[原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用

射天狼

[这个贴子最后由射天狼在 2006/01/30 06:47pm 第 4 次编辑]

美军或西方人在总结和分析处理问题之客观现实的一面被表现得很突出。这篇总结性的文章，极少看到过于华丽和不切实际的粉饰，有什么问题就提什么问题，然后寻求解决问题的可能和方案。没有那些我们过于习惯的“虽然......但是.......”所以美军是一支绝不可小看的部队。因为他们打一仗就长一智，并且触类旁通。东方人当然也并非铁板一块，但对那些从基层反映出来的问题，无论是军事还是政治社会层面的问题，高层重视解决的时间和敏感度上，要相差不少。所以，解决同样一个课题，时间和代价相对比较大。解决一些问题，有些是很简单和客观上绝对能够解决做好的事，因为人为的因素而被耽误或走歪。因为建议和创新不被重视和提倡，因为只喜欢听好话做好汉而不愿暴丑示弱、面对现实，久而久之，有问题也懒得上报了，因为报不报都一样，所以很多错误一再重犯。虽然承担代价的是不同的人，产生代价的问题却一样。

小蚁雄兵

对“徐荣”朋友的翻译水平巨佩服，我的英语都和饭吃了，实在惭愧。
不知楼主那里可有志愿军夜袭方面的资料？我这都是中文的。

徐荣

谢谢大家的肯定，希望翻译本文能对大家起一些参考作用，通过总结经验教训可以避免重犯错误，扬己之长制敌之短。我还收集了一些美军分析志愿军战术的资料，美第八集团军总部在1951年12月编写的《敌军的战术》已列入下一步翻译计划，但由于工作繁忙，推出时间待定。

甜酥墙皮

楼主是转业军官还是业余发烧友?
楼主的平时工作跟军事有关吗?
楼主掌握的这些原文资料是公开途径获取的还是(美军的)内部资料?
不便回答也没关系, 只是好奇。
觉得楼主就是想冒充西点进修过的也会有人信

徐荣

我平时工作与军事无关,纯属业余爱好.这篇文章是1998年解密的,在网上可以下载到,网址我没记住,用google搜索书名应该可以搜出来.
美军的教科书比较容易获取,但它的培训体制却不简单:
美国陆军军官的院校培养体制
20世纪初期，埃利奥·鲁特担任美国陆军部长后，借鉴欧洲军事强国的经验，吸取了美西战争中的教训，按照现代战争的要求改进和完善了美国自己的陆军军官教育体制。30年代麦克阿瑟担任陆军参谋长期间与朝鲜战争后该体制也作过一定的修改。战争与和平时期的种种考验证明了该制度的成功。
该体制大体分为三级：
第1级就是美国军事学院（United States Military Academy ，即西点军校）、弗吉尼亚军事学院（Virginia Military Academy）等军校或者设在各大学的陆军后备军官训练团（Army ROTC）、候补军官学校（OCS）等初级院校，当一名美国青年经过了在这些院校的学习，成为美国陆军的一名少尉军官后，还得进入各兵种学校如本宁堡步兵学校、汉弗莱工兵学校、西尔堡炮兵学校、诺维其骑兵学校等深造，在这里，他将学习本兵种专业知识，毕业后到自己的兵种任职。在两次大战之前的沉闷岁月里，初级军官一般在部队任职十多年年甚至二十多年后才能得到去指挥与参谋学院的机会。麦克阿瑟担任陆军参谋长期间，为了激发青年军官的服役士气与进取心，改革了这种状况，缩短选送优秀军官进入参谋学院学习的年龄条件，并选派更多的具备一定服役资历的优秀青年军官回各兵种学校接受本兵种高级业务学习，在这里他们还将接受作为一名合成部队初级参谋军官业务的学习。
西点军校校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...//www.usma.edu/
ROTC（Reserve Officers'; Training Corps）徽章
网址：http://www.goarmy.com/rotc/
OCS（Officer Candidate School）徽章
网址：http://www.armyocs.com/portal/index.php

第2级是设在堪萨斯州利文沃思堡的指挥与参谋学院（US Army Command and General Staff College）。除了接受校级军官外，从1933年开始也接受部分资历较老、任职时间较长的尉官。一般约50%的陆军少校有机会进入该学院深造。未被选中的虽然可以继续服役，但一般升到中校就已经到顶了，个别人能升到上校。如果要获得将星的话，利文沃思指挥与参谋学院是必经之路。在这里的38周学习中，他将学习一个师的指挥以及军、师战术指挥方法。在这里学习紧张，竞争十分激烈。50年代以后，陆军开始鼓励军官在职业生涯中期接受民间高等教育机构深造以开拓职业军官的视野，以利民间学术界的各种新思想进入军队。科林·鲍威尔将军就曾经在华盛顿大学取得MBA学位。此外，一些辅助兵种军官职业生涯中期的学习多是在民间院校完成的，比如军医、兽医、宪兵、军法、检察这些兵种的军官，在职业生涯中期到地方院校的相关专业进修硕士学业。
指挥与参谋学院校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...y.mil/index.asp

