御战术中被指出的一项固有弱点，步兵连之间的间隙（经常是没有有效联络的无人区）经常出现以致各连实际在战斗中不能相互支援，这只能意味着分离的部队将被各个击破。
一个固守在棱线上的营，如果所有武器对地面战斗的准备均已就绪，它就很有可能抵挡敌军一个师三天以上。同样的一支部队如果分割成连级单位，配置在不能阻止敌军进入其间低地的分离的高地上，那么很难指望它扛过一个晚上。
朝鲜战争的整个进程强调了战术协同和完整的通信联络的决定性作用，二者共同组成了行动自由的必要条件。但是和其他时期的其他军队一样，第八集团军只能通过自己艰苦的经历掌握这门课程。
一般情况下伸展过度是较常出现的情形，在这种情形下如何最佳配置各战术单位？这个主要问题的复杂性可能要求所有相关人员更认真回顾，更认真地回顾比以朝鲜战争的经验重新评估任何参谋作业更为必要。这个问题的本质涉及到各级别、各院校和各兵种。从以下陈述可以看出，许多在朝战中指挥有方的军官也还是不清楚真正的答案，他们也不确定战术研究是否作到了理论联系实际。
一位团长这样说：“我在朝鲜参加的每次行动中始终迷惑不解，问题在于以一个完整的团或三个分立的营防御指定地段，哪种部署效果更好。我知道别的团长规定他们手下的营应防守较小的营级环形阵地，从而在该团的防御地段的正面留下了宽广的缝隙。我们的策略正相反，始终保持翼侧间紧密联系，通常需要在主防线上配置两个营的6个步兵连，作为预备队的那个营在后方支援。通过这种手段，我们能够阻止敌军的夜间渗透，我们很少在后方不必要地东奔西跑或麻烦我们的支援炮兵营。我很不愿意以部署小型营级环形阵地的方法防守团级防御地段。除非在绝对必要的情况下，我不会要求支援炮兵像步兵一样作战，而采用部署营级环形阵地的方案就会导致这种类型的战斗。当然，将防线上的兵力密度稀释到这个程度是有缺点的，但是，相当奇怪，从高地上被赶下来的一个排或连如果反击迅速，就能很容易地恢复阵地。有许多次，在我看来，北朝鲜人和中国人未能扩张局部战果，他们进攻缓慢或缺乏纵深，使得我们能够从他们手中夺回主动权。”
一位营长也作了如下评论：“在朝鲜，我军一个步兵营负责的平均正面宽度为4000到5000码。十一月以后，我们认为这是正常的。无论是为了控制更大的地域接受防线上的缝隙，还是以紧密编队部署，决定如何防守这个正面都很花时间。现在我仍然没有什么好主意，采取两种方法都有很大的风险。当我与任何人讨论起这个问题时，我总是得到令人震惊的答复：“噢，那是朝鲜！”但我预见不到将来美军在人力上会拥有优势，足以使我们以野战条令中所谓的“常规正面”作战。现在的陆军军官没有如何防御延伸正面的足够知识。1946—47，在本宁堡步校的一年，预科班有一个关于延伸正面的8小时课题。现在，在利文沃斯（指挥与参谋学院），大多数课题都是基于野战条令规定的理想的常规正面。难道没有理由相信未来在攻防作战中延伸正面都将成为我们的标准吗？这项建议会使我们的军校加大战术教学的力度吗？”
TACTICAL UNITY
The company interviews also revealed a chronic weakness in major security measures by some Eighth Army infantry forces. There was no consistent and vigorous patrolling, either to the front, or laterally by the frontline formations. There was no real use of outposts, worthy of the name. What the troops called “outposts” were not infrequently positioned only 15 or 20 feet forward of the main foxhole line. On the march, the point moved in such close juncture to the lead rifle platoon as to provide no additional margin of safety to the main body.
These obvious shortcomings were called to the attention of command in the notes compiled within the Theater. It was also pointed out as an inherent weakness in our defensive tactics that battalions were not being maneuvered as such, and that the space between companies (often a void with no viable communications) was frequently such that the companies could not actually operate in support each of the other, which meant only that the separate units were asking to be destroyed one at a time.
One battalion, solidly fixed on a ridgeline, with all of its weapons prepared to fight for the ground, might well hold out against an enemy division for three days or more. The same force, divided into company units and so positioned on separate hills that the enemy could not be denied entry into the low ground in between, could hardly be expected to survive one night.
