[原译]1950冬—1951年在朝鲜的步兵战斗与武器使用

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战术协同
对连队的采访也揭示出第八集团军某些步兵部队采取的主要安全措施中存在一项由来已久的弱点——没有对前线和第一线编队侧后实施协调、有力的巡逻。前哨不切实用，徒有虚名。部队所谓的“前哨阵地”在主要散兵坑防线前仅15到20英尺也不经常设置。在行军中，距先导步兵排如此之近的尖兵并不会使主力更安全。
这些显而易见的缺点在该战区的记录汇编中引起了司令部的关注。营级部队同样地缺乏机动也是我军防御战术中被指出的一项固有弱点，步兵连之间的间隙（经常是没有有效联络的无人区）经常出现以致各连实际在战斗中不能相互支援，这只能意味着分离的部队将被各个击破。
一个固守在棱线上的营，如果所有武器对地面战斗的准备均已就绪，它就很有可能抵挡敌军一个师三天以上。同样的一支部队如果分割成连级单位，配置在不能阻止敌军进入其间低地的分离的高地上，那么很难指望它扛过一个晚上。
朝鲜战争的整个进程强调了战术协同和完整的通信联络的决定性作用，二者共同组成了行动自由的必要条件。但是和其他时期的其他军队一样，第八集团军只能通过自己艰苦的经历掌握这门课程。
一般情况下伸展过度是较常出现的情形，在这种情形下如何最佳配置各战术单位？这个主要问题的复杂性可能要求所有相关人员更认真回顾，更认真地回顾比以朝鲜战争的经验重新评估任何参谋作业更为必要。这个问题的本质涉及到各级别、各院校和各兵种。从以下陈述可以看出，许多在朝战中指挥有方的军官也还是不清楚真正的答案，他们也不确定战术研究是否作到了理论联系实际。
一位团长这样说：“我在朝鲜参加的每次行动中始终迷惑不解，问题在于以一个完整的团或三个分立的营防御指定地段，哪种部署效果更好。我知道别的团长规定他们手下的营应防守较小的营级环形阵地，从而在该团的防御地段的正面留下了宽广的缝隙。我们的策略正相反，始终保持翼侧间紧密联系，通常需要在主防线上配置两个营的6个步兵连，作为预备队的那个营在后方支援。通过这种手段，我们能够阻止敌军的夜间渗透，我们很少在后方不必要地东奔西跑或麻烦我们的支援炮兵营。我很不愿意以部署小型营级环形阵地的方法防守团级防御地段。除非在绝对必要的情况下，我不会要求支援炮兵像步兵一样作战，而采用部署营级环形阵地的方案就会导致这种类型的战斗。当然，将防线上的兵力密度稀释到这个程度是有缺点的，但是，相当奇怪，从高地上被赶下来的一个排或连如果反击迅速，就能很容易地恢复阵地。有许多次，在我看来，北朝鲜人和中国人未能扩张局部战果，他们进攻缓慢或缺乏纵深，使得我们能够从他们手中夺回主动权。”
一位营长也作了如下评论：“在朝鲜，我军一个步兵营负责的平均正面宽度为4000到5000码。十一月以后，我们认为这是正常的。无论是为了控制更大的地域接受防线上的缝隙，还是以紧密编队部署，决定如何防守这个正面都很花时间。现在我仍然没有什么好主意，采取两种方法都有很大的风险。当我与任何人讨论起这个问题时，我总是得到令人震惊的答复：“噢，那是朝鲜！”但我预见不到将来美军在人力上会拥有优势，足以使我们以野战条令中所谓的“常规正面”作战。现在的陆军军官没有如何防御延伸正面的足够知识。1946—47，在本宁堡步校的一年，预科班有一个关于延伸正面的8小时课题。现在，在利文沃斯（指挥与参谋学院），大多数课题都是基于野战条令规定的理想的常规正面。难道没有理由相信未来在攻防作战中延伸正面都将成为我们的标准吗？这项建议会使我们的军校加大战术教学的力度吗？”
TACTICAL UNITY
The company interviews also revealed a chronic weakness in major security measures by some Eighth Army infantry forces. There was no consistent and vigorous patrolling, either to the front, or laterally by the frontline formations. There was no real use of outposts, worthy of the name. What the troops called “outposts” were not infrequently positioned only 15 or 20 feet forward of the main foxhole line. On the march, the point moved in such close juncture to the lead rifle platoon as to provide no additional margin of safety to the main body.
These obvious shortcomings were called to the attention of command in the notes compiled within the Theater. It was also pointed out as an inherent weakness in our defensive tactics that battalions were not being maneuvered as such, and that the space between companies (often a void with no viable communications) was frequently such that the companies could not actually operate in support each of the other, which meant only that the separate units were asking to be destroyed one at a time.