第3级也是最高一级是位于迈尔堡的陆军军事学院（Army War College）。该学院创办于1901年，是美国陆军最高军事教育机构，也接受其它军种以及联邦政府、CIA等的学员。进入该校的一般是中校以上军官，并要求有海外任职经历，在指挥与参谋岗位上均有阅历。在这里他将学习军、集团军的指挥、陆军统帅部的工作和组织、国家的战略、政策与战争计划等，毕业后就任旅以上职务。所开的政治、军事、艺术、历史等课程在于开阔学员的眼界，使学员全面地了解美国的军事战略、国家政策与各国的基本情况。学习气氛也较为宽松、平等。1940-50年，陆军军事学院因为大战影响，停办了十年，而直到朝鲜停战后，教学才转入正常。与50年代成立的国家军事学院（National War College）相比，陆军军事学院偏重于陆上指挥艺术，而国家军事学院更侧重于各军种联合作战。
陆军军事学院校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...lisle.army.mil/

战后，美国又设立了国家军事学院、合成部队参谋学院（Joint Forces Staff College）、武装部队工业学院（the Industrial College of the Armed Forces）、国防信息学院（Information Resources Management College），合称国防大学（National Defense University），实施高等军事教育，培训高级和中级指挥参谋军官、联邦政府官员，并对国家安全战略问题进行综合研究。
国防大学校徽
网址：http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-...://www.ndu.edu/