The whole course of the Korean War has emphasized the decisive importance of tactical unity and full communications, which together compose the sine qua non of freedom of action. But as with other armies in other times, Eighth Army could only master the lesson out of its own hard experience.
The complex nature of the main question-how best to deploy component tactical bodies when over-extension is the dominant condition in the general situation perhaps calls for more earnest review by all concerned than any staff matter to be reevaluated on the basis of the Korean experience. The problem, by its nature, concerns all levels, all schools, and all arms. That many of those who commanded successfully in Korea are still in doubt about final answers, and not less so as to whether the search is being conducted in a wholly practical light, is suggested by the following statements.
This from a regimental commander : “I was puzzled through every Korean action in which I participated. The question was whether it was better to defend an assigned sector as a regiment, or as three separate battalions. I know that other regimental commanders prescribed that their battalions would defend in relatively small battalion perimeters, thus leaving wide gaps across the front of the regimental sector. Our policy, on the other hand, was always to tie in from flank to flank, which frequently required positioning of six rifle companies of two battalions on the MLR, backing that up with the reserve battalion. By this means we were able to stop night infiltration by the enemy, and seldom did we have any unwanted characters running around in our rear area or harassing our supporting artillery battalion. I would be very reluctant to defend a regimental sector by means of small battalion perimeters. I don’t like to ask my supporting artillery to fight as infantry any more than is absolutely necessary, and the battalion perimeter plan will result in that type of action. Of course there are disadvantages to thinning your line to the extent that you have to eliminate the battalion reserve position, but, oddly enough, it was our experience on many occasions that a platoon or company driven from a hill will readily regain its position if it counterattacks promptly. On numerous occasions, it seemed to me that the North Koreans and Chinese failed to follow up any initial advantage which they gained locally, and their slowness or lack of depth in their attack permitted us to regain the initiative from them.”
And this from a Battalion Commander: “The average frontage assigned to an Infantry battalion in Korea was between 4000 and 5000 yards. After November, we regarded that as normal. It took a long time to decide how to defend that frontage, whether to accept gaps for the sake of reserves, or try to play it tight. I still don’t have a good idea how I would do it today; there are great risks either way. When I talk to anyone about this problem, I get the stock answer, ‘Oh! That was Korea!’ But I can’t see that in the future the American Army will have such a preponderance of manpower that, should war come, we will fight on what the FMs call ‘normal frontages.’ The Army officer today does not have informed knowledge about how to defend on an extended front. In one year of school at Benning, 1946-47, the Advance Class had one eight-hour problem on extended frontage. At Leavenworth today, most of the problems are based on the ideal of FM normal frontage. Isn’t it reasonable to believe that for us the norm of the future is the extended front both in attack and on defense, and that this proposition should weight the teaching of tactics in our service schools?” 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-2-22 12:31 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 [这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/02/23 01:37pm 第 1 次编辑]