One battalion, solidly fixed on a ridgeline, with all of its weapons prepared to fight for the ground, might well hold out against an enemy division for three days or more. The same force, divided into company units and so positioned on separate hills that the enemy could not be denied entry into the low ground in between, could hardly be expected to survive one night.
The whole course of the Korean War has emphasized the decisive importance of tactical unity and full communications, which together compose the sine qua non of freedom of action. But as with other armies in other times, Eighth Army could only master the lesson out of its own hard experience.
The complex nature of the main question-how best to deploy component tactical bodies when over-extension is the dominant condition in the general situation perhaps calls for more earnest review by all concerned than any staff matter to be reevaluated on the basis of the Korean experience. The problem, by its nature, concerns all levels, all schools, and all arms. That many of those who commanded successfully in Korea are still in doubt about final answers, and not less so as to whether the search is being conducted in a wholly practical light, is suggested by the following statements.
This from a regimental commander : “I was puzzled through every Korean action in which I participated. The question was whether it was better to defend an assigned sector as a regiment, or as three separate battalions. I know that other regimental commanders prescribed that their battalions would defend in relatively small battalion perimeters, thus leaving wide gaps across the front of the regimental sector. Our policy, on the other hand, was always to tie in from flank to flank, which frequently required positioning of six rifle companies of two battalions on the MLR, backing that up with the reserve battalion. By this means we were able to stop night infiltration by the enemy, and seldom did we have any unwanted characters running around in our rear area or harassing our supporting artillery battalion. I would be very reluctant to defend a regimental sector by means of small battalion perimeters. I don’t like to ask my supporting artillery to fight as infantry any more than is absolutely necessary, and the battalion perimeter plan will result in that type of action. Of course there are disadvantages to thinning your line to the extent that you have to eliminate the battalion reserve position, but, oddly enough, it was our experience on many occasions that a platoon or company driven from a hill will readily regain its position if it counterattacks promptly. On numerous occasions, it seemed to me that the North Koreans and Chinese failed to follow up any initial advantage which they gained locally, and their slowness or lack of depth in their attack permitted us to regain the initiative from them.”
And this from a Battalion Commander: “The average frontage assigned to an Infantry battalion in Korea was between 4000 and 5000 yards. After November, we regarded that as normal. It took a long time to decide how to defend that frontage, whether to accept gaps for the sake of reserves, or try to play it tight. I still don’t have a good idea how I would do it today; there are great risks either way. When I talk to anyone about this problem, I get the stock answer, ‘Oh! That was Korea!’ But I can’t see that in the future the American Army will have such a preponderance of manpower that, should war come, we will fight on what the FMs call ‘normal frontages.’ The Army officer today does not have informed knowledge about how to defend on an extended front. In one year of school at Benning, 1946-47, the Advance Class had one eight-hour problem on extended frontage. At Leavenworth today, most of the problems are based on the ideal of FM normal frontage. Isn’t it reasonable to believe that for us the norm of the future is the extended front both in attack and on defense, and that this proposition should weight the teaching of tactics in our service schools?”