徐荣

连级研究中收集的资料
从步兵连的战后总结中收集的资料提供了研究和评估敌军战役企图的基础，情况逐渐清楚了：战场真相不仅与参谋和指挥部门的假定有差异，而且和它南辕北撤。
[研究人员]调查了13个步兵连。从幸存的目击者的口述中提取了它们的战斗经历。关于各连遭遇了哪些情况、这支部队作为整体获悉了敌军的哪些情报，他们讲述了相当完整的经历。在这13个连队中，有2个连曾被作为预备队，在中共军队进攻一个炮兵阵地时它们参加了战斗。
在整体上概括地讲，12场局部战斗中（各连的环形防御阵地相距甚远，因此它们的战斗具有孤立的性质），只有两场战斗里中共军队的行动路线和攻击发起方式显示它预先了解目标的位置并被特别派遣去占领该处。
在两个例外情况中，那些连队犯了（违反规定）在宿营的时候点火的错误，并且也没有采取任何防止敌军逼近时发现该连阵地的措施。在其他连队里，毋庸置疑，局部接触都是偶然和意外发生的。敌军是暗中摸索的。有充分的证据证明这一事实。在七个战例中，靠近友军侧翼的前哨向已通过的敌军纵队的末尾射“回马箭”引发了该连的全程战斗。在其他战例中，当敌军误打误撞，闯进我军的散兵坑防线时还保持着纵队队形。总之，在整个步兵防线上发生的战斗具有遭遇战的性质。
敌军对与它最接近的我军单元的移动如此缺乏了解，我军的后方支援单位与其距离更远而且稍后在战场上已进行必要的靠拢，有理由去相信敌军对这些后方支援单位的位置有更精确的认识吗？看来没有。
然而，上述结论有几处看上去与涉及局部防御战斗的资料相冲突。也许最具启发性的事件就是11月25时约18：00敌军对球场（在清川江东岸，所谓“中国帽子”岭正西）以北第61野战炮兵营阵地的进攻。11月25日晨，第61野战炮兵营和其他支援单位从球场向北往该阵地转移，以便给第23步兵团更好的支援，第23步兵团将超越第9步兵团，于11月26日发起进攻。因空间狭小，这些火炮直到当天中午才进入发射阵地。没有它们在第9步兵团前线试射的纪录。
第23步兵团，欠2、3营，在16：00接近了同一地域，并在该炮兵阵地左侧建立了一个改良的环形防御阵地，它基本沿清川江展开。该团处于支援位置，扎营多少有些不严格，但它在该处接受了一条以前的守卫者已挖好的散兵坑防线。
因此，在炮兵阵地建立与准备在它旁边扎起步兵营帐之间有一个短暂的间隔。
再次列出各事件发生的时间表：
10:00，第9团B连在北面开始与敌军交战。
14:30，第61野战炮兵营在狭小的发射阵地架设好了火炮。
16:00，第23步兵团在第61野战炮兵营旁边扎营。
18:00，第23步兵团和第61野战炮兵营遭受清川江对岸密集的步枪和自动武器火力的压制。
30—40分钟内，炮兵阵地被突破，幸存的炮兵向后方撤退。
敌军的突击部队涉水越过清川江，尽管气温接近零度，但敌军士兵们大部分双腿赤裸，用手提着鞋袜和裤子。
在接下来的一个半小时内，突破炮兵阵地的中共部队，以及在右翼径直闯入第23步兵团营地的中共部队，都已被第23团1营的两个连消灭或驱散了。
这是怎么发生的呢？
DATA FROM COMPANY STUDIES
As the data collected during the infantry company critiques began to provide the base on which to study and evaluate the operational design of the enemy, it soon became apparent that the facts of the battlefield were not only discrepant with but flatly contradictory of the off-hand assumptions of the staff and command.
Thirteen infantry companies were interviewed. Their battle experiences were drawn from the surviving witnesses; they told a reasonably complete story of what had happened to each company, and what the force as a whole had learned of the enemy. Included in the 13 were 2 which had been in reserve and had joined action during CCF attack upon an artillery position.
When the whole was recapitulated, it showed that out of 12 localized actions (the defensive perimeters were so far apart that each company action partook of the nature of an isolated fight) there were only two in which CCF moved in such a way, and fixed its assault in such a manner, as to indicate that it knew beforehand that the target was there and was set to blanket it.
In the case of the two exceptions, the companies had made the error (against orders) of lighting squad fires during bivouac, and there was nothing to prevent the enemy from seeing the position in outline during his approach.
In the other companies, engagement occurred in such way as to leave no room for doubt that the local contact was by accident and not design. The enemy was groping. There was abundant proof of that fact. In several instances, the full-length fight by the company was the consequence of an outpost along the friendly flank taking a Parthian shot at the tail-end of an enemy column which had already gone past. In other instances, the enemy force was still moving in column when it blundered into the defending foxhole line. In sum, when examined superficially, the whole battle along the rifle line partook of the nature of a chance-meeting engagement.
Was it within reason to believe that a force thus badly informed about the movements of the hostile combat elements closest to it would have almost precise knowledge of the locations of the rear support which was farther distant and had necessarily closed somewhat later on the ground where it was attacked? It did not so seem.
However, there were certain points in seeming conflict within the data covering the local defensive actions. Perhaps the most instructive incident is the enemy attack upon the position of the 61st FA Battalion to the north of Kujang-dong (on the east bank of the Chongchon and just west of the ridge called “Chinaman’s Hat”) at approximately 1800 hours on 25 November. The 61st FA Battalion and other supporting units had displaced northward from Kujang-dong to that position during the morning of 25 November in order to give better support to 23rd Infantry Regiment, which was to pass through the 9th Regiment, and attack on 26 November. The guns, seriously cramped for space, did not get in firing position until about mid-afternoon. It is not of record that they registered fires on the 9th Infantry front.
The 23rd Infantry, less its 2nd and 3rd Battalions, closed on this same ground at about 1600 and set up a modified perimeter defense to the left of the artillery position and in general extension of its line along the river. The camp was more or less relaxed, being in a support position, but the infantry took over a line of foxholes dug there by some previous occupant.
There was thus a relatively brief interval between the setting up of the artillery and the preparation of the infantry camp beside it.
To again show the chronology of events:
At 1000 Baker Company, 9th, had become engaged to the northward.
At 1430 the 61st Battalion set up in its cramped fire position.
At 1600 the 23rd Infantry made camp next the 61st.
At 1800 the 61st-23rd area was brought under intense rifle and automatic fire from the far bank of the Chongchon.
Within 30 to 40 minutes the gun positions had been overrun and the surviving artillerymen had taken off to the rear.
The enemy assault force had waded the river; the men, bare-legged for the most part, though the weather was near zero, had carried their footgear and trousers in their hands.
Within the next hour and one-half, the CCF which had overrun the artillery, as well as the Chinese on the right who had come directly into the 23rd’s camp, had been killed or dispersed in total by the action of two of the battalion’s companies.
How had it happened?
地图：第二次战役西线

徐荣

[这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/02/07 10:56am 第 1 次编辑]