噪音：信号与武器
本战区发布的战地记录中简要论述了中共军队动用号手制造恐怖气氛和使用多种管乐器发出战斗信号的情况。
音响的战术使用
如何削弱敌军这些手法产生的效果，使我军士兵较容易应对？这个问题给作者留下了深刻印象，对十一月会战的研究告一段落以后，解决它立即成为头等大事。不同级别的指挥和参谋部门还没有了解到解决该问题的迫切需要，在这方面还无所作为。他们的消极反应无非厚非。他们被紧张的战斗搞得精疲力竭，而且要全神贯注于恢复经历过苦战的部队的战斗力以及保存战斗力完好的部队。没有在第八集团军中服役的任何团队或个人被特别指派收集和整理来自我军步兵队伍、与敌军战术特点有关的战场情报，了解更多有关与敌军（噪音战术）程序的知识，有助于我军采取措施压制它的作用。
上述意见不包含一丝一毫的诡辩，相反，它是坦诚的批评。作者相信美军参谋系统中一项固有弱点是由于环境的影响。我们实际上忽略了完善我军战斗情报系统的一条主要途径。
《朝鲜战争步兵战术注解》这份文件简要涉及了敌军是如何使用制造噪音的器械对付美军的问题，并提供了敌军使用这些器械作为战场信号的某些细节。敌军主要出于以下三个目的制造噪音（1）制造普遍的恐怖（2）虚张声势（3）控制己方部队。这份报告中包括敌军信号的实例和含义。
然而，这份报告遗漏了任何这些奇袭手段对我军士兵影响的描述，而且它也未详细说明关于中共军队噪音战术的资料是如何收集的。
在十一月会战中，对中国人这种古老战术，普通美国连队非常的恐怖和惊慌。
关于这一点，毋庸置疑。我军士兵不习惯在战场上听到军号、牧羊人的号角、长笛、刚果鼓和卡嗒声。当敌军在夜间进攻中使用这些乐器时，主要由于这些声音附加的神秘性，严重挫伤了我军的士气。
在敌军进攻下生还的步兵连后来在集合的时候坦白地承认了这一情况。这些连队中的大部分都曾表现坚强甚至英勇。据信，连队一般水平上的管理并不逊色于我军年报上的纪录。但当他们讨论起敌军进攻的哪些特点导致了他们最严重的灾难时，他们最经常以下列语言概括对敌军制造噪音的诡计的反应：“那使我们毛骨悚然。”这是精神饱满地脱离战斗的人员的证词，他们是在本连其他人员在场的情况下作上述陈述的。因此，尽管第八集团军已经开始适应中共军队的古怪战法很久了，这些证词也应被不折不扣地认真对待。
这些士兵中的95%以上回忆不起中共军队怎样、何时（在战斗的哪个阶段，在什么战术形势下）使用任何制造噪音的器具的细节。大多数人只能回忆起他们听到了多种噪音，例如喇叭和口哨，而且这些噪音使他们精神极度紧张。只有不到1%的士兵能回忆起号声或牧羊人号角发出的“鸡鸣”的曲调。
各连集合起来就这一争论焦点进行回忆，这些明确的数据就来自于多次集合的记录汇编。这项工作不得不逐连重复完成。在集合中，一名士兵回忆起当战斗进行到特殊时刻响起了号声。其他众多士兵愿意证实他的回忆。那么，为使所有士兵专心回忆号声本身，应该询问这样一个问题：“你听到的确切是什么？”
许多次，（士兵们的）回答是否定的。但是调查仍在继续，直到偶尔发现少数士兵通过集中注意力能够使记忆重现，并且能用口哨吹或用嘴唱出（中共军队的）号声。这些士兵这么做了以后，在集合现场的所有其他士兵也会回忆起来，并赞同证人所说是准确的。然后，（研究人员）便作了记录。
几乎以同样的方法，研究人员也调查清楚了中国人使用噪音制造恐怖与使用乐器进行指挥两种情况之间的区别。
还剩最后一步——获取乐器本身，如此即可通过训练使第八集团军的部队了解中共军队的信号，适应它制造恐怖的战术，最终或许还能“以其人之道，还治其人之身”。
当时，这些制造噪音的乐器简直成了无价之宝。然而，作者完全肯定：把它们作为纪念品收集是很容易的，即使是从丢失的阵地撤退的我军士兵也成功地缴获了中共军队的乐器。所以，（研究人员）进行了调查。在每个连队，他们都向士兵们解释：这些战利品对陆军相当重要，只需暂时借用，每个缴获者都将得到收条。士兵们很不情愿地翻开他们的行军背包和铺盖卷，交出了所需数量的中共军号、牧羊人号角、铜哨子等等。
十一月会战结束之后两周，训练第八集团军的步兵抵抗中共军队噪音战术的工作充分开展起来了。在阵线后方的夜间演习中，扮演“进攻者”一方的部队使用了中共军队的噪音战术和信号器械。到了1951年1月中旬，敌军这种手法给我军士兵带来的刺激就已被消除了。
然而，考虑到中共军队在十一月会战中使用噪音战术所取得的显著效果，（研究人员）相信并建议我军自己的训练机构也采取此类改革，使部队适应噪音的这种奇特用途也应当成为准备战斗的标准操作程序。
NOISE:
SIGNAL AND WEAPON
TACTICAL USE OF SOUND
The field notes published in the Theater dwell briefly upon CCF’s use of noisemakers to create terror and the use of various wind instruments for giving combat signals.
The problem of reducing these techniques to a pattern which would become comprehensible to our troops impressed the writer as being of prime importance immediately after the study of the November battle was undertaken. Command and staff at the various levels were not as yet concerned about the acuteness of this need and had taken no action with respect to it. Their negative reaction was but natural. They were worn from the strain of battle and engrossed with the problem of rehabilitating the units which had been hardest used in the fighting and conserving those which were still combat-worthy. It was not specifically the assigned task of any group or individual serving with Eighth Army to collect and correlate battlefield information originating in our own infantry line, pertaining to the tactical characteristics of the enemy, toward the end that by more perfect knowledge of his procedures we would take steps toward their neutralization.
This statement is not made in any spirit of apology but to the contrary is frankly critical; the writer belives that the condition reflects an inherent weakness in the staff system of the US Army. We are in fact overlooking a main avenue toward the perfecting of our combat intelligence.