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[这个贴子最后由徐荣在 2006/02/23 01:37pm 第 1 次编辑]

噪音：信号与武器
本战区发布的战地记录中简要论述了中共军队动用号手制造恐怖气氛和使用多种管乐器发出战斗信号的情况。
音响的战术使用
如何削弱敌军这些手法产生的效果，使我军士兵较容易应对？这个问题给作者留下了深刻印象，对十一月会战的研究告一段落以后，解决它立即成为头等大事。不同级别的指挥和参谋部门还没有了解到解决该问题的迫切需要，在这方面还无所作为。他们的消极反应无非厚非。他们被紧张的战斗搞得精疲力竭，而且要全神贯注于恢复经历过苦战的部队的战斗力以及保存战斗力完好的部队。没有在第八集团军中服役的任何团队或个人被特别指派收集和整理来自我军步兵队伍、与敌军战术特点有关的战场情报，了解更多有关与敌军（噪音战术）程序的知识，有助于我军采取措施压制它的作用。
上述意见不包含一丝一毫的诡辩，相反，它是坦诚的批评。作者相信美军参谋系统中一项固有弱点是由于环境的影响。我们实际上忽略了完善我军战斗情报系统的一条主要途径。
《朝鲜战争步兵战术注解》这份文件简要涉及了敌军是如何使用制造噪音的器械对付美军的问题，并提供了敌军使用这些器械作为战场信号的某些细节。敌军主要出于以下三个目的制造噪音（1）制造普遍的恐怖（2）虚张声势（3）控制己方部队。这份报告中包括敌军信号的实例和含义。
然而，这份报告遗漏了任何这些奇袭手段对我军士兵影响的描述，而且它也未详细说明关于中共军队噪音战术的资料是如何收集的。
在十一月会战中，对中国人这种古老战术，普通美国连队非常的恐怖和惊慌。
关于这一点，毋庸置疑。我军士兵不习惯在战场上听到军号、牧羊人的号角、长笛、刚果鼓和卡嗒声。当敌军在夜间进攻中使用这些乐器时，主要由于这些声音附加的神秘性，严重挫伤了我军的士气。
在敌军进攻下生还的步兵连后来在集合的时候坦白地承认了这一情况。这些连队中的大部分都曾表现坚强甚至英勇。据信，连队一般水平上的管理并不逊色于我军年报上的纪录。但当他们讨论起敌军进攻的哪些特点导致了他们最严重的灾难时，他们最经常以下列语言概括对敌军制造噪音的诡计的反应：“那使我们毛骨悚然。”这是精神饱满地脱离战斗的人员的证词，他们是在本连其他人员在场的情况下作上述陈述的。因此，尽管第八集团军已经开始适应中共军队的古怪战法很久了，这些证词也应被不折不扣地认真对待。
这些士兵中的95%以上回忆不起中共军队怎样、何时（在战斗的哪个阶段，在什么战术形势下）使用任何制造噪音的器具的细节。大多数人只能回忆起他们听到了多种噪音，例如喇叭和口哨，而且这些噪音使他们精神极度紧张。只有不到1%的士兵能回忆起号声或牧羊人号角发出的“鸡鸣”的曲调。
各连集合起来就这一争论焦点进行回忆，这些明确的数据就来自于多次集合的记录汇编。这项工作不得不逐连重复完成。在集合中，一名士兵回忆起当战斗进行到特殊时刻响起了号声。其他众多士兵愿意证实他的回忆。那么，为使所有士兵专心回忆号声本身，应该询问这样一个问题：“你听到的确切是什么？”
许多次，（士兵们的）回答是否定的。但是调查仍在继续，直到偶尔发现少数士兵通过集中注意力能够使记忆重现，并且能用口哨吹或用嘴唱出（中共军队的）号声。这些士兵这么做了以后，在集合现场的所有其他士兵也会回忆起来，并赞同证人所说是准确的。然后，（研究人员）便作了记录。
几乎以同样的方法，研究人员也调查清楚了中国人使用噪音制造恐怖与使用乐器进行指挥两种情况之间的区别。
还剩最后一步——获取乐器本身，如此即可通过训练使第八集团军的部队了解中共军队的信号，适应它制造恐怖的战术，最终或许还能“以其人之道，还治其人之身”。
当时，这些制造噪音的乐器简直成了无价之宝。然而，作者完全肯定：把它们作为纪念品收集是很容易的，即使是从丢失的阵地撤退的我军士兵也成功地缴获了中共军队的乐器。所以，（研究人员）进行了调查。在每个连队，他们都向士兵们解释：这些战利品对陆军相当重要，只需暂时借用，每个缴获者都将得到收条。士兵们很不情愿地翻开他们的行军背包和铺盖卷，交出了所需数量的中共军号、牧羊人号角、铜哨子等等。
十一月会战结束之后两周，训练第八集团军的步兵抵抗中共军队噪音战术的工作充分开展起来了。在阵线后方的夜间演习中，扮演“进攻者”一方的部队使用了中共军队的噪音战术和信号器械。到了1951年1月中旬，敌军这种手法给我军士兵带来的刺激就已被消除了。
然而，考虑到中共军队在十一月会战中使用噪音战术所取得的显著效果，（研究人员）相信并建议我军自己的训练机构也采取此类改革，使部队适应噪音的这种奇特用途也应当成为准备战斗的标准操作程序。
NOISE:
SIGNAL AND WEAPON
TACTICAL USE OF SOUND
The field notes published in the Theater dwell briefly upon CCF’s use of noisemakers to create terror and the use of various wind instruments for giving combat signals.
The problem of reducing these techniques to a pattern which would become comprehensible to our troops impressed the writer as being of prime importance immediately after the study of the November battle was undertaken. Command and staff at the various levels were not as yet concerned about the acuteness of this need and had taken no action with respect to it. Their negative reaction was but natural. They were worn from the strain of battle and engrossed with the problem of rehabilitating the units which had been hardest used in the fighting and conserving those which were still combat-worthy. It was not specifically the assigned task of any group or individual serving with Eighth Army to collect and correlate battlefield information originating in our own infantry line, pertaining to the tactical characteristics of the enemy, toward the end that by more perfect knowledge of his procedures we would take steps toward their neutralization.