发起卷击
按照我军步兵的说法，多数越过清川江的敌军士兵并未装备轻武器，但携带了用来炸毁火炮的不同型号的特制炸药包。当敌军士兵发现自己闯入我军步兵的营帐，紧接着又遭到步兵反击时，他们大惑不解，而且也没有进行有效的抵抗。
中共军队以七路纵队越过清川江，最初投入的兵力约为共军第94团①　的两个营。我军抓获了数十名俘虏。他们讲自己曾被告知此次行动的目标是“破坏火炮”，但没料到会碰到步兵。他们并未被指派冲破炮兵阵地之后应去完成的第二任务。因为他们没有料到会与步兵交战，（据他们讲）只有一半突前人员携带了轻武器。这次讯问处处显示这些俘虏或派遣他们的人掌握了美军火炮架设在“中国帽子”高地附近的确切情报。然而，在回顾中，这可被视作关键性的疑点。第八集团军的前线到此时仍不知道整体形势已发生突变。如果这次表面上针对炮兵的局部推进实际上是中共军队的固有计划的一部分，那么对形势的评估就会有极大的不同。
然而，在这次战斗后十天，以肤浅的信息和此次行动自身的外观为基础，对“中国帽子”高地事件发生的原因，我军的参谋和指挥部门仍然坚持以下分析：（1）关键在于中共军队在高地上良好的观察（2）敌军发现火炮抵达（3）敌军未能发现步兵扎营（4）中共军队安排了一次带有明确目标——打击第61野炮营的特别行动（5）由于敌军的目标是局部性的，我军步兵的抵达对于（炮兵阵地）的防御者是一个幸运的转折。
炮兵战报总结道：“当第61野炮营抵达时敌人正好俯视着那条隘路，敌人通过出色的观察了解到何时应向该阵地进攻。”简言之，甚至在“中国帽子”高地上的步炮协同行动实施之后，情况看上去与主要的假定（敌人在局部探测我军当时构成的战线上的缺口和弱点之后，以一种“抓到什么就是什么”的方式发展进攻）并不矛盾。
我军认为中共军队向“中国帽子”高地的进攻只具有局部意义，而与中共军队当时已开始执行的整体计划没有联系，这种有些狭隘的见解可能是正确的。
但是由于缺乏任何明显的证据，其他可能也不应排除——敌军已经发起卷击，其总攻开始的时间选择正好与美军进入“中国帽子”地区的时间相符。
指向这个方向的证据中主要的一项是：中共军队进攻炮兵阵地的钟点与中共军队的机动打击部队向我第9、第38步兵团的前线发起总攻的时间是一致的。我军在清川江东西两岸的一般阵地在此前并没有受到来自正面的沉重压力。
当天，在第2步兵师和第25步兵师正面相距很远的三处，拒绝放弃山顶堑壕阵地的中国人进行了激烈的战斗，并以肉搏战来抵抗。但敌军从这些阵地后方向前席卷、沿最短路线淹没整个地区的第一波反击没有持续到18时和19时之间。
值得注意的是这些机动部队是刚抵达现场的生力军，他们绝不是那些沿山顶组成坚强的防御屏障的部队自身的预备队。
因此，关于“中国帽子”高地的战斗，疑点在于：这支突击部队的行动更像对当天黄昏敌军所取得进展的扩张，而不符合一项预定的全面反攻计划的特征。中共军队选择的主战场明显缺乏草场和其他平地。在另一方面看，在上述平坦地形出现的敌军人员出于巧合构成了对我军的欺骗。尽管中共军队的观察所没有发现任何东西，但带着特制炸药包被派去进攻炮兵阵地的营可能对这些火炮的位置就在 “中国帽子”高地附近充满信心。
（中共军队）联系到第八集团军的步兵已展开进攻，考虑到在步兵战线后面缺乏其他平坦的空地，（他推断出）美军支援炮兵便别无选择——不得不在清川江和“中国帽子”高地之间建立阵地。
此次战斗的整体表现显示敌人尽管在某些方面是二流对手，但他足够机敏，能认识到上述情况。
SET TO ROLL
By the account of our own infantry, the greater number of enemy soldiers who had crossed the Chongchon were not equipped with small arms, but were carrying special charges of varying types expressly to destroy the artillery pieces. When they found themselves in the infantry camp, and were in turn counterattacked by infantry, they became completely nonplused and offered no effective resistance.
The CCF had crossed the Chongchon in seven columns, total initially committed strength being about two battalions from the 94th CCF Regiment. Several score prisoners were taken. They said they had been told “to destroy artillery” at the objective, but hadn’t expected to find infantry. No secondary mission had been assigned them toward which to turn after overrunning the artillery. Because they had not expected to engage infantry (they said) only about half of them had carried small arms in the advance. The interrogations nowhere reveal that these prisoners or those who sent them forth had acted on the basis of positive intelligence that American guns were setting up near Chinaman’s Hat. Yet in retrospect this can be seen as the decisive question. The Eighth Army front was as yet unapprised that its general situation had radically changed. If the seemingly local advance against the artillery was in fact part of a “set piece,” that made a vital difference in the reckoning of situation.
However, ten days after the battle, on the basis of surface information and the look of the action itself, our staff and command still held to the following analysis of why things had happened as they did at Chinaman’s Hat : (1) CCF’s superior observation from the high ground was the key. (2) The enemy had seen the artillery arrive. (3) He had missed seeing the infantry make camp. (4) CCF had mounted a special expedition with the express object of hitting 61st FL4 Bn. (5) Since the enemy object was localized, the arrival of the infantry was just a lucky break for the defender.
Said the artillery operations report in summing up: “They were looking right down the throat of 61st FA Bn when it arrived and because of superior observation they knew how and when to advance on the position.” In brief, even after the minutiae of the infantry-artillery action at Chinaman’s Hat had been examined, it did not appear to conflict with the major assumption that the enemy had developed his onfall in a catch-as-catch-can manner after a local sensing of gaps and weaknesses in the battle line which we were then forming.
It is perhaps possible that this somewhat narrow view of the CCF attack on the position at Chinaman’s Hat, which gives it a purely local significance unrelated to a general plan of the enemy already then in execution, is the correct one.
But in the absence of any clear proof, the other possible alternative should not, be excluded - that the enemy force was already set to roll, and, its timing being part of a general movement, just happened to coincide with the arrival of the American force in the Chinaman’s Hat area.
One main item in proof points straight in this direction: The CCF attack against the artillery position coincided to the hour with the initiation of the general assault by the mobile hitting forces of CCF against the forward line manned by the ,9th and 38th Infantry Regiments. In the general position lying west and east of the Chongchon River, there had been felt no heavy forward pressure from the enemy until that time.
During the day, at three widely-separated points along the front of 2nd and 25th Divisions, there had been hard fighting by Chinese who refused to yield their dug-in positions on the hill crests and accepted hand-to-hand combat. But it was not until between the hours of 1800 and 1900 that the first main wave of the enemy’s counter-offensive rolled forward from behind these positions and proceeded by the shortest routes to inundate the whole area.
It is noteworthy that these maneuver bodies were fresh arrived on the scene and were not simply local reserves of the units forming the rigid defensive screen along the hilltops.
Therefore, as to the fight at Chinaman’s Hat, the question is whether the attacking force wasn’t committed in conformity with an already set, general counter-offensive plan, rather than being an improvization based upon the developments of the late afternoon. That it looked otherwise to the men on the ground could have been a deception arising from sheer coincidence. CCF had chosen a general battlefield notably short of any meadowland or other flat spaces. The battalions which had been sent forward with special charges to attack an artillery position at Chinaman’s Hat could have proceeded with full confidence that the guns would be there, even though their OPs hadn’t seen a thing.
In relation to the Eighth Army infantry attack which was already unfolding, and in view of the lack of any other flat spaces to the rear of the infantry line, there was no alternative for the supporting artillery-it had to take position between the River and Chinaman’s Hat.
The general appearance of the battle suggests that the enemy, though in some respects a second-rate opponent, was smart enough to realize that.
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①应为４０军１２０师３５９团