The document, “Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea, deals briefly with the matter of how the enemy used noise-making instruments against American forces and supplies some detail on the use of these instruments in the sounding of signals on the battlefield. It is set forth that the enemy’s noise effects were directed toward (1) the creation of a general terror, (2) the simulating of a more extended deployment than in fact occurred, and (3) the control of his own forces. Examples of signals and their meaning were included in the report.
The report omitted, however, any description of the effect on our troops consequent to these surprise methods, and it did not specify how the data on CCF noisemaking tactics were collected.
In the November battle, the reaction of the average American company to the Chinese use of this centuries-old technique was one of exaggerated fear and alarm.
Of that, there can be no question. Our troops were not conditioned to the expectation of hearing such instruments as bugles, shepherds’ horns, flutes, Congo drums, and rattles on the field of battle. When they were employed initially in the night attack, the effect was greatly unnerving, mainly because of the attendant element of mystery.
Infantry companies which had survived the attack, when later assembled, admitted this frankly. What the enemy had done was not offered as an excuse for their own conduct. None such was needed. Most of these companies had faced the unknown strongly and even heroically; it is believed that the general level of company conduct will compare favorably with anything in our annals. But when they discussed the features of the enemy attack which caused them the greatest distress, the common reaction to the enemy’s noise-making tricks was most frequently summed up in these words: “That was what made our hair stand on end.” These were the expressions of men freshly delivered from battle; they were spoken in the presence of other men of the company. For that reason, they should not be discounted, though Eighth Army has long since become conditioned to CCF eccentricities.
At least 95 percent of these same men could remember none of the pertinent details of how and when (at what stage of combat and under what tactical conditions) CCF had used any of the noise-making instruments. The majority could report only that they had heard various noises such as bugles and whistles and that the sounds had impacted strongly on their emotions. Less than 1 percent could remember the sequence of notes in any of the bugle calls or the sound of the “rooster call” blown from the shepherd’s horn.
Such specific data as were developed from the numerous assemblies came finally from requesting the companies to concentrate on the point at issue. This had to be done repeatedly, from company to company. One man in the assembly might remember that a call was heard at a particular point in the fight. Numerous of the others would confirm his recollection. Then all hands would be asked to concentrate on the call itself, the question being asked : “Exactly what did you hear?”
Many times the result would be negative. But the search was continued until finally here and there were found the few individuals who through concentration could refresh their memories and either
whistle or sing the call. Once that was done, the others in the assembly would all remember it and agree that the witness was accurate. The score was then written down.
In much the same way, the distinction was finally made between the Chinese use of noise for the creation of terror and the conditions under which noise-making instruments were being used for control purposes.
There remained the final step - the procurement of the instruments themselves, so that in training exercises Eighth Army formations could be conditioned to the enemy signals and terror-creating techniques and in the end might be able to turn these same devices against CCF.
At the time the noise-making instruments seemed almost priceless. However, the writer was perfectly sure that with their usual penchant for souvenir-hunting, our troops, even in withdrawing from a lost field, had managed here and there to possess themselves of the CCF instruments. Search was therefore instituted. At every company formation it was explained that these prizes would be of great value to the Army, that they were needed only temporarily, and that the owner would be given a receipt. With a manifest reluctance, soldiers dipped down into their barracks bags and bedrolls and brought forth CCF bugles, shepherds’ horns, bronze whistles, etc., in the required number.
Within two weeks after the conclusion of the November battle, the business of indoctrinating Eighth Army infantry against CCF noise-making tactics was well begun. In the conducting of night exercises back of the line, CCF noise and signal instruments were used by the side playing “aggressor.” By mid-January, 1951, the sting had been removed from this part of the enemy technique.
However, in view of the marked effects achieved by CCF with noise-making tactics during the November battle, it is believed, and is recommended, that such innovations should be anticipated by our own training establishment, and that conditioning troops to the eccentric use of noise should be SOP in preparation for combat. 作者: 甜酥墙皮 时间: 2006-2-22 14:09 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 人类自从有战争以来就以声响作为通信/协同/激励/威慑手段,
美军何以对军号那么陌生(以至于恐慌)?
美军平时起床、熄灯、紧急集合时用什么发信号? 作者: 徐荣 时间: 2006-2-22 16:44 标题: [原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用 可能中美两军军号的曲调不一样，美国人听中国军号的声音特别凄厉，而且从文中看不仅是军号声，还有鼓声、卡嗒声