This statement is not made in any spirit of apology but to the contrary is frankly critical; the writer belives that the condition reflects an inherent weakness in the staff system of the US Army. We are in fact overlooking a main avenue toward the perfecting of our combat intelligence.
The document, “Notes on Infantry Tactics in Korea, deals briefly with the matter of how the enemy used noise-making instruments against American forces and supplies some detail on the use of these instruments in the sounding of signals on the battlefield. It is set forth that the enemy’s noise effects were directed toward (1) the creation of a general terror, (2) the simulating of a more extended deployment than in fact occurred, and (3) the control of his own forces. Examples of signals and their meaning were included in the report.
The report omitted, however, any description of the effect on our troops consequent to these surprise methods, and it did not specify how the data on CCF noisemaking tactics were collected.
In the November battle, the reaction of the average American company to the Chinese use of this centuries-old technique was one of exaggerated fear and alarm.
Of that, there can be no question. Our troops were not conditioned to the expectation of hearing such instruments as bugles, shepherds’ horns, flutes, Congo drums, and rattles on the field of battle. When they were employed initially in the night attack, the effect was greatly unnerving, mainly because of the attendant element of mystery.
Infantry companies which had survived the attack, when later assembled, admitted this frankly. What the enemy had done was not offered as an excuse for their own conduct. None such was needed. Most of these companies had faced the unknown strongly and even heroically; it is believed that the general level of company conduct will compare favorably with anything in our annals. But when they discussed the features of the enemy attack which caused them the greatest distress, the common reaction to the enemy’s noise-making tricks was most frequently summed up in these words: “That was what made our hair stand on end.” These were the expressions of men freshly delivered from battle; they were spoken in the presence of other men of the company. For that reason, they should not be discounted, though Eighth Army has long since become conditioned to CCF eccentricities.
At least 95 percent of these same men could remember none of the pertinent details of how and when (at what stage of combat and under what tactical conditions) CCF had used any of the noise-making instruments. The majority could report only that they had heard various noises such as bugles and whistles and that the sounds had impacted strongly on their emotions. Less than 1 percent could remember the sequence of notes in any of the bugle calls or the sound of the “rooster call” blown from the shepherd’s horn.
Such specific data as were developed from the numerous assemblies came finally from requesting the companies to concentrate on the point at issue. This had to be done repeatedly, from company to company. One man in the assembly might remember that a call was heard at a particular point in the fight. Numerous of the others would confirm his recollection. Then all hands would be asked to concentrate on the call itself, the question being asked : “Exactly what did you hear?”
Many times the result would be negative. But the search was continued until finally here and there were found the few individuals who through concentration could refresh their memories and either
whistle or sing the call. Once that was done, the others in the assembly would all remember it and agree that the witness was accurate. The score was then written down.
In much the same way, the distinction was finally made between the Chinese use of noise for the creation of terror and the conditions under which noise-making instruments were being used for control purposes.
There remained the final step - the procurement of the instruments themselves, so that in training exercises Eighth Army formations could be conditioned to the enemy signals and terror-creating techniques and in the end might be able to turn these same devices against CCF.
At the time the noise-making instruments seemed almost priceless. However, the writer was perfectly sure that with their usual penchant for souvenir-hunting, our troops, even in withdrawing from a lost field, had managed here and there to possess themselves of the CCF instruments. Search was therefore instituted. At every company formation it was explained that these prizes would be of great value to the Army, that they were needed only temporarily, and that the owner would be given a receipt. With a manifest reluctance, soldiers dipped down into their barracks bags and bedrolls and brought forth CCF bugles, shepherds’ horns, bronze whistles, etc., in the required number.
Within two weeks after the conclusion of the November battle, the business of indoctrinating Eighth Army infantry against CCF noise-making tactics was well begun. In the conducting of night exercises back of the line, CCF noise and signal instruments were used by the side playing “aggressor.” By mid-January, 1951, the sting had been removed from this part of the enemy technique.
However, in view of the marked effects achieved by CCF with noise-making tactics during the November battle, it is believed, and is recommended, that such innovations should be anticipated by our own training establishment, and that conditioning troops to the eccentric use of noise should be SOP in preparation for combat.

甜酥墙皮

人类自从有战争以来就以声响作为通信/协同/激励/威慑手段,
美军何以对军号那么陌生(以至于恐慌)?
美军平时起床、熄灯、紧急集合时用什么发信号?

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可能中美两军军号的曲调不一样，美国人听中国军号的声音特别凄厉，而且从文中看不仅是军号声，还有鼓声、卡嗒声