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敌军进攻的特点
根据我军步兵连的战斗经验的描述，中共军队的进攻在运转中有这些共同点，所有这些特点当相互联系起来分析时显得特别重要：（1）中共军队总是从北面沿倾斜方向接近美军的环形阵地；（2） 我军发现中国人在接敌行动中行军方向与河床、公路或小径平行；（3）他们以密集纵队接敌；（4）在许多情况下，虽然这些纵队保持快步行进，但看上去仍十分有活力；（5）每个敌军士兵都是自给自足的个体，携带自身的给养；（6）敌军通过低地实施战术退却；（7）在整条战线上，他们的几次总攻都发生一个相当短的时间段内。
当中共军队向横跨清川江两岸的第八集团军进攻时，敌军看上去是沿从西北到东南的轴线运动的。在局部攻势中，由于地势走向和初战有时以意外方式爆发，他们在战术上可能背离这一方向， 但这种背离出现的次数极少。在第八集团军作战地幅的最右端，南朝鲜第二军崩溃之后，（中共军队）从北、东北和东面向我第38步兵团施加压力。但当主力会战开始后，敌军也是按照规定好的路线行军的。
参照地图（图块“德川 6433-IV”），清川江谷地从东北向西南割裂该地区，直达黄海。在紧靠球场北面的村庄——第2步兵师的炮兵基地——西侧的支流向东南方汇入清川江。但在清川江东岸，支流和小溪向西北方汇入干流。
敌军在清川江西侧支流河谷并在第八集团军西北方的任何集结、增援和脱离（如11月25日的情况），是沿流向清川江的水流方向的，并且敌军在横越该河时，将继续沿着最有利于徒步行军的方向前进，通常沿东南走向的轴线，这样他们一开始就将同时打击第2步兵师的步兵和炮兵阵地。
至此，讨论到的这些战术现象清楚地揭示了中共军队是如何发动及发展进攻的。关于中共军队迂回第2步兵师右翼之前粉碎该师正面的首次突击，不存在相抵触的资料。在当天同一小时，中共军队对第25步兵师位于上九洞以北的正面实施的进攻是从相反方向施加压力的，这是他们发动协同进攻的又一项情报。上九洞差不多在球场正西，位于清川江的一条主要支流——九龙江附近。隐蔽在这两条河流谷地中的中共军队向同一条分水岭的两侧发动了方向完全相反的卷击。
下图是概略图而不是地理意义上的地图，绘出它的目的也仅在于粗略地揭示中共军队酝酿其攻势时最可能采用的手段：
第八集团军正面几个地段上的战术发展同时发生，在回顾中考虑到这一点特别给人以启发。11月25日10时，位于第2步兵师最前线的第9步兵团B连遭遇到了坚定顽强、寸步不让的中共掩蔽部队。在同一小时内，第25步兵师的前锋游骑兵连进攻清川江西岸的8号目标时也有同样的经历。游骑兵连到黄昏仍未夺取该高地，最后我军不得不以密集炮火轰击敌军的堑壕阵地，才击破他们的固守。此外，敌军机动打击部队突破第25步兵师正面的进攻发生在当天18时，与此同时，敌军也攻击了第2步兵师。

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY ATTACK
From the descriptions of the combat experience of the infantry companies there were drawn these other common denominators of CCF movement in the attack, all highly significant when related one to the other: (1) CCF almost invariably approached at an oblique to the northward-facing American perimeters; (2) when seen in movement during the approach, the Chinese were following stream beds, or roads or paths parallel to them; (3) they made the approach in solid columns; (4) these columns, though in instances proceeding at double time, appeared fairly fresh; (5) each was a self-sufficient unit, carrying its own supply; (6) when in tactical retrograde, they withdrew via the low ground; and (7) along the whole front, their several general offensive movements all occurred within a relatively limited time bracket.
In the CCF attack against Eighth Army astride the Chongchon, the enemy appeared to be moving generally on an axis running from NW to SE. In the local attack, there would be tactical deviations from this, according to the fall of the ground and the accidental manner in which initial engagement sometimes took place, though these deviations were relatively few in number. On the far right of the sector, after the collapse of II ROK Corps, attack against the 38th Infantry was pressed from the North, Northeast, and East. But when the main battle opened, the line of march was as stated.
Referring to the map (map sheet Tokchon 6433-IV), it will be seen that the Chongchon River trench cuts through this area running from Northeast to Southwest all the way to the Yellow Sea. In the country immediately to the North of Kujangdong -2nd Div’s Arty base - the Chongchon’s feeder valleys to the westward run Southeast toward the river. But along the east bank, the feeder valleys and streams run Northwest to their confluence with the main river.
Thus if any enemy concentration, built up and hidden away in the feeder valleys west of the stream and to the Northwest of the Eighth Army’s northward-facing front as on 25 November, was to proceed via the line of water flow toward the Chongchon and, on crossing the river, was to continue its advance along the avenues most favorable for quick movement by foot, it would proceed always on a Southeast-running axis, and so doing would come in against both the infantry and artillery positions of 2nd Infantry Division initially at a Northwest to Southeast oblique.
The tactical phenomena heretofore discussed suggested clearly that this was how CCF had mounted its attack and then proceeded to execute it. As to the opening blow which crushed the front of 2nd Division prior to the turning movement against its right flank, there are no discrepant data. That the attack against the 25th Division front North of Ipsok, on the same day at the same hour, was pressed from the opposite direction is one more item in corroboration. Ipsok is almost due west of Kujang-dong, near the Kuryong-gang - a main tributary of the Chongchon. The CCF, from their hidings in the feeder valleys of the two streams, were simply rolling down the opposite side of the same watershed.
The following chart is diagrammatic rather than geographical and its purpose is only to give a rough indication of the manner in which the CCF offensive is most likely to have matured:
The coincidence of tactical developments along the several parts of Eighth Army’s front becomes especially instructive when considered in retrospect. It was at 1000 on 25 November that Baker of the 9th Infantry, in the forefront of 2nd Division, encountered the tough, unyielding screen of Chinese which fought for its last yard of ground. At exactly the same hour, the Ranger Company, at the forefront of 25th Division, was having an identical experience in its attack on objective No. 8 west of the Chongchon. The Rangers did not take the hill until just before dark, and finally the Chinese hold had to be broken by an intense artillery shelling against the enemy’s dug in positions. Again, the attack of the mobile hitting forces of the enemy broke against 25th Division’s front at 1800 hours on that same day, just as it did against 2nd Division

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[这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/02/22 12:22pm 第 1 次编辑]

完全从研究步兵连战斗经验而得出的这些资料和一般性现象，（使得研究人员）做出了下列试验性的推论。并将其呈递，供高层司令部考虑：
（1）中共军队的主要作战兵力并未配置在高地，而是组成了一个机动集群，这个集群在夜间沿主要公路推进，隐蔽在主攻击线两侧的支流河谷中，并在那里准备应对我军向干流河谷的进攻（或前进）。
（2）这个集群可能由许多散布在相当广大地区的小型机动部队组成，但在任何情况下单个部队都保持紧密集中，准备就绪，可迅速运动。
（3）他们未被我军的空中侦察发现，由此显示他们系统地运用了某种形式的表面掩护。
（4）因为缺少茂密的林区，北朝鲜的村庄看来是唯一适合达成此目的的掩护。
（5）中共军队的纪律或许要求所有的机动打击部队在分段进军期间白天都要保持隐蔽。
（6）（中共军队）很可能也以同样的方式利用了矿坑、洞穴等地形。
（7）中共军队实施了与其机动集群具有战术联系的掩蔽防御，这些掩蔽部队在干流两岸的高地或其他通道上驻守。
（8）因此，中共军队沿特定战线的抵抗突然增强意味着：进攻者进入了危险的时刻和区域，面临着遭受向心攻击的威胁。
（9）中共军队的这道防御屏障既是发起进攻的“击发装置”又是迟滞部队，为它的主力提供了出发和推进所需的时间间隔。
（10）我军未发现任何证据支持以下假定：中共军队的机动反击部队在集结起来准备进攻之前，是部署在山顶的守军的一部分。
（11）对时间间隔的研究显然排除了上述假定的任何可能。
（12）因此，比起散布在山顶和岭脊的工事，更应当到低地去寻找敌军主力。尽管失败会削弱中共军队攻势的机动性和信心，但敌军是会逐渐恢复过来的。
（13）这项关于敌军可能采取的总体部署的展望暗示了我军空中行动应采取的方式。
（14）在我军侧翼实施远距离巡逻行动的必要性一目了然。
（15）关于中共军队是否集中在村庄地区，（指挥官）应慎重对待空军提交的否定的报告，空军的报告只有通过战术检验才能作为最终结论加以采纳。
From these data and general indications, arrived at exclusively from the study of infantry company experience, the following tentative deductions were made and forwarded for the consideration of higher command:
(1) CCF’s main battle strength was not being disposed to the high ground but was composed of a maneuver mass, which, being brought forward by night along the main roads, was at the appropriate point marched by the flank, concealed in the feeder valleys off the MSR and there held in readiness for our attack (or advance) up the main river valley.
(2) This mass was probably composed of numerous small maneuver groups distributed over a fairly wide area, but in any case the individual groups remained closely concentrated and ready for prompt movement.
(3) They had not been detected by our air reconnaissance; therefore the systematic employment of some form of surface cover was indicated.
(4) In the absence of any thickly forested area, NK villages seemed to be the only cover suitable to this purpose.
(5) CCF discipline probably required that all such mobile hitting forces remain under cover throughout daylight during the staging period.
(6) Mine shafts, caves, etc., were likely to be employed in the same manner.
(7) CCF employed a screen defense put forth in practical tactical relationship to this maneuver mass and established on the high ground on both sides of the main river valley - or other approach avenue.
(8) Any sudden hardening of CCF resistance along one definite line was therefore a signal that the attacker was in the danger hour and area, under threat from concentrations drawn up off his flanks.
(9) The defensive screen was in effect both a trigger mechanism and a delaying force, providing the main body with the interval needed to mount up and get forward:
(10) No warrant was to be found for any assumption that CCF counter-hitting mobility derived from garrisons which had been disposed along the ridge tops prior to assembly for the attack.
(11) The study of time intervals appeared to exclude any such possibility.
(12) The main body of the enemy army was therefore to be sought on low ground, rather than in works scattered among the hilltops and ridge crests, though as defeat began to reduce CCF offensive mobility and confidence, the pendulum would swing gradually in the other direction.
(13) This outlook as to the probable general dispositions of the enemy suggested the pattern which should be taken by our air operations.
(14) The need for wider-ranging patrol actions toward the flanks was plainly indicated.
(15) Negative air reports concerning CCF concentrations in village areas should be treated with a considerable reserve, and should be accepted as conclusive only when confirmed by tactical proof.

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这个“案例”的论据最初是由军事行动研究中心主任埃利斯 约翰逊博士口头提出，他随后又将它简化成著述。后来，对陆战1师在长津湖附近与中共军队的历次战斗的研究以更完整的细节证实了该理论。因为长津湖会战是一个漫长的事件，（研究人员）有充足的机会去观察中共军队各机动部队之间的关系，中共军队沿高地构筑的工事形成了一道防御屏障，中共机动部队驻守在这道屏障附近的村庄内。北朝鲜间谍前来报告中共士兵楔入了村舍内，好像鱼进了罐头。尽管如此，空军侦查了这些位置，报告“未发现目标”。最终，由于地面部队指挥官们确信：关于村子的情形这些北朝鲜当地人肯定讲了实话，他们命令实施针对这些村庄的轰炸。当炸弹开始落下，村子像花盆一样被掀开，到处暴露出敌军士兵。中共士兵如此顽强地坚持村庄掩护，以至于飞行员观察到：甚至在执行轰炸任务的飞机返航之前，幸存的敌军士兵就返回了被炸坏的临时营房。
最后，再次强调：这些主张属于对地面战斗中的敌军的更进一步的判读，它们完全是在步兵排级单位收集和核对的情报基础上加工成形的。而且，它们逐渐演变为事后的反思和对一项分析步兵线上直接交火的战斗中敌我效能的研究的副产品。从我方情报来源了解到的处于原始状态的情报与从中共军队战俘那里得到的战场情报并不完全吻合。这项工作无人可用，而且(指挥官们)还没有完全预见到该项工作的重要性。因此，审问工作并未侧重于这项特定目标，而且我方很多可能的丰富情报来源（例如，在德川以南被击败的南朝鲜部队）还未被发掘。
因此，（研究人员）认为该项工作呈现出的情况是不完整和令人不满的。尽管连队的资料都具有相同的指示性，但关于敌军如何集结的真实情况，它们还不是最终结论，还有很多问题没有得到解答。
The argument for this “case” was first presented orally and was then reduced to writing by Dr. Ellis Johnson, Director of ORO. Subsequently, the study of operations by the 1st Marine Division against CCF in the vicinity of the Chosen Reservoir substantiated the theory in rather complete detail. Because the battle there was a prolonged affair, there was ample opportunity to observe the relationship of the maneuver groups which holed-up in the nearby villages to the defensive screen dug in along the high ground. NK agents (friendly to us) came forward and reported that CCF troops were wedged into the village huts like fish in a can. Still, the air, reconnoitering these locations, reported “negative.” Finally, air bombing operations were ordered against the villages because the ground commanders became convinced that the Korean natives must be telling the truth about the situation. When the bombs began to drop, the villages opened up like flower pots, spilling enemy troops in all directions. CCF’s hold on village cover was so tenacious that pilots observed surviving enemy soldiers returning to the bomb-shattered hutments even before the planes used in the strike had withdrawn from the vicinity.
In conclusion, it is reemphasized only that these propositions, appertaining to the larger design of the enemy in ground operations, were formed exclusively on the basis of information collected and reconciled at the level of the infantry rifle platoon.
Furthermore, they evolved only as an afterthought and as the minor by-product of a search which was pointed directly at the analysis of enemy and friendly effects in the direct-fire engagement along the rifle line. What was learned from our own sources was, in the nature of the case, imperfectly integrated with the battlefield information gained from CCF POWs. There was no personnel available for the work and, furthermore, the importance of the object had not been adequately foreseen. Hence interrogations were not slanted to the serving of this specific end, and many perhaps fertile sources of information on our side (for example, the ROK units which had been beaten south of Tokchon) were not explored.
The exposition of the subject is therefore considered incomplete and unsatisfactory. Though the company data all point in one direction, in so far as the nature of the enemy buildup is concerned, they are not conclusive, and many questions remain unanswered.